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Abstract
Why are theories of global governance unsatisfactory? Why are theories of
global governance unable to integrate the lived realities of the people of the
global South? International law and its institutions are growing at an
unprecedented speed and this expansion has captured the curiosity of
international lawyers and international law scholars. As international law and its
institutions continue to grow, there are concurrent concerns regarding their
democratic foundations. A large body of scholarship encapsulates these
anxieties through the prism of global governance. In particular, two specific
theories of global governance, global constitutionalism, and global administrative
law, seek to introduce ideas of constitutionalism and administration as theories of
governance. Global governance institutions seek to regulate the people of the
global South, but both global constitutionalism and global administrative law are
uninformed about the people living in these regions.

Two central arguments are pursued in this dissertation. First, as theories of
global governance, both global constitutionalism and global administrative law
ignore and obscure the colonial and imperial history of international law and its
institutions. By ignoring international law’s lineage, scholars are not able to
accurately theorise contemporary global governance through constitutionalism
and administration. Without the inclusion of the global South, global
constitutionalism and global administrative law, as theories, are caricatures of
western universalism embedded in international law. In this respect, these two
theories represent a false universalism, which must be challenged. The second
ii

argument is that there must be an engagement with the global South if global
governance is to be theorised accurately and holistically. As part of the second
argument, this dissertation turns to the question of how we might theorise global
governance from the perspective of the global South.

In pursuing these two arguments, this dissertation is grounded in Third World
Approaches to International Law. In order to present the foregoing arguments,
this analysis will rely on three case studies from international criminal law and its
respective institutions: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, and the International
Criminal Court.
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Introduction: Framing the Narrative

Introduction
Why are theories of global governance unsatisfactory? Why are theories of
global governance unable to integrate the lived realities of the people of the
global South? International law and its institutions are growing at an
unprecedented speed and this expansion has captured the curiosity of
international lawyers and international law scholars. As international law and its
institutions continue to grow, there are concurrent concerns regarding their
democratic foundations. A large body of scholarship encapsulates these
anxieties through the prism of global governance. In particular, two specific
theories of global governance, global constitutionalism, and global administrative
law, seek to introduce ideas of constitutionalism and administration as theories of
governance. Global governance institutions seek to regulate the people of the
global South, but both global constitutionalism and global administrative law are
uninformed about the people living in these regions.1

To some, global governance is governing with authority on the global scale.2 For
others, global governance is world politics.3 Scholars have thus sought to clarify

1

David Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds,
Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, international law, and Global Governance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 41 [D. Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance”].
2
Lawrence Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance?” (1995) 1:3 Global Governance 368 at
369; Finkelstein defined global governance as “governing, without sovereign authority,
relationships that transcend national frontiers. Global governance is doing internationally what
governments do at home”.

1

the meaning and scope of global governance as a concept4 and have attempted
to understand its contents.5 Even though the concept of global governance has
been under the academic microscope for the past 20 years, a uniform meaning
has yet to be agreed upon. Broadly, it is understood as a term used to identify
and describe the transformation process in global politics.6 Global governance
scholarship thus acknowledges “the emergence of autonomous spheres of
authority beyond the national/international dichotomy”.7

Scholars working in global constitutionalism and global administrative law
theorise global governance for two reasons. First, global constitutionalism and
global administrative law scholars theorise global governance because of the
effects of globalisation. Globalisation is a heuristic used to explain changes in
our contemporary global society. It describes a process of change that spans
centuries.8 It captures our social reality that is precipitated by the boomerangtype relocation of different actors, from local, to regional to international spaces
and back again. The relocation of actors imbricated in the process of
globalisation is intimately connected to the proliferation of international law and
3

James N. Rosenau suggests: “[g]lobal governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all
levels of human activity- from the family to the international organization- in which the pursuit of
goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”; James N. Rosenau,
“Governance in the Twenty-first Century” (1995) 1:1 Global Governance at 14.
4
Klaus Dingwerth & Phillip Pattberg, “Global Governance as a Perspective on Global Politics”
(2006) 12 Global Governance 185 at 186 [Dingwerth & Pattberg, “Global Politics”].
5
Klaus Dingwerth & Phillip Pattberg, “How Global and Why Governance? Ambivalences, Blind
Spots and Challenges for a Critical Global Governance Literature” (2010) 12 Intl Studies Rev
702.
6
Dingwerth & Pattberg, “Global Politics” supra note 4 at 196.
7
Dingwerth & Pattberg, “Global Politics” supra note 4 at 197.
8
William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000) at 6.
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its institutions. Second, global constitutionalism and global administrative law
scholars theorise global governance because of fragmentation of international
law. Fragmentation of international law is caused by an increase in various
international institutions making diverse and competing or overlapping
interpretations about various principles of international law. The results have
produced anxieties about the nature of the current global order.9

Globalisation and the fragmentation of international law have prompted
international lawyers and international law scholars to theorise global
governance through global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.10
These writers are using a constitutionalist lens to study, confront, and compete
with the fast-paced evolution of international law and its institutions.11 Scholars
working on global constitutionalism argue that it is possible to use a
constitutional vernacular to describe the emergence and operation of
international law and its different institutions.12 Similarly, global administrative law
scholars characterise global governance as administration.

13

For global

administrative law scholars, global governance as administration allows them to

9

Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties”
(2002) 15 Leiden J Intl L 553 [Koskenniemi & Lenio, “Fragmentation of International Law?”].
10
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International
Constitutionalization” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds, Ruling the World;
Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009) at 5-9.
11
Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon, “Introduction—Global Constitutionalism from an
Interdisciplinary Perspective” (2009) 16:2 Ind J Global Leg Stud 385 at 385.
12
Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues
on the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005).
13
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B Stewart, “The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law” (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Prob 1 at 22.
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“recast many standard concerns about the legitimacy of international institutions
in a more specific and focused way”.14

Two central arguments will be pursued in this dissertation. First, as theories of
global governance, both global constitutionalism and global administrative law
ignore and obscure the colonial and imperial history of international law and its
institutions. By ignoring international law’s lineage, scholars are not able to
accurately theorise contemporary global governance through constitutionalism
and administration. Without the inclusion of the global South, global
constitutionalism and global administrative law, as theories, are caricatures of
western universalism embedded in international law.15 In this respect, these two
theories represent a false universalism that must be challenged.

The second argument is that there must be an engagement with the global South
if global governance is to be theorised accurately and holistically. As part of the
second argument, this analysis will turn to the question of how we might theorise
global governance from the perspective of the global South. In order to present
the foregoing arguments, this analysis will rely on three case studies from
international criminal law and its respective institutions: the International Criminal

14

Ibid at 27.
Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the
Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 1-9 [Pahuja,
Decolonising International Law]; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 1-18 [Anghie, Imperialism].
15

4

Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Domestic criminal law represents the raw power of the state to exercise
surveillance, coercion and ultimately, punishment over its citizens. The
introduction of criminal law to the international realm 16 may arguably be the
quintessential example of the use of local governance tools on the global scale.
Furthermore, international criminal law and these three international criminal
institutions are viewed in global administrative law and global constitutionalism
literature, and the field of international criminal law itself as one of the greatest
achievements of international law.17 They are good examples of how the raw
powers of authoritarian and dictatorial post-colonial states are tamed.18

International criminal law is one of the fastest evolving branches of international
law. On the international political scene, some argue that international criminal
prosecutions are frequently viewed as the best means to resolve divergent
16

For an overview of international criminal law, see Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 319 [Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law].
17
D.M Johnston, “World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law” in Ronald St. John
Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal
Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
“International Criminal Justice in Historical Perspective: The Tension Between States’ Interests
and the Pursuit of International Justice” in Antonio Cassese, ed, Oxford Companion to
International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); M. Cherif Bassiouni,
“From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-five Years: the Need to Establish a Permanent
International Criminal Court” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 1.
18
Bardo Fassbender, “The Meaning of International Constitutional Law” in Nicholas Tsagourias
ed, Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007); Axel Marschik, “Legislative Powers of the Security Council”
in Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues
on the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) at 461-472.

5

violent conflicts and confront the perpetrators of international crimes.19 But this is
a superficial account, as it is only true for non-Western states. With the fall of the
Berlin Wall and end of the Cold War in 1989, there was a resurgence of the
number of international institutions focusing on prosecuting international crimes.
The emergence of these institutions confirms the anxieties about the
fragmentation of international law.20 Conversely, the desire to end impunity and
prosecute those responsible for mass human rights violations is an illustration of
the degree of interconnectedness and interdependence between and amongst
communities across borders. One of central the tasks of these international
regimes is to pierce the veil of immunity afforded to government officials under
traditional international law. Holding government officials individually accountable
for international crimes is a new phenomenon. International law doctrines such
as state sovereignty and equality of states have traditionally resulted in a strict
reading of the immunities bestowed upon incumbent heads of state and foreign
ministers, applying even to their participation in mass human rights violations in
times of conflict and peacetime. Another central task for international criminal law
is to act as a tool against non-state actors operating with impunity.

19

Sujith Xavier “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: An International Mechanism or
Multidimensional Domestic Strategy for Mass Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka?” in
Amarnath Amarasingam & Daniel Bass, eds, Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects
(Forthcoming New York: Hurst University Press, 2015).
20
Koskenniemi & Lenio, “Fragmentation of International Law?” supra note 9.

6

International criminal law is at the forefront of jurisprudential innovation, where
some of the more contentious issues such as sovereign immunity21 and other
various international criminal law doctrines are deployed.22 There are numerous
instances in which judges of these international criminal institutions have
invented legal doctrines, for example joint criminal enterprise.

23

These

innovations in international criminal law and procedure raise questions of
legitimacy and the role of judges in crafting legal rules as opposed to applying
existing international law.

The international criminal institutions created to prosecute state and non-state
actors are predominantly focused on conflicts in the global South (for example
the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia; the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Criminal Court prosecutions in
Africa, the Sierra Leone Special Court; the Special Tribunal for Lebanon). These
institutions suffer from various criticisms.

Amongst these criticisms is a persistent anxiety that there is a crisis of legitimacy
within the international criminal institutions about the law they create and apply.
This crisis stems from a democratic disconnect from those populations most
affected by the work of the international criminal institutions. This crisis is best

21

Asad G. Kiyani, “Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity” (2013) 12:3
Chinese J Intl L 467.
22
Beatrice I. Bonafé, “Finding a Proper Role for Command Responsibility” (2007) 5:3 J Int’l Crim
Just 599.
23
Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law supra note 16 at 356-363.
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articulated by scholars working on locating the global South in opposition to, and
in distinction from the global North. These scholars, working under the banner of
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), have sought to bring into
focus the role of international law and its institutions in the subjugation and
oppression of people of the global South through colonialism and imperialism.

I use the term global South to connote a particular, and contemporary, material
reality. Granted, the popularity of the term has recently grown, especially as
other descriptors of “developing”, “poor”, and “Third World” have fallen out of
favour as “derogatory and anachronistic”.24 I use it as both a placeholder of an
imagined space in the here and now, and as progeny of the term Third World.
Vijay Prashad has described the Third World in the following manner: “The Third
World is not a place; it was a project”.25 This project, the Third World, Prashad
suggests had three goals: peace, bread and justice.26 The emergence of the
Third World thus must be placed within the Post-War period and the rise of newly
independent states as a result of decolonisation, which encapsulate these three
goals of peace, bread and justice. The three goals speak to a desire for peace in
the aftermath of the WWII 27 , greater redistribution of wealth and poverty
alleviation28 and greater access to justice at the broader conceptual levels. The
end of the Cold War, neoliberalism and rise of Third World economies has
24

Pahuja, Decolonising International Law supra note 15 at 261.
Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York London:
The New Press, 2007) at xv; Vijay Prashad, The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global
South (New York London: Verso, 2012) at 1 [Prashad, Poorer Nations].
26
Prashad, Poorer Nations supra note 25 at 1-3.
27
Ibid at 2.
28
Ibid.
25
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significantly altered our landscape since 1989. All of these factors have resulted
in the emergence of the term global South. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff
offer the following remarks in describing the global South:

In the upshot, ‘the South’, technically speaking, has more complex
connotations than did the World formerly Known as ‘Third’. It
describes a polythetic category, its members sharing one or more—
but not all, or even most—of a diverse set of features. The closest
thing to a common denominator among them is that many were
once colonies or protectorates, albeit not necessarily during the
same epochs. ‘Postcolonial’, therefore, is something of a synonym,
but only an inexact one. What is more, like all indexical categories,
‘the Global South’ assumes meaning by virtue not of its content, but
of its context, of the way in which it points to something else in a
field of signs—in this instance, to its antinomy to ‘the Global North’,
an opposition that carries a great deal of imaginative baggage
congealed around the contrast between centrality and marginality,
free-market modernity and its absence.
[….]
Which is why ‘the Global South’ cannot be defined, a priori, in
substantive terms. The label bespeaks a relation, not a thing in or
for itself. It is a labile signifier whose content is determined by
everyday material and political processes. Analytically, though, to
return to the point made by Homi Bhabha, whatever it may connote
at any given moment, it always points to an ‘ex-centric’ location, an
outside to Euro-America. […] As such, what else it may be
presumed to be, whatever political or economic ends its invocation
may serve, “the south” is a window on the world at large, a world
whose geography, pace Kant and Von Homboldt, is being recast as
a spatio-temporal order made of a multitude of variously articulated
flows and dimensions, at once political, juridical, cultural, material,
virtual – a world that, ultimately, transcends the very dualism of
north and south.29

29

Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Theory From The South or, How Euro-America Is Evolving
Toward Africa (London: Paradigm Publisher, 2012) at 45 & 47.

9

In response to criticisms about their description of the global South30, Comaroff
and Comaroff added the following to their understanding of the global South:

It is not difficult to show that there is much south in the North, much
north in the South, and more of both to come in the future. All of
which is underscored by the deep structural articulation—indeed, by
the mutual entailment—of hemispheric economies, not to mention
by the labyrinthine capillaries of the world of finance, which defy any
attempt to unravel them along geopolitical axes. In the complex
hyphenation that links economy to governance and both to the
enterprises of everyday life, then, the contemporary global order
rests on a highly flexible, inordinately intricate web of synapses, a
web that both reinforces and eradicates, both sharpens and
ambiguates, the lines between hemispheres. As a result, what
precisely is north, and what south, becomes ever harder to pin
down.31
The global South is a condition brought about by various forces of history
including colonialism, imperialism and capitalism. It describes a relationship
between the colonised and coloniser, as shaped by the forces of globalisation.
Ultimately, it captures power relations at all levels between communities inside
and outside established borders. An important aspect of the term global South is
recognition that there are multitudes of claims in various spaces. In particular,
the possibility of a south in the North and a north in the South is important. This
speaks to the recognition of indigenous groups in the global North as

30

Srinivas Aravamudan “Surpassing the North: Can the Antipodean Avantgarde Trump
Postcolonial
Belatedness?”
online:
(2012)
5
The
Salon
<http://jwtc.org.za/salon_volume_5/srinivas_aravamudan.htm>.
31
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Theory from the South: A Rejoinder” online: (February
20012) Cultural Anthropology <http://www.culanth.org/fieldsights/273-theory-from-the-south-arejoinder>.
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engendering a Fourth World. 32 Global South thus encapsulates a number of
various claims predicated on historical progress, which includes indigenous
people, migrants, former slaves and their descendants in the global North.

There is another iteration of the global South that can be added to this
complicated description. Vijay Prashad suggests that the global South signifies a
form of resistance to the transformations described above as the coming
together of various forces. He argues that given the manner in which world
politics operates, especially as a result of neoliberalism, the global South has
come to be identified with protests “against the theft of the commons, against the
theft of human dignity and rights, against the undermining of democratic
institutions […]”.33

This complex but nuanced description of the global South is important for this
project and shapes its direction. As noted earlier, the following chapters first seek
to detail how two theories of global governance inaccurately theorise the current
state of global affairs. In particular, by focusing on global constitutionalism and
global administrative law through the lens of the three cases studies on
international criminal institutions, evidence can be gathered that indicates
international lawyers and international law scholars are unable to describe the
32

Amar Bhatia “The South of the North: Building on Critical Approaches to International Law with
Lessons from the Fourth World” (2012) 14:1 Or Rev Int’l L 131.
33
Prashad, Poorer Nations supra note 25 at 9. This point was made earlier by Boaventura de
Sousa Santos as insurgent cosmopolitanism; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal
Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (London: Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002)
at 179.

11

complicated and often difficult-to-imagine dynamics of international institutions.
The current scholarly literature that presents these theories of global governance
emphasises the legislative and judicial functions of international institutions.
However, by concentrating on these elements, these theories forgo the
opportunity to truly examine how international institutions function. The
functioning of these international institutions is part of the very nature of
international law and its history.

International law was forged as a means to regulate the interactions between the
Europeans and the inhabitants of the new world. When the Europeans arrived on
the shores of the new world, they discovered social systems with their own
norms and laws.34 Rather than trying to learn about the values and traditions of
the indigenous peoples of the new world, the Europeans set out to apply
European norms and laws to the indigenous populations and their land.35 The
application of European norms to the indigenous groups facilitated the
colonisation, occupation and genocide of the inhabitants of new world.36 This

34

Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World 1492-1640
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) at 16-40; Bruge G. Trigger & Wilcomb
Washburn, “Native Peoples in Euro-American Historiography” in Bruge G. Trigger & Wilcomb
Washburn, eds, The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 61-81.
35
Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947) at 8692.
36
Canada, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling
for the Future, Executive Summary (online:
http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/File/2015/Findings/Exec_Summary_2015_05_31_web_o.
pdf ) at 1-6.
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process continues to this day. This practise was aided by the use of international
law.37

International law and its institutions have a significant effect on the people of the
global South. Predictably, the two global governance theories of global
constitutionalism and global administrative law do not take into account these
key definitional elements of international law. In theorising global governance,
global constitutionalism and global administrative law seem oblivious to the
manner in which international law and international institutions were created and
how they continue to function. Subsequently, by ignoring these foundational
aspects of the international order, their contributions are incomplete.

Leveraging global governance from the perspective of the global South is one
method of transcending the limitations of these theories. This is the second
argument that this dissertation will unfold. By pursuing the possibility of
theorising global governance from the global South, the central concerns that will
be addressed are whether or not global governance should be theorised, and
how can we theorise global governance from the perspective of the global South.
By focusing on the “should” and the subsequent “how” questions, this analysis
will suggest two specific methods that can be used to build bridges between the
diverse body of literature on the global South and global governance theory. In
this respect, this dissertation will offer two novel insights that can used as a
37

Anghie, Imperialism supra note 15 at 1-18.
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means to construct these linkages from the current literature: ethnography38 and
ethics, intellectuals, and international law.

39

The first concentrates on

international lawyers, international law scholars and their understanding of
international law as a field of practice. There are forces that mould the manner in
which international law doctrines and institutions are utilised and deployed.
Ultimately, there is a need for greater understanding of this field of practice
through the everyday operation of international law. 40 The second insight
examines how international lawyers and international law scholars, as
intellectuals, can shape the dynamics of their field.

In pursing these two arguments, the focus is on scholars writing about global
constitutionalism and global administrative in the respective chapters. I do not
draw a distinction between lawyers and scholars writing on international law,
given the very nature of international practice and scholarship and will further
examine this particular point in the final chapter.
Methodology
This dissertation is grounded in Third World Approaches to International Law.
Specifically, I use a TWAIL method to ground the argument that global
38

Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, “Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of
International Law” (2012) 45:2 Journal of Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (VRÜ) 195 at 213; Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus
{Political Life Across Borders of Settler States} (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014).
39
Edward Said, Representations of the Intellectual: The 1993 Reith lectures (New York: Vintage
Books, 1996); Buphinder Chimni, “The Self, Modern Civilization, and International Law: Learning
from Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s Hind Swaraj or Indian Home Rule” (2012) 23:4 EJIL1159
at 1160.
40
Luis Eslava, “Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of International
Law” (2014) 2 London Rev Intl L (forthcoming).
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governance theories of global constitutionalism and global administrative law
ignore and obscure the history of international law. TWAIL’s central epistemic
claims can be characterised as follows: to unpack, deconstruct and then
reconstruct international law. 41 The constructive objectives of my research
project to theorise global governance borrow from neighbouring disciplines to
advance progressive and practical solutions to the challenges resulting from the
exclusionary

nature

of

contemporary

international

legal

doctrines

and

international institutions.

Numerous rationales exist in adopting a TWAIL perspective about international
law, international institutions and global governance. The first, and most relevant
is the effect that international law and its institutions had, and continue to have,
on the global South. The global South is where the decisions made by the World
Trade Organisation or the International Criminal Court take direct effect. As
David Kennedy has suggested, the global South is where the rubber of global
governance hits the road.42 With reference to the ICC, all of the cases in the
Court’s docket at the moment pertain to the African continent. The Court’s work
will undoubtedly have significant effect on the manner in which the individuals
and their respective countries conceptualise international criminal justice.

41

Makau Mutua “What is TWAIL?” (2000) 94 American Society of Intl L Proceedings 31; Antony
Anghie “What is TWAIL: Comment” (2000) 94 Am Soc Int’l Proc 39; Obiora C. Okafor, “Critical
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?” (2010) 10
Intl Community L Rev 37.
42
D. Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” supra note 1.
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Structure
The two arguments identified above will be discussed in the following manner
through the preceding five chapters. In the first chapter, a purposeful account of
international law and international institutions is outlined by examining how
international law and its institutions have evolved from the 17th to the 20th century
in order to understand how they function. I offer the mainstream account of this
evolution of international law and juxtapose narratives that seek to challenge
these accounts. In this respect, I will detail how international law and its
institutions were forged as response to the colonial encounter, how this
encounter continues to shape international law and its institutions. The argument
is centred on how international law and its institutions carry with them a particular
western universalism as they travel to their respective destinations. Once this
particular history of this field is presented, there will be an examination of how
this practice continues by examining the three contemporary international
criminal institutions identified earlier.

The second chapter explores globalisation and fragmentation of international
law. In this chapter, I describe and engage with both theoretical discussions that
seek to understand the rapid expansion of world order. Globalisation, a heuristic
device, helps explain the expansion of international law and its institutions as
part of greater connectedness and interconnectedness across borders and social
interactions. As our public and private institutions expand on the global scene,
we are witnessing a diversification of international norms by different
adjudicatory bodies. Fragmentation of international law, coined as a postmodern
16

anxiety,43 has inspired scholars to search for ways in which accountability and
legitimacy can be introduced to international law and international institutions.
These two chapters form the backdrop to the first central claim that the two
theories of global governance, global constitutionalism and global administrative
law, present a false universalism.

The literature on global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation is vast.
In the third chapter, the first section explores the four corners of global
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. From this analysis, the chapter
then tracks three specific camps in the current literature on global
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. By using the case studies of
the three international criminal institutions, the basic premises outlined by global
constitutionalism scholars in their respective camps will be challenged. The
challenge will be based how their versions of constitutionalism and
constitutionalisation deploy and entrench the universalisms embedded in
international law chronicled in the first chapter. In this chapter, I will briefly
explore various avenues by which global constitutionalism can transcend its
limitations.

The fourth chapter chronicles global administrative law. It examines two
particular sets of claims housed in global administrative law. The first set of
global administrative law scholars provide a detailed description of how
43

Koskenniemi & Lenio, “Fragmentation of International Law?” supra note 9.
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international institutions deploy administrative law in their everyday interactions.
The second set of claims acknowledges and concedes to the challenges
encountered by analogising in this manner, and proposes to read in
accountability in how these institutions functions. Analogous to the third chapter
on global constitutionalism, I will use the empirical evidence from the
international criminal institutions to challenge the universalism embedded in
global administrative law. The central argument in this chapter is that global
administrative law ignores, obscures, and effaces the underlying context of
international institutions. It presents a unique western understanding of
administrative law as universal.

The final chapter seeks to build bridges between theories of global governance
and the global South. In this chapter, the discussion turns to the recent scholarly
interventions that engage with the lived realities of the people of the global
South. This chapter asks: how can international lawyers and international law
scholars learn from the global South? This prompts moreover another related
question,

what

should

we

learn

from

the

global

South?
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Chapter 1:

Tracing the Evolution of International Institutions (and

International Law) through the Dynamics of Difference
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I trace the evolution of international criminal institutions to provide
the empirical backdrop to this dissertation. Contemporary global governance
theories, such as global constitutionalism and global administrative law, omit and
obscure the true nature of international law and its institutions. This is part of a
larger trend in international law to present a particular and singular western
perspective as universally applicable across the globe. This is not a new
argument in international law1, rather it is part of a rich history of arguments that
unite under Third World Approaches to International Law. TWAIL is both theory
and method2 that traces the “glib universality narratives based on an ahistorical
reading of international law and international relations”.3

In order to understand the glib universal narratives embedded in international
criminal institutions and its significance to theories of global governance, it is
important to study the history of international institutions. The history of

1

Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) [Anghie, Imperialism]; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising
International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011).
2
Obiora C. Okafor, “Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory,
Methodology, or Both?” (2010) 10 Intl Community L Rev 37 [Okafor, Theory or Method].
3
Obiora C. Okafor, “Re-Defining Legitimacy: International Law, Multilateral Institutions and the
Problem of Socio-Cultural Fragmentation Within Established African States” (PhD Thesis, UBC,
Faculty of Law, 1998) online: < http://law.library.ubc.ca/abstracts/#1998>.
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international law has been recounted from various perspectives. Most often, as
Martti Koskenniemi suggests, the history of international law is presented as a
caricature. 4 It is characterised as a narrative of conquest, colonisation and
extreme violence through a placid perspective rooted in western notions of
progress and development.

Generally, the history of international law has been presented as the search for
universal law based on western legal traditions that would apply to everyone.5
International law’s history has been conceptualised as epochs.6 It has been told
through the rise and fall of international law and its profession.7 TWAIL scholars
have challenged some of these historical accounts of international law.
TWAIL scholars have argued that the traditional accounts that characterise the
origins of international law as a search for universal law ignore the dark and
barbaric realities of colonialism and imperialism facilitated by international law,
and the continuing effects of these phenomena.8

To better understand the evolution of international criminal institutions, we must
first study the evolution of international law and its institutions. This is not an

4

Martti Koskenniemi, “A History of International Law Histories” in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds,
The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)
at 945.
5
Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947)
[Nussbaum, Law of Nations].
6
Wilhelm Grewe, Epochs of International Law (Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2000) [Translated
and revised by Michael Byers].
7
Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law,
1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at p. 4.
8
Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 1.
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easy task. I acknowledge that this may be a difficult task given the challenges
legal scholars have in writing history.9 I also acknowledge the dangers of this
type of scholarship of cherry-picking historical events to demonstrate a particular
outcome. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has articulated the problems with this type
of approach as the dangers of a single story. 10 Presenting certain historical
events without the context is problematic and leads to narrow and particular
interpretation. There are number of experts engaged in this debate that have
explored these challenges.11 Even though I acknowledge all of these dangers,
for my purpose, it is crucial to trace the manner in which in international
institutions and in particular international criminal institutions have evolved to
demonstrate that there are relics of colonialism and imperialism embedded in
contemporary international law and its institutions. Moreover, in presenting the
materials ahead, I juxtapose the traditional understanding of international law
and its institutions and then present an alternative TWAIL based reading. I do so

9

Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” (1969) 8 History and
Theory 3; Quentin Skinner, “Interpretation and the Understanding of Speech Acts” in Quentin
Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume I, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002) at 103; George Cavaller, “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices
of European Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans?” (2008) 10 J Hist Int’l Law
181; Ian Hunter, “Global Justice and Regional Metaphysics: On the Critical History of the Law of
Nature and Nations” in Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds, Law and Politics in British Colonial
Thought: Transpositions of Empire (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) at 11; Annabel Brett,
Changes of State: Nature and the Limits of the City in Early Modern Natural Law (New Jersey:
Princeton UP, 2011) at 14–15.
10
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, “Dangers of a Single Story” (TED TALKS, February 2009) online:
< http://www.ted.com/talks/chimamanda_adichie_the_danger_of_a_single_story?language=en>
11
Anne Orford, “On international legal method”, (2013) 1:1 London Rev Intl L 166; Charlotte
Peevers, “Conducting international authority: Hammarskjöld, the Great Powers and the Suez
Crisis”, (2013) 1:1 London Rev Intl L 131; Jacqueline Mowbray, “International authority, the
responsibility to protect and the culture of the international executive”, (2013) 1:1 London Rev Intl
L 148.
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as way to illustrate how contemporary global governance theories do not engage
with the actual realities of international law and its institutions.

What follows is a deliberately cursory account of international law and its
institutions. Relying on international lawyers and their assertions to narrate this
historical account, I will first set out the evolution of international law and its
institutions from the 17th to the 20th century. I will present the standard historical
claims. Then I will posit insights that are critical of these accounts to demonstrate
how international law and its institutions developed as part and parcel of
colonialism and imperialism. International law and its institutions thus embody a
particular western perspective that can be characterised as universalist.
Sundhya Phahuja and Antony Anghie are two writers that have pioneered this
approach. 12 Their respective contributions have explored the universalism of
international law and its institutions in various historical moments. There are
other TWAIL scholars that have embarked on similar journeys.13

In this chapter, I rely on the work of Antony Anghie to trace the universalism
embedded in international law.14 Once I have presented this particular history of

12

Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 1; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law:
Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011).
13
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, “Counterhegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and
Development as a Third World Strategy”, (2006) 27:5 Third World Q 767; Michael Fakhri, Sugar
and the Making of International Trade Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
14
There are two specific reasons for this: First, Anghie’s scholarship traces the evolution of
international law back to the first contact between European colonisers and the indigenous
communities. This is useful for my project as this analysis provides a window by which to
examine the development of international law and its institutions that have now become an
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international law and its institutions, I will illustrate the continuation of this
practice of presenting a singular western perspective as universal in one of the
fastest growing contemporary fields of international law: international criminal
justice. In the first section I develop international law’s universalism by tracing
international law’s origins back to the Treaty of Westphalia and then chronicling
the development of international institutions. I focus on telling the story of
international law through the lens of its institutions. Additionally I pay close
attention the manner in which international criminal institutions emerged as part
of the evolution of international institutions. Then I develop this second line of
inquiry through case studies of three international criminal institutions: the
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).
1.2 Glimpses of World History: Evolution of International Law and
International Institutions from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648)
It is suggested that the emergence of the modern nation state in the early 15th
century prompted the proliferation of multifaceted governance regimes.15 The
development of our modern sovereign 16 engendered a seismic shift in how
societies were regulated at that time, and more relevantly, how the international
important part of global governance discussions. Second, by exposing the relationship between
international law and colonialism, Anghie develops the dynamic of difference. I adopt this concept
as a means to illustrate how international criminal law has developed and importantly, the
significance of the dynamic of difference as it relates to the efforts to theorise global governance
through global constitutionalism and global administrative law; Anghie, Imperialism, supra note 1.
15
Helmut Willke, Smart Governance: Governing the Global Knowledge Society (Frankfurt New
York: Campus, 2007) at 11; Willke defines governance as “the activity of coordinating
communications in order to achieve collective goals through collaboration”; Nussbaum, Law of
Nations supra note 5. .
16
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil, ed by J.C.A Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
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community is regulated now.

In this section, the historical development of

international law and its institutions will be presented in a chronological manner
starting with the Treaty of Westphalia and concluding with the Post-War era and
fall of the Berlin Wall.

The nation state’s precise date of birth is contested; some trace it back to the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648,17 while others date it as early as the late 1400s.18
The discussion about the precise date of the birth of the modern nation state
alludes to a broader theoretical disagreement between scholars as to the very
origins of international law. By dating the emergence of the modern nation state
to 1648 and placing the event in Europe, there is an obvious erasure of other
potentials and possibilities. This erasure is indicative of a broader theme in the
history of international law that omits or forgets that there were, and continue to
be, thriving indigenous communities in the new world with advanced cultures.

Moving beyond the question of when and how the nation state, and by extension
the international order, were created, the arrival of the nation state necessitated
innovative means of creating agreement between different sovereigns. In Europe
particularly, the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 resulted in a landmark
change in international relations with the Peace Treaty of Westphalia between

17

Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1.
Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 52; Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law and
Raison D’Etat: Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law” in Benedict Kingsbury and
Benjamin Straumann, eds, The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and
the Justice of Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 297.
18

24

the Holy Roman Emperor, the King of France, and their respective allies.19 The
Treaty was Europe’s central organising framework in the 17th and 18th centuries
and ushered in the sovereigns’ right to rule over their subjects without any
external interference. The Peace Treaty of Westphalia guaranteed sovereign
states exclusive control over their territories.20 It stipulated that all sovereigns
were to be treated as equal, and institutionalised the self-interested nature of the
nation state.21

The consequential economic stability and growth stemming from the interactions
between sovereign states allowed international law to flourish. 22 The trade
among the European sovereigns and, more importantly trade relations with their
newly-colonised subjects in the new world, were essential to ensuring growth
and stability.23 Consequentially, there was potential for international regulatory
control to limit the new sovereigns desire to enter into conflict with each other,
particularly over human and natural resources. 24 The desire for peace and

19

Heinz Dunchhardt, “From the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna” in Bardo
Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford; Oxford
University Press, 2014) 628 at 629; Stephan Verosta, “History of International Law, 1648 to
1815”, in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2008 online edition) at 3-5.
20
This principle was later codified in the Montevideo Convention the Rights and Duties of States
1933, 165 L.N.T.S 19; U.S.T.S 881.
21
United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 39 A.J.I.L. 190 Supp, (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945)
[UN Charter].
22
Frank Walters, History of the League of Nations (Oxford: OUP 1952) [Walters, League] at 7;
Walters suggests that “[E]xtraordinary increases in population, the revolutionary effects of the
steamship, the railway and the telegraph, the enormous extension of external trade and internal
wealth- these and other changes multiplied many times over the fields of contact between
nations and between governments”.
23
Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 86-92.
24
Richard Falk, “Introduction” in Charles S. Edwards, ed, Hugo Grotius The Miracle of Holland; A
study in Political and Legal Thought (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981) at 2.
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conflict resolution was a central theme that animated the evolution of
international law.25 This desire would trigger the institutionalisation of dispute
resolution mechanisms as early as 1815 in Europe. The development of these
mechanisms would eventually pave the way for early international institutions of
the 19th and 20th centuries that are now an important part of our global
governance discussions.26

Conversely, there was also a need to legitimise European occupation and
conquest in the new world. In an attempt to contain the raw power of the new
and all-powerful sovereign, early writers of international law formulated some of
the key elements of modern international law.27

Some of these early scholars of international law, such as Francisco de Vitoria
(1480-1546) created governance mechanisms in the form of specific
international law doctrines. Sovereignty was one of these newly formulated
doctrines. The doctrine of sovereignty regulates relationships between the local
inhabitants and the colonisers of the new territories. Arthur Nussbaum chronicles
the emergence of the sovereignty doctrine in the 16th century. Nussbaum
ascribes the development of sovereignty to the scholarship of Vitoria and his

25

Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 86-92.
Walters, League supra note 22 at 9: “In particular, the idea of arbitration acquired immense
importance. Between 1815 and 1900, disputes and differences between States were submitted
to arbitration on some two hundred occasions”.
27
Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 86 &107; Anne Orford, “The Past as Law or
History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern International Law" in Emmanuelle Jouannet,
Helene Ruiz Fabri and Mark Toufayan, eds, Tiers Monde: Bilan et perspectives (Paris: Société
de Législation Comparée, 2013); Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 13-31.
26
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assessment of whether the “war of the Spaniards against the Indian aborigines
was or was not just”.28

Vitoria formulated some of the following questions: “Who is the sovereign? What
are the powers of a sovereign? Are the Indians Sovereigns? What are the rights
and duties of the Indians and the Spaniards? How are the respective rights and
duties of the Spanish and [Indians] to be decided?”29 Antony Anghie argues that
Vitoria developed the sovereignty doctrine by answering these questions while
focusing on the social and cultural practices of both the indigenous communities
and the Spaniards. In doing so, Vitoria succumbs to what Antony Anghie has
coined as the dynamic of difference. This is a process that creates a gap
between two different cultures, characterising one as universal, the other as
uncivilised and as a consequence developing techniques to bridge this gap.30

The indigenous communities and the Spaniards had different cultures with two
divergent conceptions of governance and ownership.31 In developing the early
conceptions of sovereignty, Vitoria challenged the existing practice of applying
divine law to the indigenous communities (or heathens).32 Subsequently, Vitoria
removed the role of the Pope and divine law and replaced it with natural law. The
argument is that if divine law does not apply to the indigenous communities and

28

Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 59.
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 15.
30
Ibid at 4.
31
Ibid at 16.
32
Ibid at 17; Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 61.
29

27

they had recourse to natural law given their political institutions, then they were
logically part of a different political and legal order. The central problem therefore
was how to bridge the two divergent indigenous and Spanish cultures.

In bridging the cultural gap, or what Anghie terms as the “juridical problem of
jurisdiction”, Vitoria uses two techniques: first he focuses on the personality of
the indigenous communities and second, he looks at the application of the
universal natural law system.

33

In Vitoria’s assessment, the indigenous

communities of the Americas were not barbarians or sinners (as decided by
divine law). Rather, they possessed reason because of their political and social
order. The indigenous communities were able to establish “their own versions of
the institutions” found in Vitoria’s world because they possessed reason.34 By
making natural law applicable to the indigenous communities, Vitoria extends
natural law to the Spanish-Indigenous relationship. 35 Under natural law, the
Spaniards had the right to travel, “to sojourn” in indigenous territory36 provided
that they “did not harm the Indians”.37

Natural law is used as a means to legitimise a system of interaction between the
indigenous people and European colonisers as equals. This interaction is
characterised as occurring between two parties with equal and analogous

33

Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 19.
Ibid at 20-21.
35
Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 62.
36
Ibid at 62.
37
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 20.
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28

understanding of the systems of governance premised on natural law. Yet this
natural law is not predicated on an indigenous understanding of norms of land
ownership (i.e. sharing of the land). 38 Rather it is predicated on a Spanish
understanding of ownership and governance and this understanding is taken to
be the universal understanding of ownership and governance. It is then used as
the basis to determine the legality or justness of indigenous behaviour. Anghie
captures the results of resolving the juridical problem of jurisdiction as follows:

Seen in this way, Vitoria’s scheme finally endorses and legitimises
endless Spanish incursions into Indian society. Vitoria’s apparently
innocuous enunciation of a right to travel and sojourn extends finally
to the creation of a comprehensive, indeed inescapable system of
norms which are inevitably violated by the Indians. For example,
Vitoria asserts that to keep certain people out of the city or province
as enemies, or to expel them when already there, are acts of war.
Thus any Indian attempt to resist Spanish penetration would amount
to an act of war, which would justify Spanish retaliation. Each
encounter between the Spanish and the Indians therefore entitles
the Spanish to defend themselves against Indian aggression and in
so doing, continuously expand Spanish territory […].39
This illustration of the sovereignty doctrine40 demonstrates that the development
of international law was shaped by and intrinsically linked to colonialism and
imperialism. Features such as the dynamic of difference, that is to characterise
one culture as primitive and the other as universal, are deeply embedded within
the structure of contemporary international law. These features can be traced
38

Aimée Craft, “Living Treaties, Breathing Research” (2014) 26 Can J Women & L 1 at 4-7; Craft
presents a good illustration, albeit in the late 1800’s, of treaty negotiations between European
colonisers and the indigenous people of what is now Manitoba, Canada.
39
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 21-22.
40
For Anghie, sovereignty doctrine is as follows: “[…] the complex of rules deciding what entities
are sovereign and the powers and limits of sovereignty […]”; Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at
16.
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back to the origins of international law and continue have an effect on the
manner in which international law has evolved and continues to function today.

By the 19th century there was an increase in positive law through bilateral and
multilateral treaties and state practice. The evolution of international law, from
the Peace Treaty of Westphalia to the 17th and 18th centuries, accelerated rapidly
during the 19th century.41 The French and the American Revolutions and the
Napoleonic wars had lasting effects well into the 19th century. The Congress of
Vienna, held under the supervision of Great Britain, Prussia and Russia, sought
to restore the balance of power that existed during the 17th and 18th centuries.42
The Vienna Congress ushered in a new 19th century political order.43 At this time,
there was a general trend towards conquest, exploitation and control of the rest
of the globe, exasperating the relationship between the Europeans sovereigns.
As suggested by Anghie, “the universalization of international law was principally
a consequence of the imperial expansion which took place towards the end of
the [19th] century”.44

41
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Most scholars see 1815 as the commencement of the 19 century; Martti Koskenniemi, “A
History of International Law Histories” in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of
the History of International Law (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014) at 952-958
[Koskenniemi, International Law Histories]; Hans-Ulrich Scupin, “History of International Law,
1815-World War I” in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law,
11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition) at para. 2.
42
For a discussion of the concert of Europe, see Walters, League supra note 22 at 7-9.
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Nussbaum, Law of Nations supra note 5 at 178; Hans-Ulrich Scupin, “History of International
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International law’s progress is described in the following manner: the 19th century
shift towards state practice and positive law can be seen through the creation of
legal institutions, the prolific use of treaties as a means to regulate intercourse
between states, and the embryonic “move to institutions”.45 These developments
to codify international law - or in Lassa Oppenheim’s words, “plough the fields of
international law” - are arguably the first phase of the hyper-specialisation that
has resulted in the contemporary proliferation of international regulatory regimes
and global governance. The solidification of international law eventually leads to
a ramping up in creating global governance regimes by the latter part of the 19th
century.

As sovereign entities continued to interact through treaties and various
agreements, there was a need to create dispute resolution mechanisms to
resolve conflicts arising from these newly formed relationships. The first instance
of institutionalisation occurred in the early 19th century, with the creation of the
waterways commissions.46 A multi-state organisation was established as result
of the internationalisation of the Rhine and Danube waterways. 47 These
commissions (or international institutions), especially the Danube Commission,
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were powerful. They were granted “rule-making, executive and judicial powers”.48
Similarly, in the 19th century, numerous international organisations, originally
called Administrative Unions, were created.49 For example, there was the Central
Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (1875), the International Telegraph
Union (1875), the Universal Postal Union (1878) and the Berne Bureau for the
Protection of Industrial Property (1883). These unions were given dispute
settlement powers but they did not have the capacity to create laws. However
their decisions had binding effects on the respective parties and potential new
members. In effect, these international bodies, with their new international
personality, were creating universally applicable international law through their
policies and judicial decisions.50

In describing the history of international law, scholars often succumb to a linear
idea of progress (as can be seen in the previous two paragraphs) that suggests
that there was a search for some form of universal law that would become
globally applicable. Marti Koskenniemi describes this project as: “law that would
recognize all humans as bearers of rights, citizens of their nations, organised as
secular states […]. This was a project for progress, for a global modernity –the
dream of the entire world one day resembling Europe’s idealised image of
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itself”.51 The search for universal law, characterised as the progress narrative of
international law, is Eurocentric and is part of the universalism that is layered into
the way international law operates. This layering process has consequences.
This process has affected the very nature of law creation at the international
level and importantly it has structured international law for the benefit of some.
Subsequently there is an emphasis on the development of the doctrines and
principles by European powers for their benefit as demonstrated by the dynamic
of difference in Francisco de Vitoria scholarship and the creation of the
sovereignty doctrine.

The idea of progress in international law obscures its violent use. Particularly the
sovereignty doctrine was used as a tool to regulate the interactions of Europeans
and non-Europeans.52 A handful of international lawyers have pointed to the
monolithic universalising nature of international law.53 Anghie and other scholars
have thus historicised the evolution of sovereignty doctrine as part of the colonial
encounter starting with the Spanish theologians dating back to the 15th century,
as a means to subjugate the original inhabitants of the new world.54
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The 19th century ended, by most accounts, immediately before the outbreak of
the WWI in 1914. 55 During the 19th century, international law was loosely
consolidated. Yet the existing international regulatory regimes could not prevent
the escalation of the hostilities and the eventual collapse of the balance of power
established by the great powers between 1815 and 1915.56 The outbreak of WWI
highlighted the urgency for the much-needed reforms of the international system.
Reforming the international system was a possible technique to prevent future
wars. 57 In the previous centuries, international law had concentrated on
examining the interaction between nation states and how to control this
relationship. Relying on the ideas encapsulated within the Treaty of Westphalia,
and the subsequent drive to control and contain the sovereign nation states,
international lawyers and international law scholars, activists and politicians had
focused on the nature of the relationship between states.

As David Kennedy notes, most scholars engaged in historical examination have
romanticised the 19th century as paving the way forward for the creation of the
League of Nations.58 The 19th century is characterised as classical, leading to the
codification of international law. However, the turn to formalism away from
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politics is highly contested.59 Ultimately, the development of international law in
19th and 20th century was challenged.

For example, John Austin questioned the merits of international law. Austin
asserted that “law properly so-called” could only emanate from a proper
sovereign. International law regulated the behaviour of nation states, there was
necessarily no international sovereign at the helm. International law could not
amount to “properly so-called” law similar to the laws found within the nation
state.60 For Austin, international law was non-law and consisted “of opinions and
sentiments current among nations generally”.61 Understandably, Austin’s views
have haunted international lawyers throughout the 19th century and beyond. The
development of the consent-based treaty system and state practices can be
credited with countering Austin’s claims. Austin’s arguments about international
law have found a contemporary home in the writings of the American
international lawyers, like Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith.62

Kant’s idea of perpetual peace and the failure of 19th century international law
inspired the creation of the first real international institution in the 20th century:
the League of Nations. The League was created with the hope that it would
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potentially prevent future wars and institutionalise peace on a global scale.63
International lawyers, peace activists, and other various stakeholders, allegedly
received their cue from Jan Smuts of South Africa, the founder of South African
apartheid and United States President Woodrow Wilson. These two men are
often depicted as supporting the internationalist ideals of formalism and
legalisation that brought about the League of Nations. In fact, Smuts can be
credited with attempts to institutionalise colonial mentalities through the Mandate
System.64 As the father of South Africa’s apartheid, Smuts’ involvement allude to
broader problems in the creation of the League of Nations.65

The end of the WWI signalled a remarkable shift in the desire for peace as
articulated by the leaders of the United Kingdom and the United States.66 Both
Prime Minister Lloyd George and President Wilson (through his Fourteen Points)
made references to the institutionalisation of peace through an international
organisation.67 The victors of the war agreed on the Armistice agreement but the
resulting peace treaty would be controversial. The Allied and Associated Powers
forced severe and draconian conditions upon the losers of the war that would
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precipitate the next world war, less than a generation later. 68 Vladimir Lenin
described the peace agreements as: “A peace of usurers and executioners has
been imposed on Germany. This country has been plundered and dismembered.
[…] All its means of survival were taken away. This is an incredible bandits'
peace”.69

One week after the commencement of WWI Peace Conference in January 1919,
the Allied and Associated Powers created a commission to inquire into the
causes and responsibilities for the recently concluded war.70 The Commission,
the first international investigative body of its kind, was tasked with determining
responsibility for the start of the war and individual criminal responsibility for the
violations of the laws of war.71 The Commission in its final report suggested that
the Central Powers (essentially the German, Hapsburg and Ottoman empires)
were responsible for starting the war and much more importantly, had committed
violations of the laws of war. As such, the Commission recommended the “High
Officials, including Kaiser Wilhelm II, to be tried for ordering such crimes and on
the basis of command responsibility”.72 As result of the Commission’s report, the
Treaty of Versailles included a provision (article 227) envisioning the prosecution
Kaiser Wilhelm II and other high officials. This requirement of the treaty was not
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implemented.73 The first signs of international criminal law can be seen through
the Commission’s attempts to institutionalise accountability for the violation of the
laws of war. 74 The French and the British were strong supporters of this
initiative. 75 Their attempts to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II were defeated by
arguments that favoured sovereignty, championed by the Americans and the
Japanese.76

Moving beyond the responsibility for war crimes, the WWI Peace Conference
and the resulting Treaty of Versailles ensured peace through the Covenant of the
League of Nations and the concept of collective security.77 The draft covenant of
the League of Nations was negotiated in the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and
the Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations.78 There were 22
original and associated members and 13 neutral member states of the League.79
Germany joined in 1926 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1934. The
central aim of the League of Nations was to “promote international co-operation
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and to achieve international peace and security”.80 The lifespan of the League
was short lived and by the late 1930’s, the League was in decline.

Even though the purpose of preventing future war was commendable, the
League was nonetheless vulnerable to the same universalism-based critiques
that we encountered with respect to international law in the earlier centuries.
Marc Mazower has characterized the League of Nations as a“[V]ictorian
institution, based on the notional superiority of the great powers, an instrument
for a global civilising mission through the use of international law”.81 At the same
time it was a way of understanding “British imperial world leadership and
cementing its partnership with the United States”.82 Moreover these pragmatic
aspects of this story are often ignored, especially at the beginning stages of the
League of Nations. These pragmatic aspects, for example the political
compromises, are relegated out of the story of the League. The politics are
ignored as a means to present the break forward, as part of international law’s
progressive response to the atrocities of war and cruelty.83 In fact, politicians who
held the balance of power at the Paris Conference endorsed a system that would
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be deferential to politics through law, an outcome that would continue through to
the United Nations.84

The creation of the United Nations through the Charter of the United Nations
ushered in a new era of specialisation in international law. The multiplication of
international norms initiated in the 19th century, if not before gained further
momentum with the creation of the League of Nations’ successor, the United
Nations. The first steps in creating the United Nations were initiated during the
summer of 1944 at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference by representatives from
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, United States, and
subsequently the Republic of China. 85 They were able to reach decisive
conclusions on the “purpose and principles of the organization, its membership
and its principal organs”.86

The development of the United Nations and its various branches continued the
work of the League of Nations, especially as it related to the process of
decolonisation of former colonies. 87 The doctrine of self-determination, an
essential part of the decolonisation process was formulated as a response
allowing former colonies to become independent, demonstrating fully the

84

Mazower, No Enchanted Palace supra note 64 at 21.
Ruth Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 19401945 (Menasha, Wisconsin: Brookings Institute, 1958) at 421.
86
Jochen Frowein, "De Facto Regime" in R. Wolfrum ed., The Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law, 12 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, online edition) para. 1-3.
87
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 196-197.
85

40

universal applicability of international law.88 Once their independence was gained
for example, former colonies from the continents of Asia and Africa would be
able participate as full sovereign entities within the United Nations and other
international organisations. The primary purpose of the United Nations is: to
maintain peace and security, peacefully resolve disputes, foster equality of
member states and self-determination, foster social and economic cooperation,
and finally promote and protect of human rights.89 The ancillary purposes of the
United Nations include disarmament and development and codification of
international

90

law.

In the next few pages, I will focus on one of the central purposes of the United
Nations: human rights. I focus on human rights, as it is one of the central
precursors

to

the

contemporary

international

criminal

justice

regimes.

Simultaneously, I recognise that there are other contributions to the development
of the international criminal justice regime that is just as important as the United
Nations and human rights. For example, Anne Orford’s interventions about the
origins of the responsibility to protect doctrine examines the role of the UN
Secretary General in maintaining peace and order through an international
executive rule in newly decolonised countries.91 The international executive rule
and role of the UN Secretary General that commenced in the early 1960’s would
88
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prove invaluable in creating the two ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia.92 It is important to keep all of these various factors at the forefront,
especially in setting out the development of the international criminal justice
regime.

The creation of the United Nations is heralded as the era of human rights.93 The
development of the different human rights protection regimes within the United
Nations, the codification of the prohibition of genocide and other similar
mechanisms as a result of WWII are used as indicia to support this claim. Yet, as
Mazower argues, the result of such a claim is “if anything, to deepen the crisis
facing the world organization and to obscure rather than illuminate its real
achievements”.94

Claims that the contemporary system of international human rights is connected
to the creation of the United Nations are contested.95 Samuel Moyn challenges
the assertions that the human rights discourse emerged out of the Holocaust and
subsequently through the creation of the United Nations.96 Moyn on the other
hand asserts that the history of human rights is rather recent and is imbricated
with the development of international human rights organisations such as
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Amnesty International. Such a broad claim is not without its problems either.97
Philip Alston argues that the “heated controversy that has been generated in the
recent literature over whether and how the origins of human rights may be
discerned is due primarily to a failure to acknowledge the polycentric nature of
the human rights enterprise”. 98 He questions these “attempts to capture the
alleged essence of that enterprise by viewing it through a single lens” and
suggests that Moyn and others 99 arguments “are intrinsically flawed and
potentially deeply misleading”.100

That said, the United Nations legal framework did in fact foster the creation of the
contemporary human rights regimes starting with the Universal Declaration of the
Human Rights and its accompanying two covenants, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (collectively known as the International Bill of Rights).101 The
International Bill of Rights has spawned a vast amount of jurisprudence through
the various monitoring bodies of the two covenants as well as domestic
jurisprudence as a result of its acceptance by the members of the United
Nations. The international human rights regime is just one illustration of the
growth of international law. Under the auspice of the United Nations, multiple and
97
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fragmented subspecies of international law evolved. In particular, there was a
strong push to create a specific field of international criminal law rooted in the
successes of Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the failures of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East.102

The expansion of the United Nations was not the sole focus of the Post-War
period proliferation of international law. For example, the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund and other international institutions emerged at the
same time. There were universalising innovations in several other registers with
the expansion of the international legal order through the processes of
globalisation. The older image of the international order as a pyramidal structure
with the nation state at the apex was no longer viable. 103 This image was
replaced by a dense web of “overlapping and detailed prescriptions in subject
areas as diverse as […] human rights and international trade” through the
expansion of international law and its different institutions in the late 20th
century.104
Self-contained regimes or highly specialised areas of law, such as diplomatic
law, the law of the European Union and human rights instruments were unique
subsystems that embraced in principle, full of exhaustive and definite rules of
interpretation “concerning the consequences of breaches of their respective
102
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primary norms”. 105 The expansion of the international institutions through
globalisation led to a unique set of anxieties about the very nature of
international law. These anxieties would later shape the discourse. 106 I will
explore the two concepts of fragmentation of international law and globalisation
in the following chapter.

The Cold War stalemate between the Western powers and their communist
counterparts significantly diminished the United Nations’ potential for success.
While some of the self-contained bodies of international law grew as a result of
expanding trade and the movement of people and goods, the body of law
encapsulated under the rubric of international criminal law did not and the
potential promise of Nuremberg did not take off.107 The precedent of prosecuting
the Axis and Japanese war criminals from WWII did not result in the creation of
International Criminal Court or prosecution of war crimes until the early 1990s.108

The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals did have an impact. The United Nations
General Assembly “unanimously affirmed the principles of international law
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgement of the
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Tribunal”. 109 Based on Nuremberg Tribunal’s decisions, the UN General
Assembly subsequently asked the International Law Commission to draft a code
of offences against the peace and security of mankind.110 The Law Commission
formulated a number of international crimes and the notion of individual criminal
responsibility, but its work was slow. By 1996, it drafted close to 20 provisions as
part of the Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.111

While during this Post-War period, there was little movement in the prosecution
of war crimes similar to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. There were
however large-scale expansion of international human rights laws and the laws
of war. For example, the European Court of Human Rights commenced its
important work in 1959 along with other UN bodies that sought to monitor the
application of specific treaties. The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, adopted in 1966, prohibits the crime of torture, an intrinsic component of
war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity and genocide. In a similar vein,
the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide sought to prohibit genocide.
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Conventions regulated the conduct of war and most importantly entrenched the
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prosecution of violation of the laws of war.113 There was a rapid expansion in
both laws of war and international human rights during the Post-War era. But the
same cannot be said about international criminal law. Cherif Bassiouni, one of
the pioneers of international criminal law has captured the lull in international
criminal law as follows:

Between 1919 and 1994 there were five ad hoc international
commissions, four ad hoc international criminal tribunals, there
internationally mandated or authorized national prosecutions arising
out of World War I and World War II. These processes were
established by different legal means with varying mandates, many
of them producing results contrary to those original contemplated.
These investigations and prosecutions were established to appease
public demand for a response to the tragic events and shocking
conduct during armed conflict. Despite the public pressure
demanding justice, investigative and adjudicating bodies were
established for only a few international conflicts. Domestic conflicts,
no matter how brutal, drew less attention from the world’s major
powers, whose political will has been imperative to the
establishment of such bodies.114
Bassiouni’s disappointment with international criminal law and its applicability to
domestic conflicts alludes to a larger problem with the development of
international law and its institutions in the Post-War context. On the one hand,
there was the development of international law, the various subspecies of
international law and the other relevant institutions noted above. All of these
mechanisms, in principle, allowed newly-formed states to participate in the
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international system as sovereign entities. But these newly-formed states were
conceptualised, and their borders were demarcated, during the colonial period.
They were then given their sovereignty either through the League’s Mandate
system or the United Nations’ decolonisation process.115

These newly-formed states however included populations, and not infrequently,
governments that challenged the delineation of borders by the colonial powers,
which subsequently lead to mass rupture and violence in the Post-War era.116 In
the context of the African continent, Obiora Okafor argues “[w]hether in Sudan or
South Africa, Nigeria or Niger, Rwanda or Burundi […] the post-colonial African
State continues to be weakened, even torn apart by a multitude of dissociative
forces”.
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decolonisation process are seen by some as a “straightjacket with time bombs
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The central problem is that the colonisers crafted the borders of existing units of
sovereign states. Such a process includes and/or excludes certain portions of
the populations that may not or may have an allegiance to the newly formed
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sovereign state. Conversely, the officials populating the state may have
grievances with particular minority communities within their borders. In this
context, the convergence of allegiance or grievance may lead to a stumbling
roadblock of disagreements and disadvantages may potentially precipitate
violence, as suggested by Okafor.

Anghie offers another layer of insight about the relationship between newly
formed sovereigns and their respective minority communities in the Post-War
period. He writes: “[…] we might see the relationship between the state and
minorities, as it has been characterised in international law, as reproducing the
dynamic of difference; the minority is characterised as the primitive that must be
managed and controlled in the interests of preserving the modern and universal
state”.119

Even though we see the continuation of the dynamic of difference in the PostWar period, the newly formed Third World States were not without agency.
These states understood the role of international law and thus they attempted to
use it as a force for justice and to challenge its very structures. Sundhya Pahuja
characterises this move as: “a call for international law to transcend its imperial
origins in the name of the universal”.120 The attempts to use international law as
a tool of emancipation by the international law scholars allied to the Third World
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has been aptly denoted as the first incarnations of Third World Approaches to
International Law.121

The dynamic of difference during this period can be summed up with the
following: The logic of the Post-War system and the end of the Cold War gave
way to an internationalist moment in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall. The
build-up of international institutions and their inability to function given the geopolitical climate of the Post-War period created a vacuous space. Most
international institutions were rendered powerless. They were captured by the
politics between the West and the Soviet Block. The implosion of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and its Warsaw Pact caused a geo-political shift in the
early 1990s. There was a proliferation of international justice regimes as result of
the implosion of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the conclusion of the
Cold War détente.122 More importantly, from this period onwards, there was a
rapid expansion of international criminal regimes and international criminal law.

Thus far, the narrative that I have presented demonstrates the evolution of
international law and its institutions. In doing so, I have paid close attention to
how the development of both international law and its institutions occurred. I
exposed the inadequacies of international law and its institutions by illustrating
the potential pitfalls of its universalising nature, which started at the early stages
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of international law with Vitoria’s concept of sovereignty. The move to
international institutions in the global order that I have chronicled is the basis for
a number of theoretical claims by international lawyers and international law
scholars encapsulated within the theories of global governance. For example,
some scholars use the development of the Charter of United Nations and the
United Nations institutions as an illustration of global constitutionalism.123 Global
administrative lawyers trace the emergence of their specific theory of global
governance back to the administrative unions of the 18th century.124 I will explore
these two theories in greater detail in the following chapters.

In this section, I traced the evolution of international law and its institutions from
a broad historical perspective as means to introduce the universalism of
international law and to trace the evolution of international institutions. Within this
evolution, I paid particular attention to the development of international criminal
law. In the next section, I turn to the three case studies from international
criminal law. In this respect, I will trace the evolution of international criminal
institutions and then I will chronicle the development of two ad hoc international
criminal institutions of ICTR and ICTY and the International Criminal Court. By
focusing on this particular subfield of international law, I will to demonstrate the
continued effects of the dynamic of difference and the subsequent false
universalism in how we theorise global governance.
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1.3 Situating ICL institutions in Development of International Institutions:
Cherif Bassiouni dates the origins of international criminal law to the trials of
Conradin von Hohenstaufen in 1268 and Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. 125
Robert Cryer has sought to trace the emergence of international criminal law all
the way back to the antiquity. He suggests that some elements of criminal
prosecution can be found in what are now China, Egypt, Greece and India.126
Other scholars locate the first example of war crimes prosecution to the early
14th and 15th centuries, with the trial of William Wallace (Braveheart, 1305) and
Joan of Arc (1431).127 In the early 20th century there was one important instance
of a potential international criminal prosecution:128 the attempts by victors of WWI
to establish an international criminal institution to prosecute the German and
Ottoman war criminals.129

Historical scholarship further supports the assertion that international criminal
law started taking on its modern form right after WWI. Kristen Sellars for example
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examines the French and British desire to prosecute the deposed Kaiser Wilhelm
II.130 These attempts, as Justice Antonio Cassese, the former President of the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon, argues, were fruitless owing to numerous different
factors, such as sovereign equality of nation states. An international institution,
therefore, was not created.131

Prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes was not possible after WWI.
The consensus to pursue justice on the part of the Allies resulted in the two
different international criminal prosecutions of the German and Japanese
perpetrators of mass atrocities for acts against “peace, security and well-being of
the world”.132 The establishment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
(NIMT) and International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) are frequently
represented as an important policy shift in understanding state sovereignty in the
international criminal law literature.133 As seen through the WWI example, the
grand narrative of state sovereignty prevented attribution of individual criminal
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responsibility for conduct during war. 134 The sovereignty principle, developed
through the scholarship of Vitoria, meant that states were immune from any
outside interference, and individuals in power enjoyed immunity from prosecution
for any acts conducted during their tenure as public officials.135 Immunity (both
functional and personal) is a fundamental doctrine of international law that is
deeply contested in the context of international crimes.136 State sovereignty was
one of the central arguments used by the Americans for refusing to support the
prosecution of the Kaiser Wilhelm II at the end of WWI.137

The desire to prosecute the officials of the Axis Powers started as early as 1943,
if not before.138 Various official statements made by the Allies during the war
demanded the prosecution of war crimes by the Axis Powers. The most
significant of these statements was the Moscow Declaration of 1 November
1943, which provided the political backdrop for the creation of the international
tribunal in Nuremberg.139 A month prior to the Moscow Declaration, the Allies
134
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had created the United Nations War Crimes Commission. The Commission was
tasked with investigating war crimes and providing advice on the punishment.
The Commission operated from 1943 to 1948 to investigate war crimes and,
later, to advise on the process for punishment.140

The Moscow Declaration was a promise to punish those responsible for war
crimes. There was considerable discussion about the type of punishment and in
the end British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had to be convinced of the
merits of an international trial rather than summary execution. 141 Cassese
suggests that “[A]fter the defeat of Germany, the British led by Churchill, stated
that it was enough to arrest and hang those primarily responsible […], without
wasting time on legal procedures”.142 The Americans, and to some extent their
Russian counterparts, had to convince Churchill of the advantages of
prosecuting the war criminals. 143 There were various arguments that were
advanced in support of the triumph of rule of law over barbarism.144

The first

and most important reason was to ensure that rule of law and democracy
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prevailed by affording the accused with a fair trial.145 The Chief Prosecutor of the
NIMT, Robert Jackson in his opening address captured the triumph of rule of law
in the following manner in 1945:
That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant
tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason. This inquest
represents the practical effort of four of the most mighty of nations,
with the support of 17 more, to utilize international law to meet the
greatest menace of our times-aggressive war. The common sense
of mankind demands that law shall not stop with the punishment of
petty crimes by little people. It must also reach men who possess
themselves of great power and make deliberate and concerted use
of it to set in motion evils which leave no home in the world
untouched.146
Upon this basis, the London Agreement established the NIMT, which was
negotiated as a treaty between the Allies.147 The NIMT was created through a
multilateral agreement between the allied nations, United Kingdom, United
States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France.148 The Agreement was
the result of concessions between the Americans and their Soviet counterparts.
The disagreements during the negotiations seemed so fundamental and often
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turned on conceptions of law and legal process, such as the distinctions between
the adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions. The Tribunal included eight
judges (one main and one alternate for each of the allied powers).149 It received
the indictments on 1 October 1945, which included four different charges based
on the NIMT’s Charter: the crime of conspiracy, crimes against the peace, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The four respective Allies each provided a
‘chief prosecutor’ responsible for the prosecution of these crimes.150 The Tribunal
indicted 24 defendants and seven organizations.151

Unlike their response to German actions, the Allies did not make statements of
criminal responsibility regarding the Japanese until the latter part of WWII. The
most important statement by the Allies is the Potsdam Declaration of 1945,
which set out the terms of surrender of the Japanese.152 The IMTFE was created
through an executive decree of General Douglas MacArthur, the supreme
commander of the Allied Powers in Japan. He was acting under the authority of
the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.153 This founding instrument of the IMTFE
was, therefore, legally a matter of US domestic law.154 Similar to the NIMT, the
IMTFE included 11 judges and sought to prosecute 28 defendants with over 750
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individual charges. The Emperor of Japan was not prosecuted. These charges
related to crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.155

These two examples of international prosecutions were replete with problematic
procedure and practices. These problems take us back to Anghie’s dynamic of
difference that chronicled in the first section of this chapter. The problems
centred on victors’ justice, denial of due process rights, and violation of
fundamental rights. 156 Trial fairness was a genuine concern for the IMTFE’s
Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal and this was included in his dissenting opinion.
Justice Pal’s dissent deemed the prosecution of the Japanese as ‘vindictive
retaliation’ and an exercise of neo-colonialism by the war’s victors.157 He argued
that the exemption from prosecution for the atomic bombing of Japan by the
Americans, colonial aggression and territorial annexation by the Allies all
rendered any attempts to punish the Japanese unjust. More importantly, he was
highly critical of the decision to mandate the tribunal to prosecute undefined
crimes:
To say that the victor can define a crime at his will and then punish
for that crime would be to revert back to those days when he was
allowed to devastate the occupied country with fire and sword,
appropriate all public and private property therein, and kill the
inhabitants or take them away into captivity. When international law
will have to allow a victor nation thus to define a crime at his will, it
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will […] find itself back on the same spot whence it started on its
apparently onward journey several centuries ago.158
Justice Pal’s dissent then is encapsulated in the interruptions I presented in the
earlier section vis-à-vis the universalism through Anghie’s dynamic of difference
endemic in international law and international institutions. Justice Pal dissent is
perhaps the first TWAIL based critique of international criminal law. The dissent
represents a dark and often forgotten aspect of international criminal law. 159
Furthermore, in thinking about international prosecutions, we can see how a gap
is created between distinct cultures, or parties at war, where the victors’ ideals of
justice are hoisted up as the universal and the losers’ practices are deemed
barbaric. Prosecuting the losers for international crimes then fills the gap.160 This
is even more illustrative in the context of the atomic bomb and its enduring
effects on Hiroshima.

According to the traditional progress narrative of international law161, the two sui
generis tribunals of ICTR and ICTY and the International Criminal Court are the

158

Ibid 23-24.
For recent attempts to examine the history and implications of IMFTE, see Yuki Tanaka, Tim
McCormack & Gerry Simpson, “Editors’ Preface” in Yuki Tanaka, Tim McCormack & Gerry
Simpson, eds, Beyond Victors Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden: Martinus
Nijhoff, 2011) xxvii; Kristen Sellars, Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo (2011) 21:4 EJIL
108; for Japanese perspective on Justice Pal, see Nakajima Takeshi, “Justice Pal (India)” in Yuki
Tanaka, Tim McCormack & Gerry Simpson, eds, Beyond Victors Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes
Trial Revisited (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011) 127.
160
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 4.
161
The progress narrative is clearly illustrated in Crawford’s most recent Brownlie’s Principles of
Public International Law with the following: “It is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the
United Nations era began with a trial and a promise. […] But despite the Tokyo trials and some
further trials in Germany, mostly under the auspice of the occupying powers, the arena of
international criminal law became populated by conventions largely without implementation. [….]
Then, in the early 1990’s, the arena came to life: ad hoc criminal courts were created by the
159

59

direct descendants of the NMIT and IMTFE. 162 The gap of nearly 60 years
between the two instantiations of international prosecution is largely credited to
the politics of this period.163 It is often argued that a casualty of the Cold War was
the desire to prosecute those responsible for mass human atrocities. 164
Bassiouni alludes to this with the following reflection: “[S]oon after World War II,
the cold war began and efforts to advance international criminal justice gave way
to the political conflict between East and West”. 165 Putting aside the linear
progress-based narratives, there is some truth to the assertions that Cold War
politics prevented the international community from acting to either prosecute
those responsible for mass human rights violations or prevent such atrocities.
For example, the United Nations Security Council, and even the United Nations
General Assembly, was often unable to deliver concrete decisions given the
voting patterns of the West and its allies and the Eastern communist block during
the Post-War period. Ultimately, allegations of international crimes were often
marshalled by one side against the other, with little benefit for those on the
ground experiencing human rights violations.
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The following sections will provide an account of the process by which modern
international criminal institutions have been created since 1989 as set out in the
current academic literature. This account is provided to illustrate the history of
these institutions. My central purpose is to present the ideals encapsulated in the
creation of these institutions through their formal mechanisms. Subsequently, I
will demonstrate how the institutions present a singular aspiration to promote a
particular Western narrative of justice, that is part of the history of international
law. This chapter (and the previous section specifically) established how
international law and international institutions have evolved and how this
evolution is described in the contemporary literature. Moreover, as is apparent in
preceding descriptions of international law and international institutions, there is
often an omission of certain key-facts. For example, international lawyers and
international law scholars often ignore the role of colonialism and imperialism in
the development of the sovereignty doctrine and international law in general. Our
orthodox historical understanding of Vitoria does not include his role in theorising
the relationship between the Spanish colonisers and the local indigenous
inhabitants. This omission, as I argue in the chapters that follow, is a key feature
of international law and its institutions and this feature is very relevant in how we
theorise global governance today.

The manner in which three different international criminal institutions were
created will be set out in the following sections. Some of the difficulties that these
institutions have encountered will also be explored. I characterise these
difficulties as part of international law’s tendency to present the western
61

particular as universally applicable. These three case studies demonstrate that
the repetition of the dynamic of difference is present at all levels of international
prosecutions and adjudication. The dynamic of difference, for example, is visible
in the selectivity both of creating these tribunals and of prosecuting particular
(African) heads of state. Moreover, it is also visible in how the procedures are
created and implemented within the institutions. In the following section, I focus
on the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. I will not include the three other current institutions –
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that form an intimate part of the
international criminal justice regime.

In the first case study, the focus is on ICTY and its completion strategy as it
relates to the rights of the accused. I will present the changes to the Rules of
Evidence and Procedure as law-making by the judges of the tribunals and outline
the deleterious effects of these initiatives on the rights of the accused in three
registers: First, the amendments to the rules have repealed judicial decisions in
certain cases; second, the changes to the rules have precipitated trial delay; and
third, reformulation of the rules has allowed new evidence on appeal to be
admitted. By honing in on these three aspects, what becomes demonstrable is
the disparity between the goals of the ICTY in providing justice to the victims and
bringing the accused to justice through the violation of the rights of the accused.
In exploring these disparities, the dynamic of difference theorised by Anghie is
once again made visible.
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The dynamic of difference as noted earlier, is the creation of cultural differences
between two cultures, characterising one as universal and the other as
uncivilized, and thus bridging the gap between these two cultures. The ICTY
Statute and international human rights standards prohibit trial unfairness. Trial
fairness is jeopardised when judicial decisions are repealed through what may
seem like a judicial fiat by changing the rules of evidence and procedure. But
these international human rights standards are not applicable to the accused
before the ICTY because they have allegedly committed barbaric atrocities
against civilian populations. The barbaric war criminals are deemed unworthy of
these basic fundamental rights. What emerges from this first case study is a
dichotomy between ending impunity and doing so while affording the due
process guarantees to the accused. The lens of the dynamic of difference allows
us to see how the singular narrative of ending impunity, a universal aspiration
encompassed in the development of international law, is extended to the
barbaric acts of the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide. But simultaneously, the exercise of bridging the gap between the
universal and uncivilized does not occur completely rather it is somewhat
lackadaisical. Similarly in the second case study, I focus on ICTR and witness
testimony and the role of experts, which demonstrates the dynamic of difference
in operation. In the third case study, I explore the International Criminal Court
and its prosecutorial policy as evidence of Anghie’s dynamic of difference.
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1.4 ICTY and ICTR: From Nuremberg to The Hague, the continuation of the
progress narrative?
The break-up of the former Yugoslavia started in the early 1990’s and eventually
escalated into an international armed conflict with mass human rights
violations.166 In 1992, the UN Security Council (UNSC) requested that the UN
Secretary General establish an impartial Commission of Experts to examine,
analyse, and provide “conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia”. 167 In its first interim report, the Commission, chaired by Cherif
Bassiouni, concluded that grave breaches and other violations of international
humanitarian law had been committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia.168
While the Commission undertook its important work, the UN Secretary General
canvassed states about the creation of a future tribunal as a UN Security Council
subsidiary organ, rather than a treaty based institution.169 With the submission of
the first interim report by the Commission of Experts,170 the Security Council
decided to prosecute those responsible for the crimes against humanity,
genocide and war crimes. In response to a request by the UN Security Council
through Resolution 808, the UN Secretary General recommended a tribunal by
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resolution, rather a treaty based institution.171 The UN Secretary General’s report
included a draft statute for the tribunal, in which the he laid out the possible
language for the future statute based on “provisions found within the existing
international law, particularly with regard to the competence of the rationae
materiae”.172 In some ways, this statute was modelled on “on the Nuremberg
IMT’s Charter”. 173 The report also contained a brief commentary on each
proposed provision of the statute. Pursuant to Resolution 827, the UN Security
Council created the ICTY on 27 May 1992, relying on its United Nations Charter
Chapter VII powers to maintain peace and security.174

During the same time period, the conflict between the Rwandan Peoples Front
(RPF) and the Hutu led Rwandan government escalated. By mid 1994, it was
clear to the international community that genocide was occurring in Rwanda.175
Even though many of the factors that precipitated the creation of the ICTY were
present in the Rwandan context, there was some reluctance on the part of the
world leaders to create an international tribunal because of the costs associated
with such a project.176 Cassese suggests the following:
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“[S]ensitive to the criticisms that the establishment of the ICTY
represented yet another illustration of the disproportionate attention
paid to the problems of Europe vis-à-vis the developing world, the
international community was also anxious to establish a Tribunal for
Rwanda so as to assuage its conscience and shield itself from
accusations of double standards”.177
Almost 18 months later, through Resolution 935, the UNSC established the
Commission of Experts to investigate the atrocities committed during the
Rwandan genocide from January 1994 to December 1994. 178 The Secretary
General of the UN appointed three experts from the region to the Commission of
Inquiry, and a final report was submitted to the UN Security Council in October
1994. According to the Commission of Experts, “since 6 April 1994, an estimated
500,000 unarmed civilians have been murdered in Rwanda”.179 Resolution 955
established the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda along with its
empowering Statute.180

Leading up to the resolution, the issue of whether the Rwandan conflict was an
international armed conflict or non-international conflict was fervently debated by
the various parties. The Commission of Experts report clearly states that the
Rwandan conflict was a non-international conflict. 181 The severity of the
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atrocities, however, caused the United Nations Security Council to utilise its
Chapter VII powers to create the institution. In the context of the ICTR, the
United Nations Security Council followed a one-step process in creating the
tribunal, rather than the two-step process that was followed with the ICTY.182

The negotiations within the United Nations Security Council were spearheaded
by the United States and New Zealand, including the drafting of the statute. Even
though the RPF initially supported the Tribunal, once it formed the Unity
Government, there was an attempt to rethink its commitment to international
prosecutions.183 Rwanda voted against the resolution at the end. It did however
promise to co-operate with ICTR, while China abstained.184

The ICTY Statute has 34 provisions and ICTR Statute has 32 provisions, which
delineate the international crimes, the organisational structure and the
composition of the tribunal. 185 The statutes set out four punishable crimes
(genocide, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity186). Since both institutions were temporary, the judges
initiated the completion strategy in 2003 (ICTR) and 2004 (ICTY)187 respectively
so that both tribunals were expected to complete their cases in the following
182
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years. The ICTY is set to deliver its final judgment in 2016 (trial level), while the
ICTR hoped to deliver its final appeal decision in July 2015.188 Both institutions
have also adopted a policy to strengthen the national judicial system of each
respective institution.

ICTY is the catalyst for creating war crimes chambers in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia with the support of the United Nations Security
Council. These chambers focus on the intermediate and lower-level officials
accused of committing serious human rights violations, and are also part of
ICTY’s completion strategy. Similarly, the Rwandan regular and Gacaca courts
are in the process of prosecuting intermediate and lower-level officials.189

As set out in the resolutions, the purpose of these institutions is: (i) to bring to
justice persons allegedly responsible for the violation of international
humanitarian law, (ii) to render justice to the victims, (iii) to deter future crimes
and (iv) to restore peace by ending impunity.190 It is certain that these goals of
international criminal institutions are part of the larger universalising mission of
international law that was discussed in the previous section.
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1.4.1 The Costs of Justice: International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia as a Case Study
The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia in 1993
was a pivotal moment for the international community: the violation of inalienable
human rights reached traumatic levels in specific regions of the country and thus
the international community decided to intervene. 191 But as early as 1997,
commentators and member states of the United Nations started to raise
concerns about the efficiency and the costs associated with the Tribunal. 192
Some writers argue that these concerns originated from within the Tribunal and
as a response to the 1997 annual report of ICTY. 193 As the growing
dissatisfaction with the efficiency of ICTY germinated, the members of the
Security Council were concerned because of the costs associated with
prosecuting war criminals.194 There were several flaws in the very design of the
Tribunal that precipitated these criticisms.195 Concerns over efficiency and costs
associated with the Tribunals day-to-day operations gave rise to significant
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results. These outcomes serve to illustrate how the mandate of this institution
quickly morphed from ending impunity to ending impunity quickly and cheaply.

While on the surface, the descriptive and normative elements of this international
criminal institution may signal the concretisation of a constitutional moment196,
the reality is different. The internal dynamics of the Tribunal are plagued with
contradictions. This is not surprising, given what we know from the history of
international law and its institutions discussed earlier in this dissertation. The
central purpose of the Tribunal is purportedly to deliver justice to the victims and
bring the perpetrators to justice. However financial constraints necessitated a
different ethos, one where corners were cut as a means to ensure expedient and
efficient trials. In laying the foundation for this argument, it is appropriate to
examine the powers of the judges to create and amend the rules of evidence and
procedure. Judges of both ad hoc Tribunals have this power, but in this section I
will focus on the ICTY. Article 15 of the ICTY Statute states:
The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of
procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the
proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the
protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate
matters.197
This significant legislative power granted to judges has enabled approximately
40 amendments to the Rules after its initial drafting. Ultimately, the Rules are
there to fill in the gaps of the Statute. They consist of ten sections, with 127
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provisions. The Rules cover every aspect of the Tribunal’s work from
investigations, trials to appeals and thus form the background operating system
of the Tribunal as a whole. The powers of the judges of this particular Tribunal to
legislate exceed those of domestic and International Criminal Court judges in
drafting and amending the rules of evidence and procedure.198

For example, the separation of powers within national jurisdictions is defined by
the various domestic constitutional arrangements. The arrangements prohibit
violations of fundamental rights enshrined therein by state agencies or
governmental omission and any such violations are deemed justiciable.199 There
are constitutional orders that vary in how they envision the role of their judges.
What is certain however is that the judges cannot make laws or amend laws
explicitly in these jurisdictions. Yet this is the standard practice at the ICTY.200

From the perspective of the accused, the Statute along with the Rules do not
include specific provisions to challenge changes to the rules in the judicial review
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sense.201 Once a rule has been amended, no matter the effects on the rights of
accused, there is no way to challenge the rules application. However, there are
possibilities to review particular decisions using the regulations and directives of
the Tribunal.202

There is an appeal procedure, as set out by the Statute to challenge judicial
decisions based on the standards of review. On the surface, as set out in the
enabling ICTY Statute, there are no implicit methods to challenge the decisions
of the Tribunal, unless it relates to a matter of fact, law or procedural error
(encapsulated within the appeals provisions). There is no other possibility to
challenge any decisions before any other competent international body either.203

The legislative powers of the judges to amend the rules do have significant
consequences on the manner in which the Tribunal functions. I will provide three
illustrative examples that have resulted in law-making by the judges. These
amendments have resulted in the judges legislating. These three illustrations,
from the accused’s perspective demonstrate that a singular and universal
narrative of human rights is only applicable to some and not all. That is, even
though the Tribunal is bound to protect the fair trial rights of the accused, it does
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not do so for a whole host of reasons. Anghie’s dynamic of difference in
particular helps us understand this more explicitly.
1.4.1.1 Repealing Judicial Decisions & Judicial Law-making
There are instances in which the judges have amended the Rules in order to
overrule the decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. 204 The most significant
example is the Appeals Chamber’s decision to overturn the Trial Chamber’s
decision to proceed without the third member of its panel in Prosecutor v. Zoran
Kupreskic et al. During the trial proceedings in February 1999, the presiding
judge informed the parties that one of their judicial colleagues was ill and was
“unlikely to be able to attend the hearings during the remainder of the week”.205
In light of these circumstances and for effective time management purposes, the
presiding judge enquired whether the parties were prepared to “request that
depositions pursuant to Rule 71 be taken from the defence witnesses scheduled
to be heard during this time-period”.206 The prosecutor made such an application
against the wishes of the accused. The remaining members of the panel went
ahead with the deposition. 207 The witness’ evidence was taken by way of
deposition with the two judges present, acting as presiding officers.
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The accused appealed this decision to include the testimony. The Appeal
Chamber agreed with the accused, noting that “[G]iven the plain and ordinary
meaning of the latter provision, a Trial Chamber is only competent to act as a
Trial Chamber per se if it comprises three Judges”.208

Four months later, the judges, acting in plenary, amended Rules 15 and 71 and
created Rule 15 bis. This new rule overturned the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s fivemember panel decision in Kupreskic. The new rule allowed the judges, in the
event that one of their panel members is ill or unable to attend the hearing, to
order “the hearing in the case continue in the absence of that judge”.209 This
amendment’s direct effect was to overturn the ICTY Appeal Chamber’s decision
in Kupreskic. There are other examples in which the judges acting in plenary
have sought to overturn decisions. Gideon Boas suggest that judges have
overturned the chambers decisions in “core areas of the law, including the
procedure for the delivery of discrete sentences for each finding of guilt by a trial
chamber; amending the provisions on the right of appeal […]”.210

In the example of Kupreskic, the accused’s right to a fair trial, as set out by the
Statute, is irrelevant. The judicial practice to amend the rules211 demonstrates
what matters most: the expediency and efficiency of the ICTY. The universalist
208
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arguments in favour of ending impunity takes over, where the judges palpably
ignore the rights of the accused set out in the Statute. Getting the job done
(prosecution), spending less money and moving on to the next case are the
ultimate goal. The judges, and other participants of the Tribunal are able to forgo
the rights of the accused based on the alleged barbaric acts perpetrated against
the victims.212 By deeming the perpetrators uncivilised, the Tribunal is able to
transcend its human rights requirements.

Anghie’s dynamic of difference thus helps us understand how the desire to end
impunity trumps the fundamental rights of the accused. The central goal of the
Tribunal was to deliver justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice.
As noted earlier, the conflict was precipitated by the collapse of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics and the collapse of Communist Yugoslavia. In one of
its first decisions, Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Tribunal, after having detailed the
colonial history of the region, notes the following:
The years from 1945 to 1990 had no tales of ethnic atrocities to tell.
Marshal Tito and his communist regime took stern measures to
suppress and keep suppressed all nationalist tendencies. Under its
Constitution of 1946, the country was to be composed of six
Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Macedonia, and Montenegro and two autonomous regions,
Vojvodina and Kosovo, these two being closely associated with
Serbia. The peoples of the Republics other than Bosnia and
Herzegovina were regarded as distinct nations of federal
Yugoslavia. The situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was unique;
although it was one of the six Republics, it, unlike the others,
possessed no one single majority ethnic grouping and thus there
212
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was no recognition of a distinct Bosnian nation. However, by 1974
the Muslims were considered to be one of the nations or peoples of
federal Yugoslavia.213
As noted by the Tribunal, the Balkan region has a unique cultural history that is
rooted in the colonial history of the Ottoman Empire.214 In creating the Tribunal
well before the end of the conflict in 1995215, the Security Council dictated the
process by which justice was to be rendered. The Security Council believed that
the new breakaway sovereign states (or the former republics under the
Communist Constitution) could not handle their own sovereign affairs.216 The
decision to create the Tribunal as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and
not a treaty-based body is illustrative of the dynamic of difference. There was a
fear amongst those pushing for the creation of the tribunal that the new
sovereign states of the former Yugoslavia would not ratify the treaty. 217 The
Secretary General in his report to the Security Council thus states:
20. As has been pointed out in many of the comments received, the
treaty approach incurs the disadvantage of requiring considerable
time to establish an instrument and then to achieve the required
number of ratifications for entry into force. Even then, there could be
no guarantee that ratification will be received from those states
which should be parties to the treaty if it is to be truly effective.
[...]
22. In light of the disadvantage of the treaty approach in this
particular case and of the need indicated in resolution 808 (1993)
for an effective and expeditious implementation of the decision to
establish an international tribunal, the Secretary-General believes
213
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that the International Tribunal should be established by a decision of
the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations. Such a decision would constitute a measure to
maintain or restore international peace and security, following the
requisite determination of the existence of a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression.218
The Security Council therefore created the Tribunal. In doing so, it grants the
judges, similar to the NIMT, the power to amend their rules of evidence and
procedure. Two cultures are present in this context. One is deemed superior and
universal and the other is seen as unable to handle their domestic affairs and
render justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice. Thus the
Security Council bridges this gap by creating the Tribunal. It does so as a means
to ensure that the Tribunal implements the superior culture’s standards and
renders justice to the victims by prosecuting those responsible for the violation of
the laws of war.219

In the Kupreskic example, the alleged perpetrators are before the Tribunal facing
charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity as part of that
goal of rending justice. But simultaneously, because of costs, their fundamental
right to a fair trial, as set out by the Statute (drafted and implemented by the UN
Security Council), is ignored through the law-making capacity of the judges. The
judges of the Tribunal were granted the power to amend the rules as they saw fit
in fulfilling their goal of ending impunity. In this instance they choose to do so at

218

Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 in Security Council Resolution 808
(1993), UN Doc. S/1994/674 of 27 May 1994, para 20 & 22.
219
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 4.

77

the expense of the accuseds’ right to a fair trial. Viewed from this perspective,
the accused, given their alleged complicity in the most heinous crimes are not
worthy of having their rights guaranteed. This takes us back to Justice Pal’s
concerns over the changes in the rules in IMTE.220
1.4.1.2
Significant Trial Delays and the Completion Strategy
The desire to control the exponential growth of the budgets commenced after
both ad hoc tribunals began their important task of prosecuting those responsible
for the most serious crimes in the former Yugoslavia.221 With the then President
Cassese’s alarming annual report222, the UN General Assembly requested the
Secretary General to assemble a group of experts to conduct a review of the
operations of ICTY and ICTR. In November 1999, the expert group delivered its
report to the Secretary General with over 40 substantive recommendations, most
of which were adopted by both institutions to curb their expenses.223 As a result,
in April 2000, Judge Jorda presented a report to the United Nations General
Assembly that sought to limit the trials to 16 years. Moreover he asked to change
both ICTR and ICTY’s jurisdiction to only cover senior leaders accused of
committing grave crimes. This was the starting point of the completion strategy,
as set out by the United Nations Security Council.

After numerous consultations and reports from the Tribunal’s President and the
ICTY prosecutor, UNSC Resolution 1503 ended the temporal jurisdiction of both
220
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tribunals and called for both institutions to complete their cases by 2010. 224
UNSC Resolution 1534 reaffirmed previous commitments and required both
tribunals to “take all necessary measures” to achieve the completion strategy.225

The underlying factors pushing the United Nations Security Council and the
United Nations General Assembly to limit the activities of the tribunals were
financial. Even though we may view ascribing monetary value to international
justice as vulgar,226 the reality is that international institutions are governed by
how much they spend. In 2011, it was forecasted that the cost of international
criminal justice will reach close to $6.5 billion by 2015.227 The costs associated
with ICTY alone are staggering. The ICTY has managed to indict 161 accused
(141 concluded proceedings, excluding potential review proceedings and
contempt proceedings). In the fiscal year of 2010, ICTY spent $301,895,900. On
average, the ICTY has spent close to $18M on each accused.228
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In 1997, ICTY President Cassese noted in the annual report that: “[T]he Tribunal
must find new ways of working that will enable it to try all of the accused within a
reasonable time.”229 By 1998, ICTY had over 28 accused in custody but had only
managed to deliver two judgments.230 Thus questions about efficiency turned to
whether the rules, favouring the adversarial model, could be amended to make
way for new, more efficient trial proceedings. Such proceedings needed the
judges to have more of a managerial role. The turn to managerialism coincides
with a civilist judge taking control of the presidency of the tribunal in 1999.231

The United Nations Security Council’s reaction to the exorbitant costs of
international justice forced ICTY (and ICTR) to find feasible alternatives to how
they conduct their trials. To prevent pre-trial and trial delays, precipitated by both
the prosecution and the defence, judges introduced reforms that would allow
increased judicial access to information about the parties’ cases. Simultaneously,
the reforms to the rules provided the judges with new powers to set deadlines
and work-plans, thereby limiting the number of witnesses and legal issues. The
changes therefore “would reduce the length of both pre[-]trial[s] and trial[s]”.232
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In fact, the move to managerial judging at the ICTY did not lead to more efficient
trials.233 To the contrary, the changes to the rules, with the added new steps,
prolonged the duration of the trials and thus lead to the following conclusion:
“[T]he results of these regressions reveal that the managerial judging reforms did
not deliver any of their promised outcomes”.234 The rationale for this assertion is
that the judges lacked specific information about their cases. Furthermore the
prosecution and defence counsel resented and resisted their diminished roles.

Based on the available data, an accused before ICTY can be incarcerated for
close to six years from the pre-trial to the conclusion of the appeal process.235 In
this instance, even though there are significant trial delays, the accused can
mount a challenge within the tribunal structure, utilising the enabling Statute and
the respective rules as a means to challenge the delays. Nonetheless, it is the
same judges that amended the rules who then decide if their changes resulted in
the violation of fundamental rights guarantees afforded to the accused. The
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accused is left in a precarious position of challenging the law-making function of
the judges.

From a cursory and uncritical domestic criminal law perspective, the fundamental
rights guarantees afforded to the accused are a central tenet of the national
codifications of criminal procedure and constitutional protections. Constitutional
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been
interpreted by the Canadian courts as prohibiting any erosion of the rights of the
accused.236 In the Canadian jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has focused on
the whether the delay is reasonable.237 The jurisprudence balances the interests
of the public, the accused and administration of justice. In the United States, the
Supreme Court and the Constitution are highly protective of the rights of the
accused.238 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has developed an
expansive jurisprudence protecting the rights of the accused in criminal
matters.239 Meanwhile, there is a long tradition of affording fundamental rights
protection in international human rights law.240 However, the customary nature of

236

See for example R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 223; David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law
th
of Evidence 6 ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 352.
237
R. v. Smith, [1989] S.C.J. No. 119; R. v. Askov, [1999] S.C.J. No.106.
238
Sandra Guerra Thompson, “Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony”
(2011) University of Houston Law Center No. 2011-A-8; Caleb Mason “Jay-Z’s 99 Problems,
Verse 2: A Close Reading with Fourth Amendment Guidance for Cops and Perps” (2012) 56: 567
St. Louis University Law Journal 45.
239
See for example Jalloh v Germany (2006) Appl. No. 54810/00; Funke v France (1993) Appl.
No. 10828/84; Saunders v United Kingdom (1996) Appl. No. 19187/91; Khan v United Kingdom
(2000) Appl. No. 35394/97, 12 May 2000.
240
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, 999 UNTS 171; Universal
rd
Declaration of Human Rights. GA Res. 217 (III), UNGAOR, 3 Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc.
A/810 (1948).

82

the right to a fair trial, which includes the rights of the accused, is still
debateable.241

The fundamental guarantees afforded to the accused, therefore, embody a
central organising feature of how the international criminal regime is
conceptualised within the Statute and other international human rights standards
established in the Post-War period. Within the context of ICTY however, there is
a certain level of relaxation of these fundamental tenets that adversely affect the
rights of the accused. Arguably, the relaxation of the rights of the accused stems
from the behaviour of judges as they legislate using their powers to amend the
Rules. The decision of the judges to regularly tamper with the Rules –
sometimes in response to political pressure from the Security Council - has had
a significant effect on the rights of the accused in terms of trial delays.242

Similar to the earlier example, the significant trial delay has a serious effect on
the rights of the accused. The Tribunal was set up by the Security Council as a
means to bridge the divide between the Western superior culture and the
barbarism of Balkan conflict. Nonetheless, the universal attempts to prosecute
war criminals through the ICTY tests the international communities commitment
to international justice and the desire to end impunity. The serious work of
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prosecuting international war criminals challenges both the international
community to fund the Tribunal and maintain its support for these efforts. This
tension between costs and justice operationalises the dynamic of difference even
further by denying the accused, their basic fundamental rights guaranteed by
law. What we can learn from this example is how the dynamic of difference is
embedded in international law and its institutions. These conclusions have
significant effects on the manner in which we choose to theorise global
governance, in particular global constitutionalism.
1.4.1.3

Rights of the Accused & New Convictions on Appeal

Christoph Safferling identifies trial fairness as one of the main problems of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East.243 Trial fairness is exemplified through new convictions
and sentences on appeal before the ICTY. In certain instances, the new
convictions arise through the production of new evidence facilitated through the
changes to the rules. Rule 115 of the ICTY Rule of Evidence and Procedure
allows a party to present, with the permission of the ICTY Appeals Chamber,
new additional relevant evidence on appeal.244 This rule was amended twice. In
conjunction with the interpretation of the appeals provisions, this rule has
precipitated a fierce debate amongst the judges of the ICTY Appeals Chamber.
The judges debated whether or not they are allowed to impose a new conviction
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on appeal.245 There are exceptions; for example in Tadić, the Appeals Chamber
quashed acquittals by the Trial Chamber and entered a new conviction on
appeal but the Appeals Chamber remitted the matter of sentencing back to the
Trial Chamber.

246

The general practice however is clearly contrary to

contemporary international human rights norms to admit new evidence on
appeal. The International Criminal Court’s Rome Statute is different.247

Justice Pal’s powerful dissent from the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East focused on the haphazard nature of trial fairness as a result of allowing the
judges to draft and amend the rules. 248 The Tokyo Tribunal faced a similar
situation as the ICTY in which the sitting judges were able to amend the rules of
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procedure. In his dissent, Justice Pal states: “[T]hough the Charter sought to
makes us independent of all artificial rules of procedure, we could not disregard
these rules altogether. The practical conditions of the trials necessitated certain
restrictions. This however might not have yield[ed] happy results”. 249 The
unhappy results that Justice Pal refers to is the burden placed on the accused
and its significance to trial fairness. Arguably the baseline requirement for trial
fairness for war crimes prosecution is greater given the significance to the
victims and the community that has experienced severe trauma.

In all three ICTY examples, the dynamic of difference is front and centre. It a
process by which a gap is created between two cultures.250 In the instance of
ICTY, the Security Council and the former Yugoslavian states are presented as
the embodiment of two different cultures. The West is often presented as the
universal while the Yugoslavian states, and the respective officials are presented
as the barbarians that committed the mass atrocities against their own people.251
The only means to bridge the gap between the two is to prosecute those
responsible for the mass human rights violations using the universalism of
international law (and international criminal law) through the Tribunal. But
simultaneously, in this example, we know that these war criminals committed the
mass atrocities and thus there is really no need to extend the rights that are
guaranteed in the Statute.
249

IMTFE Justice Pal Dissent supra note 157 at 923.
Anghie, Imperialism supra note 1 at 4.
251
See historical account of the conflict by the Tribunal, Prosecutor v. TadićTadić (2000) Case
No. IT-94-1-T at paras. 53-97.
250

86

The recognition of these modalities should not be surprising. It serves to illustrate
the manner in which universalist claims operate in international law. In the
example of new evidence on appeal, prosecutor of the Tribunal can present new
evidence on appeal against the accused. It is ultimately, the prosecutor’s second
attempt to prosecute a convicted war criminal. Much more importantly, the ICTY
Appeals Chamber is asked to act as a second trier of fact, without the ability to
test the evidence that was proffered at first instance. Ultimately, the accused is
left in the precarious hands of the judges.
1.4.2 Locating the Cultural Local in Rwanda: Case Study of Witness
Testimony in Administering Justice before the ICTR
The ICTR’s mandate, as set out in the respective United Nations Security
Council Resolution, 252 sought to bring to justice persons responsible for the
violation of international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to
deter future crimes, and to restore peace by ending impunity in the region.253 The
respective statutes of the both ad hoc tribunals require the judges to draft and
adopt Rules of Evidence and Procedure.254 Focusing on the issue of witness
testimony, the Rules Committee has, on numerous occasions, amended and
revised the rules relating to the standard of admitting evidence and witness
testimony.
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Empirical evidence from the ICTR suggests that the changes to the rules have
not been successful. The changes have not been successful in terms of flexibility
for the benefit of the two opposing parties, expeditious trials or more importantly
in protecting the rights of the accused.255 Rather, the anomalies reported by
these interdisciplinary insights may be attributable to the flexible nature of the
rules and the role of the judges.256 In the discussion that follows, I focus on the
role of witness testimony and the experts as a means to demonstrate the
perpetuation of the singular western narrative as the universal. This particular
drive to use a western form of adjudication has had a decisively negative impact
on the manner in which ICTR conducts its trials and taints the jurisprudence and
the entire perusal of justice, especially as it relates to the rights of the accused.

In the first section, I explore the faulty witness testimony before the ICTR. By
describing the witness testimony, it is illustrative that the Tribunal’s use of
western form of adjudication is incompatible with the manner in which the
witnesses experienced the horrific events during the Rwandan genocide.
Moreover, the use of the witness testimony by the experts of the tribunals further
substantiates the perpetuation of Anghie’s dynamic of difference. The western
adjudicatory model is the prevalent universal tool that is used in all of these
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institutions. In the examples below, I chronicle how the Tribunal must contend
with faulty witness testimony but nonetheless convict the alleged perpetrators.
1.4.2.1

Locating

the

Cultural

Local:

Witness

Testimony

In

Administering Justice
There are various empirical studies that explore the diverse ways in which
international criminal tribunals function.257 A witness’ ability to narrate who did
what to whom is a fundamental tenet of any justice system. Moreover, this is one
of the central components of the ICTR’s mandate as encapsulated within the
goal of delivering justice to the victims. ICTR has struggled with witness
testimony and this struggle stems from the specific culture of Rwanda and its
colonial past. 258 By using the adjudicatory process, there is an imposition of
western understandings of how to conduct investigations, trials and elicit witness
testimony, which may diverge from the local customs. 259 My assertions are
premised on the culture and context in which the ICTR operates and my central
concern is the inability of witnesses to accurately convey their stories to the trier
of fact.

A number of scholars have examined witness testimony before the two ad hoc
tribunals. Already in 1999, scholars worried about perjury before the international
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criminal tribunals.260 For example, Alexander Zahar has recorded the role of
perjury in the 2006 Rwamakuba decision by the ICTR Trial Chamber. Moreover,
he suggests that the Trial Chamber in Rwamakuba did opt for the relaxed
approach to witness testimony by taking stock of “time elapsed, translation
discrepancies, the manner in which the prior statements were taken or the
impact of trauma inflicted upon the witnesses”.261 This is one of the ways in
which the Tribunal has generally dealt with the faulty witness testimony due to a
number of practical constraints brought about because of the witnesses’ fading
memory resulting from the passage of time and witness trauma due to the
horrific nature of the events.

Nancy Combs reviewed the transcripts of witness testimony from the ICTR.262
She points to a systematic hurdle that has plagued the institution: how to grapple
with local witnesses? More relevantly, she demonstrates that there is a direct
disjuncture between evidence that is provided by witnesses and the adjudicatory
process. She states: “[I]n sum, Trial Chambers often seem content to base
convictions on highly problematic witness testimony.” 263 As a result, the
Chambers fails to find “reasonable doubt in some of the most doubtful instances
and as a consequence, convict just about every defendant who comes before
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them”. 264 By reviewing trial transcripts, Combs concludes that witnesses are
often unable to provide detailed accounts of the dates, times, and specific
location of the events or, more importantly, they are unable to place the
perpetrator accurately at the scene of the crime. This is a necessary requirement
of any criminal adjudication. Combs notes that these discrepancies are a result
of educational, cultural and translation related factors.

In jurisdictions where witnesses are called in testify, they are expected to provide
a detailed account of who did what to whom. However, scholars working in
domestic criminal law jurisdictions have pointed out that witness testimony is
deeply flawed based on insights from race, gender and feminism, and mental
health angles. 265 Cursory review of American and Canadian criminal law
suggests that these national jurisdictions are heavily protective of the rights of
the accused. Americans prohibit the use of the death penalty in cases that rely
solely on eyewitness testimony.266 Examples from specific jurisdictions in the
United States illustrate that each prosecuting state must produce DNA evidence,
which can be buttressed by witness testimony in order to utilise the death
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penalty.267 These types of insights about the unreliability of witness testimony
have yet to find their way into international criminal law.268

The primary focus within international criminal law debates has been on the
substantive legality of international criminal adjudication. The literature thus far
has concentrated on setting out and developing specific areas of substantive
international criminal law. 269 There are numerous accounts of problematic
features of institutional practices from defence counsel270 and academics with
specific

institutional

knowledge

of

international

mechanisms,

271

and

interdisciplinary insights from political scientists and anthropologists. 272 The
focus on the mechanics of the institutions, especially as they relate to
international criminal procedure is minimal. 273 There are various calls to
incorporate diversity into the existing framework

274

or criticisms of the

problematic nature of admitting faulty evidence. 275 Nonetheless, very little
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attention is paid to the critical insights emerging from domestic criminal
jurisdictions with regard to witness testimony.

The rationale behind the absence of interdisciplinary and other critical analysis in
international criminal law is twofold. First, unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal
prosecutors who relied entirely on documents prepared by Nazi officials to
establish guilt, the ICTR prosecutors rely exclusively on witness testimony.276
Combs suggests that the prosecutor of NIMT did not have to rely on witness
testimony as their perpetrators had meticulously detailed all of their criminal
actions in their records. The onerous task presented to the NIMT was to sieve
through the thousands of documents. Modern day international criminals,
especially those indicted by the ICTR, did not leave a trail of documentary
evidence that could be used by the prosecution. The prosecutors had to rely on
witness testimony. Secondly, the rules of the ad hoc tribunals were drafted and
amended by the judges, prosecutors, and other officials of the tribunals. The
debates have therefore focused on the institutional and meritorious aspects of
the rules and the degree to which common law and civil law traditions have
influenced the development of these rules.277 Ultimately the exclusion of critical
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insights from the domestic context, which questions the viability of using witness
testimony, were omitted or ignored.

The role of experts in this omission is significant. The prosecutors and most
international staff conducting the investigations, trials and legal research are
western.278 Based on my own experience of working in the Appeals Chamber of
ICTY and ICTR, most of the staff that populated the Tribunals in The Hague
hailed from Europe or North America. Other similar accounts point to an
overrepresentation of staff members from Europe and North America.279 This is
relevant when the prosecution prepares the witnesses for testimony.280 All of
these arguments point to the fact that there is a strong tendency to rely on
western adjudicatory models.

Even though the ICTR witnesses understood that the Rwandan President’s
plane was shot down on 6 April 1994, precipitating the genocide (this is the most
significant date for the Tribunal), the witnesses are not able to place the
perpetrators at the scene of the crime on a specific date. The reason why the
witnesses are unable to situate the perpetrator at the scene of the crime is
simply cultural. Some witnesses cannot recount events based on the western
calendar, or they lack the formal western-style education needed to respond to
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questions about specific dates and times put to them by the parties to the
adjudicatory process.

For example, in the Nahimana proceedings, a trial witness testified that Colonel
Rwendeye had attended two death-squad meetings in 1993-4. When the witness
was confronted with evidence that the Colonel had in fact died in 1990, the
witness rejected the evidence and maintained that the Colonel had in fact died in
1992. ‘When it was pointed out that the [witness’s] revision nonetheless made
[the Colonel] the only dead man at the meetings, [the witness] claimed that he
had testified that the meetings had taken place at the end of 1992 and 1993.’281

More significantly, Rwandan witnesses often use cultural practices to identify
events. Witnesses rely on the seasons to determine the time of the year and
then subsequently place the perpetrator at the scene of the crime based on the
time of the year. These types of practices are culturally specific and culturally
contingent. Similarly, the notion of temporality or temporal sequences of events
is another issue of contention, where witnesses are unable to provide the exact
timeline in which an alleged incitement to genocide may have occurred.

The judges of the Tribunal have proceeded to accept faulty witness testimonies
for compelling reasons. The accused Hutu perpetrators were clearly involved in
the Rwandan genocide given their political affiliations, which is the central basis
281
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for conviction. The judges rely on these factors to credit witness testimonies.
There is an 85 per cent conviction rate in the ICTR, which corroborates Combs’
claims that the judges have a pro-conviction bias. Even when there are glaring
inconsistencies in testimonies, Combs notes that the “[T]rial Chambers explain
these [inconsistencies] away as products of the passage of time, the frailty of
memory and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters.282

From a broader perspective, the adjudicatory process envisioned by these
tribunals is predicated on the traditions of western adversarial common law and
inquisitorial civil law.283 Both these traditions rely heavily on witness testimony.
The judges, and the Tribunal as a whole, have adopted these traditions as the
modus operandi. Thus, by using the western trial form, “international criminal
proceedings cloak themselves in the form’s garb of fact-finding competence, but
it is only a cloak, for many of the key assumptions that underlie the [W]estern
trial form do not exist in the international context”.284

As noted earlier, the UN Security Council granted the judges of the two ad hoc
tribunals the power to draft (and amend) their own respective rules of evidence
and procedure, which may have provided the perfect tool to rectify these
anomalies.285 Moreover, the very design of the trial process, and even pre-trial
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investigation, was left to the judges of the two tribunals to determine as they saw
fit. Given these conclusions, what we have is a lack of connection between the
substantive evidence (based on witness testimonies) and the mandate of the
tribunals to prosecute those with the gravest responsibility for the mass
atrocities, whilst respecting the rights of the accused to due process.

The changes to the rules are predicated on efficiency and expeditious trials that
would not run up the costs of international justice. This disconnect is based on
the bias of the judges and the tribunals.286 The pro-conviction partiality of the
judges may possibly stem from their personal background and their expertise.
Within the Rwandan context, political and ethnic affiliations signal to the Tribunal
the potential culpability of the accused. These factors ultimately lend support to
the belief that the accused participated in the genocide, even without the
‘beyond-reasonable-doubt’ threshold given the faulty witness testimonies.

As I noted earlier, the Tutsi-led Rwandese government supported the creation of
a tribunal once the conflict had ended. During the conflict, RPF proposed the
creation of a tribunal as early as September 1994 for a number of reasons.287
The end of the conflict, Tutsi-led Rwandese government favoured international
prosecutions to avoid victors’ justice, the international recognition of the
prohibition of genocide and to end impunity as a means to build a better
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future.288 But ultimately, the Rwandese government voted against UN Security
Council Resolution 955 for two reasons: largely because of the erosion of
Rwandan sovereignty289 and the potential, given the Tribunal’s structure to only
appease “the conscience of the international community rather than respond to
the expectations of the Rwandese people and of the victims of the genocide
[…]”.290 As the above analysis demonstrates, Rwandan government’s fears have
now become a reality.

Once again, we observe the influence of Anghie’s dynamic of difference. The
manner in which the UN Security Council created the Tribunal serves as the
starting point. At the outset, there was reluctance to even set up the tribunal
given the costs associated with such an exercise. 291 Moreover, there was a
sense of Western guilt over the creation of the ICTY. Some commentators have
highlighted that the creation of the ICTY would be seen as a “disproportionate
attention paid to the problems of Europe vis-à-vis the developing world”. 292
Nonetheless, the Security Council went ahead to bridge the cap between the
superior western culture and uncivilised, backward Rwandans by creating the
Tribunal to render justice. In doing so, they adopted, as in the case of the ICTY,
a western adjudicatory model premised on the Nuremberg Charter.
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The western adjudicatory model is used as the universal truth mechanism that
would deliver justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators to justice. But
fundamentally, the universal model is unable to understand and incorporate the
local within its own binaries. The forces that drive the universal model are
incapable of communicating with the local as they are both literally speaking two
different languages. Superficially, the Tribunal is able to receive the witness
testimony. This information nonetheless has to be managed by taking stock of
extraneous factors such as passage of time and trauma.

The Tribunal relies on its specific and singular understanding of the conflict as a
means to navigate and contend with what may seem like faulty witness
testimony. The next section will take a look at the role of experts in perpetuating
the dynamic of difference.
1.4.2.2 International Expert Class and Understanding the Local?
The employees of these ad hoc tribunals are central to the pro-conviction bias
dealt within the earlier section and the central reason why faulty witness
statements are accepted. The staff members of the ad hoc tribunals are United
Nations employees. They range from legal associates and prosecutors to inhouse translators. From this cohort, there has emerged a class of international
employees who work on post-conflict justice issues and who maintain an
itinerant lifestyle in pursuit of that work, moving from one conflict hotspot to
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another within these tribunals.293 The judges of the tribunals are also part of this
cohort. Judges are elected by the United Nations General Assembly. 294 The
United Nations Security Council provides the United Nations General Assembly
with a list of shortlisted candidates prior to their election. Most judges move from
one tribunal to another given the scarcity of expertise in international criminal
law.295

Expertise is the subject of intense theory generation. In particular, legal
anthropologists have chronicled the role of experts in various domains from the
World Bank to over-the-counter derivative markets. With specific reference to
international organisations, Galit Sarfaty has suggested that ethnographic
research can illuminate the rationale for specific policy choices. For example, the
question of the World Bank’s human rights policy therefore is not contingent on
the role of the member states; rather it is about the internal dynamics of the
Bank.296 Sarfaty provides the following insights:
The World Bank typifies the multiple-principals problem, where
member governments serve as principals that collectively form the
Board of Executive Directors. The board is composed of twentyfour executive directors who represent countries or country groups.
Under the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the board serves as the
institution's policymaking organ, while the president and senior
management are responsible for operational, administrative, and
organizational issues. The executive directors thus serve as
principals that delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to agency
293
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officials. When member countries hold competing preferences and
cannot achieve consensus on a policy, bureaucratic drift may
ensue. In view of their difficulty in exerting oversight, the member
countries are forced to delegate authority to the agency officials. My
study of the Bank's internal decision-making process confirmed
these dynamics, showing that employees operate quite
independently of the board. They carry out certain sensitive
management issues without board approval or involvement.297
Elena Baylis’ interventions in the context of international criminal institutions
allude to a similar significance of the role of the experts from a socio-legal
perspective. Baylis chronicles young aspiring activists and advocates trying to
make a difference by transferring their social activist legal training from western
institutions to conflict-ridden places and international criminal institutions. These
good intentions, however, are clouded by what Baylis demonstrates as the
known unknowns.298 These known unknowns are characterised as a “lack of
local knowledge of post-conflict settings, whether that is knowledge of the local
legal system, local facts, local culture or any other relevant information”. 299
Furthermore, Baylis argues that these known unknowns are notoriously
challenging to deal with because there are issues of lack of timing, false
expertise, complexity, and size of the local context.

False expertise stems from the very nature of the work that is undertaken by
these experts and their ability to transfer these skills to other hotspots. For
297
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example, Tribunal staff members may work as Associate Legal Officers in the
ICTR for two years and then they may move to another tribunal adjudicating
similar crimes in a different location such as Freetown in Sierra Leone (Sierra
Leone Special Court). The substantive law may be similar but the nature of the
conflict and the associated history of the regions are vastly different. These
international experts spend no more than two to three years at each tribunal as
they follow the spread of international criminal justice.

The role of experts within networks is not neutral similar to Sarfaty’s World Bank
employees. 300 Their roles are deeply political, embedded with a particular
universalistic ethos of ending impunity for mass human rights violations. David
Kennedy’s insights suggest that the background norms of international
institutions are more important than we had originally thought.301 The political
values of experts within the tribunals in effect shape the outcome of the process.
The process nonetheless is supposed to be objective enough to ensure that the
accused are given a fair trial. These experts within the Tribunal however manage
the background norms that permeate the value-structure of the tribunals. As
Kennedy has highlighted, what really matters at the global institutional level is
not what is in the foreground (the tribunals) or the context (Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia). Rather,
[t]he work of the background has colonized the foreground and the
context. The foreground increasingly seems a mere spectacle—a
300
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performance to which we attribute agency, interest and ideology. At
the same time, it is difficult to locate elements of context, which are
not constructed by people managing background norms and
institutions. Indeed, the foreground and the context may well turn
out to be effects of background practices.302
The judges and their experts (Associate Legal Officers and Interns) have a proconviction bias, which may be rooted inherently in the way international law is
constructed, as part of the civilising mission and the dynamic of difference.303
Lack of training and cultural competencies with regard to the local context has a
significant influence on outcomes. What are the interests that are driving the
jurisprudence of the ICTR? Are the judges and the Tribunal staff biased? Have
the accused been afforded sufficient substantive and procedural rights
protections? These questions are important indicators in calibrating the calculus
of accountability and legitimacy production.

Much more importantly, the role of the experts in driving the pro-conviction bias
further illustrates my point about the operation of the dynamic of difference within
international criminal law. The creation of the Tribunal by the Security Council is
the first step in bridging the gap between two distinct cultures. Then by
institutionalising the appointment of judges and their experts through the
Chambers, the Security Council has ensured that the logic of western
universalism is entrenched deep within the institutions structure. The experts are
an essential feature of the western adjudicatory model as it furthers the search
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for the truth and justice. But again, this model is unable to understand and
incorporate the specific local context.

1.5. Universal Prosecutions? Case Study of the International Criminal
Court and Prosecutorial Selectivity
The international criminal justice regime has rapidly evolved over the past 20
years and culminated in the adoption of the ICC through the 1998 Rome Statute.
The road to the creation of the International Criminal Court however started
much earlier. As discussed earlier in this dissertation, the desire for an
international court to prosecute war criminals from WWI and WWII is clearly
documented.304 This desire was not possible until the end of the Cold War. The
idea of an international criminal court was brought back to life, after a long
hiatus, by Trinidad and Tobago. 305 They made this request as a means to
address concerns over drug trafficking. The UN General Assembly requested the
UN International Law Commission to “address the question of establishing an
international criminal court in 1989”. 306 By the time the International Law
Commission had completed the draft statute in 1994, there were signs that the
international community would be receptive to the idea of an International
Criminal Court. Cryer suggests that the Commissions’ draft arrived at a fortunate
time for the following reasons:
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Cold War divisions had thawed, there was enthusiasm for
international criminal tribunals, and the international community had
embarked on several treaty-based initiatives strengthening human
rights and humanitarian law. Scepticism about the prospects of a
permanent international criminal court was diminishing.307
In this context, UN General Assembly established an ad hoc committee to
examine the issue further. Within a year, there was sufficient support to create a
Preparatory Committee to draft the treaty. Based on the Law Commissions’ draft,
the Preparatory Committee was able to create a new statute that “served as the
basis for negotiation at the World Conference held in Rome in 1998”.308 The aim
of the five-week conference was to create consensus amongst states and to iron
out controversies within Preparatory Committee’s draft statute. A mix of states,
non-governmental organisations, international governmental organisations in
conjunction with the United Nations, helped draft the International Criminal
Court’s Statute.309 Most of the negotiations were carried out in small committees
composed of states and their delegations.310 There were significant issues of
contention at the conference. Some of these issues for example included the role
of the UN Security Council311, the breadth and scope of the various crimes and
the role of gender.312
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The states gathered at the conference adopted the draft text and the Rome
Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. The Rome Statute, with over 128
provisions, delineates the four international crimes over which the Court has
jurisdiction. The Statute doubles as a multilateral treaty. The Rome Statute is the
result of years of efforts by human rights activists and policy makers to curtail
impunity enjoyed by state actors and non-state actors in the commission of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and the international crime of
aggression.313

As of 5 August 2015, there are 123 states party to the Statute. It has a special
but at times tense relationship with the United Nations Security Council.314 The
permanent International Criminal Court, for its part, is a tribunal of last resort in
the cases of states that are party to its Statute. The ICC’s complementarity
provision allows the Court to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes if the
State party is unwilling or unable to do so.315

There are essentially three ways by which the Court’s jurisdiction can be
triggered so that it can exercise its territorial or personal jurisdiction over alleged
international crimes. The Court, through the Office of the Prosecutor can receive
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referrals about a situation (as opposed to a case316) of grave concern by a state
party to the Rome Statute.317 United Nations Security Council can similarly refer
a situation.318 In the third method, the prosecutor (currently Fatou Bensouda) can
commence investigations proprio motu (on her own initiative) based on
communications submitted by states, non-governmental organisations and
concerned individuals.319 All three mechanisms automatically trigger the powers
of the prosecutor but to different degrees.

If the prosecutor receives state or Security Council referral, the Statute requires
a preliminary investigation. Here, the prosecutor must first conduct an analysis of
information in order to determine whether the statutory threshold to start an
investigation is met (art.53). When the prosecutor receives a communication for
the purposes of the proprio motu trigger, the standard is the same but the
starting point is reversed: the prosecutor shall not seek to initiate an investigation
unless she first concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed, which is
supervised by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC. Once a decision to initiate an
investigation is made, all of the parties concerned (including those that submitted
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the initial communication) are promptly informed of the decision, with supporting
reasons for the decision.320

There is an embedded hierarchy in the Statute’s procedures to trigger
jurisdiction. At the top of this hierarchy are Security Council referrals. With this
type of referral, the Statute makes the preconditions of jurisdiction, based on
nationality or territoriality, inapplicable (art.12). The drafters of the Statute placed
the Security Council at the apex of the Court referral mechanism because of its
powers stemming from Chapter VII of the UN Charter. These referrals are
considered to be the most authoritative. In this instance, the Statute does not
require approval by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court.321

The second trigger mechanism arises from state referrals under Article 14 of the
Statute. There is no need to seek Pre-Trial Chamber approval to commence a
preliminary investigation as such, but there is the possibility that a State referral
can be found to have no reasonable basis to proceed.

The third trigger mechanism arises from communications received from any
other source (for example non-governmental organisations) or on the initiative of
the prosecutor through her vested proprio motu powers in the Statute.322 This
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mechanism requires the Pre-Trial Chamber’s approval prior to deciding whether
to investigate based on the preliminary evidentiary findings. It is a weaker basis
for prosecution than state party or Security Council referrals, subject to two
different types of review mechanism under Article 53 of the Statute.

The Court has been actively seized of nine situations in which investigations or
prosecutions are underway, and is adjudicating close to 21 cases, all of which
involve African states.323 Of the nine situations, the state party referral by the
Union of the Comoros against Israel (a non state party) is an anomaly. Comoros
made the referral on the basis of alleged crimes committed on vessels registered
in Comoros and other state parties. On 5 July 2013, the Presidency of the
International Criminal Court assigned “the Situation on Registered Vessels of the
Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia” to
Pre-Trial Chamber I, but the Court stressed that this “is a procedural matter only,
and is not the beginning of an investigation”.324 On 06 November of 2014 ICC
prosecutor, based on the available information, declined to proceed with an
investigation. Even though her office determined that the Israeli Defence Force
may have committed war crimes on Mavi Marmara. 325 The prosecutor however
did not believe that a potential case would emerge from this investigation. The
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acts of violence perpetrated by the Israeli Defence Force were not of sufficient
gravity “to justify further action by the court”.326

Within the formal structures set up within the Statute, a highly contingent process
exists in which some situations are selected for investigation and prosecution,
while others are not. With reference to the nine situations before the Court; by
honing in on what has been included and excluded from those situations, I
pursue the dynamic of difference as it relates to how the ICC functions.327 In the
ensuing discussion, I will hone in on the manner in which cases are selected to
demonstrate how Anghie’s dynamic of difference continues to operate. In doing
so, I will focus on the manner in which the UN Security Council is deploying its
powers similar to what it did with the ICTR and ICTY.

1.5.1 Politics of Selection: ICC’s Prosecutorial Policy
Six of the situations before the Court involve state parties to the Statute who
were deemed by themselves, or the prosecutor, as unable to take charge of
prosecuting those alleged to have committed war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or genocide within their respective territories. Of these, the Central
African Republic, Uganda and Mali involved self-referrals. With reference to the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the prosecutor was in the process of initiating an
326
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investigation proprio motu when the country’s President, Joseph Kabila, referred
the situation to the Court in April 2004. The prosecutor has subsequently initiated
two proprio motu investigations in relation to post-electoral violence in Cote
d'Ivoire and Kenya. 328 There are, however, numerous other areas where the
Office of the prosecutor has been asked to initiate a proprio motu investigation:
Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea and Nigeria.329

In addition to the six state party situations, Libya and Sudan are not state parties
but have been referred to the Court by the UN Security Council. The Security
Council referred the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the prosecutor through
Resolution 1593 on 31 March 2005.330 This culminated in the issuance of the
arrest warrant in 2007 against Ahmad Muhammad Harun, Minister of State for
Humanitarian Affairs (since 2006) and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (the
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alleged leader of the Militia, Janjaweed).331 In 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the
Court issued the first ever arrest warrant against a head of State: Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir.332

The international politics of the Security Council referral started in 2004 with the
creation of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, headed by Antonio
Cassese. Acting under its Chapter VII powers, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1564 asking the UN Secretary General to establish a commission of
inquiry to investigate the violation of human rights, violation of international
humanitarian law and to determine whether acts of genocide were perpetrated
by the parties to the conflict.333 The Darfur Commission, in its final report, found
that there were serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian
law. It did not however find that Sudan had committed acts of genocide.
Nonetheless, the Commission strongly recommended that the “Security Council
immediately refer the situation of Darfur to the International Criminal Court,
pursuant to article 13(b) of the ICC Statute”.334 On 31 March 2005, the Security
Council passed Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to the
prosecutor335 by a vote of 11 in favour to none against, with four abstentions.336
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On 12 December 2014, ICC Prosecutor Bensouda announced that she would
halt the investigations into the Sudanese President Bashir because of the lack of
cooperation by the United Nations Security Council, states party and other
international organisations.

The civil unrest that started in several Middle Eastern and North African
countries in late 2010 spread into Libya in early 2011. The Gaddafi regime in turn
pursued a policy of brutal crackdown on protesters. The civil war that followed
triggered a UN authorised air and naval intervention by the international
community based on the responsibility to protect doctrine. The Gaddafi regime
was overthrown in 2011. In the midst of this acute crisis, the UNSC in Resolution
1970 referred the situation in Libya to the Court.337

On 27 June 2011, the Trial Chamber I of the Court issued three arrests warrants
for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, and
Abdullah Al-Senussi for crimes against humanity (murder and persecution)
allegedly committed across Libya from 15 February 2011 until at least 28
February 2011, through the Libyan state apparatus and security forces. The
Chamber terminated the case against Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar
Gaddafi in November 2012 due to his death. The Chamber further found that
336
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Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi as Muammar Gaddafi’s “unspoken successor and the most
influential person within his inner circle and, as such, he exercised control over
crucial parts of the State apparatus, including finances and logistics and had the
powers of a de facto Prime Minister”.338

Libya challenged the admissibility of the case against Al-Senussi before the ICC.
The Court decided that since Libya is able and willing to carry out the
investigation against the accused, the “case is inadmissible before the Court, in
accordance with the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome Statute,
founding treaty of the ICC”.339

By focusing on the two United Nations Security Council referrals (Darfur and
Libya), what becomes visible is the potential power of the ending impunity
narrative made visible in the discussions about the ICTY and ICTR. This
narrative, as encapsulated within the power of the United Nations Security
Council’s referral powers is particularly useful in demonstrating how the dynamic
of difference operates within the ICC. This is even more important given the
prominence of the UN Security Council in ICC referrals. The atrocious acts
perpetrated by the Libyan and Sudanese leaders are deemed sufficiently
barbaric that the United Nations Security Council has to act to bridge the gap
between the deplorable actions of these outlier states and the international
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community. The Court is used as the means to control the behaviour of these
states and bring the perpetrators to justice.

The referral of Sudan and the Bashir arrest warrant are an indication of a double
standard. In light of this double standard, the African Union is in the process of
creating a specialised human rights court to sidestep the ICC’s selectivity of
cases.340 The selectivity of referral of Sudan and Libya, and not other situations
in places like Palestine and Sri Lanka is too significant to ignore. This is even
more relevant when there are two international fact-finding investigations that
demonstrate mass human rights violations and international crimes in Palestine
and Sri Lanka, similar to Darfur that should invite a quick response by the United
Nations Security Council.

The Goldstone Report of September 2009, commissioned by the UN Human
Rights Council, alleges that Israeli soldiers targeted civilians and specifically
destroyed non-targetable infrastructure during Operation Cast Lead and the
Israeli war on Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009. 341 The
Goldstone Report recommended that the United Nations Security Council refer
the case to the ICC using its universal jurisdiction powers set out in the Statute.
The recent Israeli attacks on Gaza in July 2014 have precipitated another
international inquiry with yet another report detailing the commission of war
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crimes by both parties to the conflict. What is noteworthy however is the
analogous nature of the investigation undertaken by the Goldstone Commission
to Darfur Commission and the commissions of inquiry that called for the creation
of two ad hoc international criminal institutions. This illustrates the selectivity in
creating ad hoc tribunals and referring cases to the ICC. I am not suggesting that
the ICC should launch investigations immediately in Palestine or Sri Lanka as it
would perpetuate western universalism that I am critiquing. Rather the example
of Palestine and Sri Lanka serves to demonstrate the double standard in
prosecuting international crimes.

With the termination of hostilities in the Gaza Strip in 2009,342 the Palestinian
Authority’s Minister of Justice, Dr. Khashan, lodged a declaration pursuant to
article 12 (3) 343 of the Rome Statute. 344 Article 4 (1) of the Rome Statute
establishes the legal personality of the Court and the second limb of this
provision delineates the applicability of the Statute to states party.345 The ICC
and its Statute must be ratified by a state in order for the Court to have the
requisite jurisdiction through either state referral or through the initiative of the
prosecutor.346 The ICC Prosecutor conducted the pre-investigative analysis to
determine if the Palestinian Authority has the requisite ability to transfer
342
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jurisdiction to the Court, invoke the Rome Statute and prosecute those
responsible for the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
during Operation Cast Lead. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the former ICC Prosecutor
rejected this request as he did not want to determine if Palestine was a state for
the purpose of the Statute.347

In December 2014, the Palestinian Authority attempted to gain statehood with
United Nations Security Council resolution. This resolution was intended to
upgrade Palestine’s status before the United Nations. The failure to pass this
resolution precipitated the Palestinian Authority to ratify the Court’s Rome
Statute and submit a declaration under Article 12 (3) to accept the jurisdiction of
the Court.348 The Court can only exercise its jurisdiction once a state is party to
the Statute and thus the Palestinian Authority made the declaration as a means
to ensure that the Court can have jurisdiction to investigate the events during
Operation Protective Edge in July 2014.349 Palestine was accepted as a state
party on 01 April 2015.

The Sri Lankan government defeated the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE or Tamil Tigers) in May 2009. During the lead up to the defeat of the Tamil
Tigers, there were approximately 70,000-100,000 civilian causalities. The
347

International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine (Update) April
2012
online:
<http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf>.
348
Daphné Richemond-Barak, "Double Duty at the ICC" (2015) EJIL Talk! online:
http://www.ejiltalk.org/double-duty-at-the-icc/.
349
Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza Conflict,:
387/SituationinPaleSupp No 52, UN Doc A/HRC/29/52 (2015).

117

Secretary General and the former President, His Excellency Mahinda Rajapaksa,
agreed to a commitment to human rights and accountability.350 Subsequently,
the United Nations Secretary General appointed a Panel of Experts to advise
him on accountability for the violation of international human rights and
humanitarian law during the final phrase of the war in 2011.

The Panel’s recommendation calls for the establishment of an independent
international mechanism to monitor the Sri Lankan Government’s initiation of
accountability proceedings to investigate the alleged violations and to collect
evidence of past crimes. The international community, especially nongovernmental organisations 351 and the Tamil diaspora 352 are eager for the
prospects of delivering justice and ending impunity in Sri Lanka.353 On 27 March
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2014, the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution calling for
accountability. This Resolution tasks the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights with conducting another investigation into the alleged international
crimes. The High Commissioner has yet to conclude the investigation and will
most likely have more success than the Panel in getting the newly elected Sri
Lankan government to cooperate.

Even though there was clear and demonstrable evidence from the 2011 Panel’s
report of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the parties to the conflict,
the United Nations Security Council was silent. In the lead up to the end of the
civil war in May 2009, the Security Council could only muster a weak statement;
first demanding that the LTTE surrender. Second, that the Security Council
expressed “deep concern at the reports of continued use of heavy calibre
weapons in areas with high concentrations of civilians, and expect the
Government of Sri Lanka to fulfil its commitment in this regard”.354

Ultimately, what these case studies reveal is that there are only certain instances
in which the United Nations Security Council is willing to utilise its powers of
referral and bring a situation before the ICC. This vague, ambiguous, and highly
selective decisions making process is fraught with politics. The politics is often
fuelled by the self-interest of the Security Council’s permanent members. In the
Sudanese and Libyan examples, the Council was compelled to act as part of its
354
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role to maintain peace and order. But simultaneously, it is unwilling to use its
powers when it concerns one of the longest conflicts and enduring illegal
occupation in modern international law (Palestine355) and one of the bloodiest
recent civil wars (Sri Lanka).

This highly selective process in determining who is referred to the Court, and
who is not, clearly illustrates Anghie’s dynamic of difference. There two cultures
present: the cultures of those that are allies and the cultures of those that are
not. With reference countries in Africa, they have very little political influence in
the eyes of the Security Council. In Libya’s case, it is of little utility and thus, the
Security Council is willing to bridge the cultural difference through the ICC and
prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. But in
the case of Sri Lanka, a geo-political ally of China, India and Iran, the Security
Council is unwilling to act. Similarly with Israel, the western members of the
Security Council are unwilling to act against one of their strongest allies in the
Middle East.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides the empirical backdrop to my arguments in challenging
current

theorising

of

global

governance

institutions

through

global

constitutionalism and global administrative law. I traced the evolution of
international law and international institutions. I relied on international lawyers
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and international law scholars to set out the evolution of international law and its
institutions from the 17th to the 20th century. In doing so, I presented the standard
historical account and then posited insights that reveal a divergent narrative. In
taking of stock of the different perspectives, the discussion focused on how
international law and its institutions developed as part of colonialism and
imperialism of the European colonial settlers in the new world. The encounter
between the European sovereigns and the local inhabitants engendered a
relationship that was regulated by international law. This particular regulatory
framework then became a central feature in the development of international law
and subsequently was embedded within the respective international institutions.
The development of our current global order, in particular international
institutions thus embody a western universalism. I then traced the continuation of
this phenomenon in practice by examining one of the fastest growing
contemporary fields of international law; international criminal justice regimes.
Setting out the continuation of international law’s universalism provides the
historical background and contemporary empirical evidence to support my
central arguments that I will unfold in the forthcoming chapters: contemporary
theories of global governance, such as global constitutionalism and global
administrative law ignore and obscure international law and its institutions’ past.
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Chapter 2: Globalisation and Fragmentation of International Law
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will focus on globalisation and fragmentation of international
law. They are twin concepts that must be studied in conjunction to better
understand the manner in which international lawyers and international law
scholars are theorising global governance. In the previous chapter, I traced the
evolution of international law and its institutions. I was able to locate, based on
historical accounts, the colonial past of international law and its institutions. By
taking international criminal law and its institutions as case studies, I
demonstrated how international law and its institutions function using a
universalist register through Anghie’s dynamic of difference. 1 Moreover the
discussion in the previous chapter examined how this past continues to affect the
manner in which international law and its institutions perform their duties today.

I first looked at the origins of international law, starting with the Treaty of
Westphalia and other developments in international law and its institutions by
focusing on the evolution of specific doctrines and institutions. The central theme
of the previous chapter is the capacity of international law and its institutions’ to
make the particular western narrative into a universalism that is applicable to all.

1

Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 4 [Anghie, Imperialism].
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I then turned to one of the fastest growing fields of international law as my case
study: international criminal law. The case studies illustrate how international law
is haunted by its tendencies to perpetuate universalism. I focused on the field of
international criminal law, its three recently created institutions and how these
institutions embody the dynamic of difference in how they function. The anatomy
of this process is to create a universal narrative that becomes applicable to all
cultures.

The early 18th century move to institutions is celebrated in traditional public
international law scholarship. It is seen as a pivotal moment in creating dispute
resolution mechanisms that foster peace through the institutionalisation of
conflict resolution.2 The international community also celebrates the creation of
the international criminal institutions as a tremendous achievement.

But the

creation of the NIMT and IMTFE at the end of WWII did not prompt an expansion
of international criminal law. Rather, during the Post-War period, the Cold War
between the two superpowers limited any prospects of ending impunity and
prosecuting international crimes. Ending impunity however was one of the
central rallying cries of the international human rights movement in the Post-War
period. The international human rights movement evolved as part and parcel of
the various United Nations bodies created at the end of WWII.3

2

Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press
2012).
3
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The expansion the UN international human rights treaties and their respective
monitoring bodies were part of a broader trend in international law and
international relations to create institutions to resolve disputes. The rapid
expansion in various international institutions in the Post-War era, as
demonstrated in the previous chapter, has captured the imagination of many
scholars. On the one hand, the proliferation of international institutions and their
respective legislative, administrative and judicial powers has enabled the
development of highly specialised areas of international law. On the other hand,
the subfields, or what scholars have aptly coined as the self-contained units, are
so highly specialised that their various adjudicatory decisions either corroborate
or contradict existing understanding of international law and its principles.4

Globalisation and the fragmentation of international law have,5 for international
lawyers and international law scholars, accelerated the search for public
authority, legitimacy, and accountability in international law and its institutions.6
The concept of globalisation was coined in the 1970s, and in the same period as
global governance.7 It is an amorphous term with multiple and often contested
4

Bruno Simma “Self-Contained Regimes” (1985) 18 Netherlands YB112.
Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties”,
(2002) 15 Leiden J Intl L 553 [Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation”].
6
Antje Wiener, Anthony F. Lang, James Tully et al. “Global constitutionalism: Human rights,
democracy and the rule of law” (2012) 1:1 Global Constitutionalism 1 at 8.
7
Henk Overbeek, “Global Governance: From Radical Transformation to Neo-Liberal
Management” in Henk Overbeek et al, “Forum: Global Governance: Decline or Maturation of an
Academic Concept?” (2010) 12 Intl Studies Rev 696; The 1995 Commission on Global
Governance (CGG) report defined global governance as: “Governance is the sum of the many
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a
continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce
compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to
5
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meanings. In short, the term globalisation is used to describe the changes our
global society has witnessed, and continues to experience. More specifically,
globalisation is considered to be the process of transformation that stretches
over several centuries. 8 Globalisation describes changes in our social reality
precipitated by the relocation of different actors, from local, to regional to
international spaces. Furthermore, it describes a destabilisation of the
public/private distinctions and the evolution of actors and norms beyond the
reach of the traditional nation state.

One of the consequences of the social, economic, legal and political interaction
fostered by the nation state 9 is the hyper-specialisation in specific areas of
international law. 10 As the social, economic, legal and political interaction
expands at all levels of our global society, the nation state agrees to delegate
some of its core functions to international organisations and other non-state
actors. Globalisation helps us understand the role of international institutions and
or perceive to be in their interest”; The Commission on Global Governance, Our Global
Neighbourhood (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 2; The term is a both a
heuristic device that captures and describes the fast-paced development of our international
system and a normative concept that details how societies should address global problems;
Klaus Dingwerth & Phillip Pattberg “Global Governance as a Perspective on World Politics”
(2006) 12 Global Governance 185 at 191 & 193; Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair,
Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 3-18; Lawrence
Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance?” 1 (3) (1995) Global Governance 368; James N.
Rosenau “Governance in the Twenty-first Century” (1995) 1:1 Global Governance 14.
8
William Twining, Globalization and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000) at 6.
9
Saskia Sassen, “The State and Globalization” in Rodney Bruce Hall & Thomas J. Biersteker,
eds, The Emergence of Private Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) 91 [Sassen, “State and Globalization”]; Saskia Sassen, “The Emergence
of Electronic Markets: The Case of Global Capital Markets” in Karin Knorr Cetina & Alex Preda,
eds, The Sociology of Financial Markets (Oxford University Press, 2005) 27 [Sassen “The
Emergence of Electronic Markets”].
10
Frédéric Mégret, “Globalization and International Law” in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition).
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international law in facilitating the growth of global governance. Much more
importantly, as the scale of global interactions stretches, we are witnessing a
change in how we are regulated. There is a shift in how legislative,
administrative, and judicial decisions are made at the global level. In fact, there is
a transformation of governance at the global level. In the international sphere,
there is no state-like sovereign, given the very nature of international law. This
realisation has led scholars to turn their attention to creating accountability and
legitimacy through for example global constitutionalism and global administrative
law in global governance.

Simultaneously, as we encounter greater connectivity between places through
economic and social exchanges, we are witnessing a bifurcation of international
norms by different adjudicatory bodies in our expanding global space. Scholars
worry that the various international adjudicatory bodies are rendering different
and

contradictory

decisions.

Coined

as

a

postmodern

anxiety,

11

the

fragmentation of international law has prompted scholars to search for ways in
which accountability and legitimacy can be included in the dynamics of
international law and its functionaries. Global constitutionalism and global
administrative law are two such attempts to theorise global governance.

In what follows, I will describe globalisation and fragmentation of international
law and engage with the theoretical discussions that seek to comprehend the
11

Koskenniemi & Leino, “Fragmentation” supra note 5.
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rapid expansion of global governance.

I will first present the orthodox

understandings of globalisation and then I will challenge these claims using the
scholarship of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Saskia Sassen. In the following
section, I will examine fragmentation of international law. Globalisation and
fragmentation of international law are used as the rationale to theorise global
governance from a constitutional law or administrative law perspective. The
ensuing discussion will first introduce these important concepts of globalisation
and fragmentation. Simultaneously, the following analysis will also seek to
challenge some of the basic assumptions embedded in these discussions as
means to open up a space to challenge global constitutionalism and global
administrative law in the following chapters.
2.2 Globalisation and the Turn to International Institutions
There are multiple understandings of the contents of the term globalisation.
Fundamentally, the term seeks to capture the changes in our every day modern
life. It speaks to the deterioration of public/private distinctions and the evolution
of actors and norms. It involves a process of interconnectedness that is far
beyond what is achieved through technological or economic progress.

Scholars from law, sociology, politics and other disciplines, use varying
approaches to understand this concept. There is agreement amongst these
scholars that globalisation is a recent phenomenon that has managed to alter our
daily experiences. But there is no agreement on “which dimensions contain the
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essence of globalisation”.12 The exact contours of the processes of globalisation
are the subject of major disciplinary battles. This frustration over globalisation
has spilled into the streets of Geneva, Rio, Cancun, Seattle, London and Toronto
as well.13 The continuously expanding markets and capital has pushed national
citizens affected by these changes on to the streets. The frustration over
globalisation reflects its real life significance on individuals from various regions
and cities that are directly affected by its consequences, which then precipitates
the above referenced protests. Yet there are those that remain steadfastly
unconvinced by such claims. They suggest that arguments about the extension
of interdependence are dangerously overblown.14

A description of the significance of globalisation for scholars writing in various
fields will be provided below. This will be positioned as the mainstream
description of globalisation. Upon establishing this context, focus will then turn to
the writings of Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Saskia Sassen as a means to
12

Manfred B. Steger, Globalization, A short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
at 11 [Steger, A Short Introduction].
13
David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington
Consensus (London: Polity Press, 2004 & 2013) at 2.
14
Specifically, they argue that: “the present highly internationalized economy is not
unprecedented; genuinely transnational companies appear to be relatively rare (most are
multinationals imbricated in their home countries’ political economies); contemporary capital
mobility is not producing a massive shift of investment and employment from the advanced to the
developing countries; foreign direct investment is actually highly concentrated among the
advanced countries and the Third World remains marginal in both investment and trade; the
world economy, far from being genuinely global, concentrates investment and trade flows within
the economies of the core; and perhaps most importantly, global markets are by no means
beyond societal capacity to regulate transnational capital, instead it is elite preferences and
power which prevent such measures. They do not deny trends towards increased
internationalism, nor that there are important constraints on nationalist industrial policy; their
claim is rather that there is still a major role for nation–state level policy measures”; William K.
Tabb
“Questioning
Globalization”,
online:
(2001)
53:5
Monthly
Review
<http://monthlyreview.org/2001/10/01/questioning-globalization/>; Paul Hirst & Grahame
Thompson, Globalization in Question (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).
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interrupt this mainstream account. By presenting the writings of both Santos and
Sassen, I seek to challenge the assumptions about the very nature of
globalisation in international law scholarship. Broadly, this particular discussion
about globalisation leads to the rationale of the search for public authority,
legitimacy and accountability that is encapsulated with various theories of global
governance.

For some scholars, globalisation signifies that we now live in one world.15 The
argument is that “not only is globali[s]ation very real, but its consequences can
be felt everywhere”. More importantly, “[N]ations have lost their sovereignty they
once had and politicians have lost most of their capability to influence events”.16
Similarly David Held and Anthony McGrew posit that “simply put, [globalization]
denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening
impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction”.17 There is a shift
in the scale of human social organisation that links distant communities together.
This shift further expands the reach of power relations across the world’s major
regions and continents.18 For others, this type of interpretation of globalisation
simply ignores the very essence of the unequal manner in which it operates. In
this context, globalisation is seen as a set of social processes that transforms
current social conditions. It is exemplified by “weakening nationality into one of
15

Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives
(New York: Rutledge, 2003) at 6.
16
Ibid at 8.
17
David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 1st
Edition (London: Polity Press, 2002) at 4.
18
David Held & Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide, 1st
Edition (London, Polity Press, 2002) at 4.
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globality”. 19 At the centre of this claim is idea that globalisation is about “shifting
forms of human contact”.20

Globalisation thus is envisioned as a force that has somehow changed the
manner in which states operate based on economics. For instance, the claim
that states have lost their sovereignty is premised on a limited conception of
state behaviour. The various scholars writing under the descriptive camp of
global constitutionalism suggest that international law has been developing in
various regional and functional pockets in an amorphous and non-hierarchical
system.21 These same scholars suggest that economic, social and cultural forces
of globalisation motivate international law and its institutions.

22

Global

administrative lawyers also adopt such a vision of globalisation that underpins
their move to global governance as administration.23

This conventional account of globalisation presented above is simply not true,
especially in a post-911 world.24 The terrorist attacks on New York City in the
United States on 11 September 2001 ushered in a new regulatory era.
Governments are reconceptualising a number of different policies in their
territories and abroad. In particular, there has been merger of domestic criminal
19

Steger, A Short Introduction supra note 12 at 9.
Ibid.
21
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, international
law, and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
22
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See chapter 4, False Universalism of Global Administrative Law.
24
I have elaborated on this point in: Shanthi Senthe and Sujith Xavier, “Re-Igniting Critical Race
in Canadian Legal Spaces: Introduction to the Special Symposium Issue of Contemporary
Accounts of Racialization in Canada” (Forthcoming) (2015) Windsor YB Access Just.
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law, immigration and administrative law that regulates foreign nationals through
such schemes as national security certificates. Yet what is accurate about this
conventional account is that there is a large-scale expansion of social interaction
at the global level. This expansion is made possible by both existing and new
infrastructures though global governance regimes.

Sassen rightly rejects the idea that the nation state is losing its sovereignty.25 For
Sassen, the globalisation debate incorrectly centres on a duality between the
national and global state. 26 She points to key contemporary government
institutions, for example the ministry of finance and banks, and other types of
institutions that do not fit well into this picture.27 For Sassen, this is an impetus to
reimagine the globalisation debate. She contends that her “position is not
comfortably subsumed under the proposition that nothing has changed in terms
of state power nor under the proposition of the declining significance of the
state”.28

The continuous participation of states within the global economic system has
ensured that they have undergone a “significant transformation”.29 The state is
the guarantor of the rights of global capital, but its role has been relegated to the
background. Sassen argues that this is indicative of the state’s technical and

25

Sassen, “State and Globalization” supra note 9.
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administrative role, and this role cannot be mimicked or performed by any other
institution. More importantly, this capacity, as Sassen points out, is backed by
military and global power for most states. 30

For scholars writing on the global South, globalisation is directly related to
imperialism. Bhupinder Chimni suggests that the “[t]he threat of recolonisation is
haunting the world… The process of globali[z]ation has had deleterious effect on
the welfare of third world peoples”.31 International law and its institutions facilitate
this process of recolonisation. Through such mechanisms as good governance,
international law and its institutions furthered the flow of globalisation.32

Santos, writing in the same vein, defines globalisation by taking it outside the
sole arena of economics. He notes “the process of globali[z]ation is […]
selective, uneven and fraught with tensions and contradictions. But it is not
anarchic”.33 For Santos, globalisation is “the process by which a given local
condition or entity succeeds in extending its reach over the globe and, by doing
so, develops the capacity to designate a rival condition or entity as local”.34
There are two specific methods in which globalisation is produced.

30
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33
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The first mode of production are: globalised localism and localised globalism.
Globalised localism depicts the process by which a given local phenomenon is
successfully globalised. The latter “depicts the specific impact of transnational
practices and imperatives on local conditions that are thereby altered”.35 These
two processes operate in tandem to constitute the hegemonic neoliberal and topdown globalisation. Law generally, and international law and its many institutions
in particular, is an example that fit nicely in the first mode. Criminal law is
exemplary in this manner.

The second mode of production of globalisation is insurgent cosmopolitanism.36
It includes “transnationally organised resistance against the unequal exchanges
produced or intensified by globalised localisms and localised globalisms”.37 The
resistance is organised through local and global linkages between social
organisations and movements representing those classes and social groups
victimised by hegemonic globalisation. A good illustration is the protests around
the world against the expanding markets and capital. Various social movements
are united in concrete struggles against “exclusion, subordinate inclusion,
destruction of livelihoods and ecological destruction, political oppression, or
cultural suppression, et cetera”.38 In this analysis, the core countries produce and
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market globalised localism. Countries on the periphery are forced to receive
these localised globalisms.39

Santos’ description of globalisation situates the different forces that are involved
in the creation of this particular social condition. His analysis closely traces the
diverse and unequal distribution of wealth and power between the global North
and the global South. By characterising the effects of globalisation as both cause
and effect of the distribution of unequal wealth and power, Santos offers a much
more nuanced perspective of how recent social interactions and the rapid
expansion of international law and its institutions can be understood. Much more
importantly, he captures a particular unequal tendency to delegate legislative,
administrative and judicial functions to international organisations and the
ensuing dynamic of difference that follows. Ultimately, Santos’ theoretical
construction allows us to understand the multifaceted nature of globalisation
rather than presenting a one sided perspective.

Some writers have noted that globalisation is a “vehicle by which European
public law was projected on to the rest of the world”.40 European public law, the
once coveted and revolutionary ideals of a single region, is now, to use Santos’
term, a globalised localism. Similarly, the notion of the nation state that was born
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William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000) at 5.
40
Frédéric Mégret, “Globalization and International Law in R. Wolfrum ed, The Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, online edition)
at 6.
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out of the Treaty of Westphalia is also a globalised localism. 41 To invoke
Sassen’s contribution, it is through the state that localised globalism and
globalised localisms are now possible.

In this complicated and contested intellectual map of globalisation, what is clear
is that globalisation is a process rather than an end result. International lawyers
and international law scholars at times are silent about this type of processes. It
has been argued that their domestic counterparts were the first to sense the
importance of globalisation as it affected their domestic areas of legal practice.42

As international lawyers and international law scholars became more attuned to
the forces of globalisation and the role of the state, they realised the significance
of its role and consequences for their discipline. One of the central
consequences is the recognition that the process of globalisation is generating
multiple and often overlapping systems of governance. Once these regimes are
created, often with the consent of the nation state, they operate and function
without oversight, as I illustrated in the previous chapter. Undoubtedly, there is a
lacuna in accountability 43 and legitimacy 44 . The preoccupation with both
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legitimacy and accountability will be the focus of the following two chapters. The
process of globalisation, global constitutional and global administrative scholars
argue, is one of the main reasons why they are seeking to discover, either
through meta constitutional or administrative norms or principles, the
constitutional and administrative tendencies within international law and its
international regulatory regimes. By discovering these norms, the scholars
working on global governance theories hope to curb, mediate and moderate
these institutions using domestic law analogies. Yet these writers simply ignore
the very nature of globalisation narrated by Santos. In ignoring this aspect of
globalisation, these scholars are also able to forgo and omit any discussions
about the context (and the dynamic of difference) in which these global
governance regimes operate.

2.3 Fragmentation of International Law
The evolution of international law, as demonstrated in the previous chapter,
illustrates a struggle for cohesion and uniformity. International law started out as
a means to regulate the relationships between equal European sovereigns.
Another reading could be that international law concretised the framework in
which European sovereigns could interact with their conquered subjects.
International law expanded drastically from the Treaty of Westphalia to the
current system in which there are multiple norms, actors, and processes. By the
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late 1990s to the early 2000s, scholars and practitioners, in particular the judges
of the International Court of Justice, worried about the proliferation of selfcontained units and the possibilities of having multiple and competing
interpretations of international law.45 Their anxieties can be illustrated through
two examples of contradictory judicial interpretations by different international
courts.

The first is the competing interpretation of territorial reservations by the
European Court of Human Rights and the International Court of Justice.46 The
second example is conflicting judicial interpretation state responsibility between
the International Court of Justice and the ICTY. In this example, one of the first
ICTY decision conflicted with the state responsibility test created by the
International Court of Justice in its landmark decision in US v Nicaragua.47

The real danger, according to judges, scholars and the international law’s
epistemic community, is “that international law as a whole will become
fragmented and unmanageable”.48 In thinking about this particular issue, Rosalyn
Higgins suggests writes the following:
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“Judicial findings that are inconsistent with the judgments of the
International Court of Justice would present particular problems for
the role of international law in international relations, given that the
International Court is the judicial arm of the United Nations and the
only judicial body vested with a universal and general subject matter
jurisdiction”.49
This problem is significant for the discipline of international law, its institutions
and practitioners of international law. The presence of conflicting interpretation of
specific rules of international law by various tribunals and courts simply creates a
lack of coherent and predictable rules that can be generally applied. The
International Law Commission’s study of fragmentation suggests that there are
three potential places of conflict: there are tensions between different
interpretations of general law, tension between general law and special law, and
tension between two types of special law.50

The hyper-specialisation of international law has compelled certain scholars to
question the self-contained units of international law.51 In order to overcome the
issue of hyper-specialisation, some scholars have used the metaphor of
international law as a highway between the different and “isolated villages of
international environmental law, international criminal law, international trade
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law, et cetera”. 52 The literature suggests various methods of tackling this
particular issue, ranging from specific construction of the conflicting treaties to
applying the hierarchy of rules found in the International Court of Justice’s
Statute.53

It is difficult to describe the emergence of new global governance actors that are
not wedded to the nation state using our international law vernaculars. These
regimes, with their particular rules and regulatory norms, have further
exacerbated our conceptions of the strict divisions of labour between the
executive and legislative arms of government. Our conceptions of governance
moreover are wedded to orthodox understandings of our existing national
worlds.54 The division of labour in this instance is the various roles taken on by
the judiciary, the legislative and executive branches of government in the nation
state through the constitutional separation of powers. In light of these concerns
about the bifurcation of international law, scholars, primarily in Europe have
unsurprisingly sought to unify the field of international law through ideas
embedded in constitutions and constitutionalism and administration.55
52
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For the purpose of this analysis, it is useful to define fragmentation as the
“branching out and gaining some form of quasi-independence” of various
international mini regimes and orders.56 Fragmentation is described as “having
developed in two distinct periods”.57 Mario Prost suggests that the first period
can be visualized through two themes: “the functional automisation of special
regimes” and “the multiplication of international tribunals”.58 Within each thematic
space, scholars oscillate between having strong views on how special
international regimes, which were created with their own rules of interpretation,
are self-contained units, to those that view self-contained units as being
dependent upon a general body of international rules. With reference to the
second theme, there are those that view the proliferation of different institutions
as creating “problems of overlapping and conflicting jurisprudence in a way that
undermines the coherence, foreseeability and efficacy of the international legal
order”.59 The first period, which would ultimately start from the rapid of expansion
of international law and international institutions in the Post-War era is concerned
with the predictability of the international legal order.

But what is missing from these debates, as illustrated from the previous chapter,
is the manner in which international law and its institutions were constructed and

56

Jan Klabbers “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 14.
57
Prost, Unity of PIL supra note 45 at 9.
58
Ibid at 9 & 9-14.
59
Ibid at 11.
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how they continue to act. Even though there were concerns about the specific
rules and their applications in the broader international legal order, there was
very little emphasis on how these rules affected the global South.

In the second period of fragmentation, important questions centre on the search
for coherence and unity in international law. If these are legitimate objectives,
then how can this complex web of interactions and interrelations between all of
these different actors, norms and processes be organised? The aim is to find
“principles, methods and techniques that can be used to put the pieces of the
puzzle together and bring order to multiplicity.”60 Oddly enough, as Prost has
pointed out, postmodern anxiety has focused solely on one side of the debate:
fragmentation. It has ignored the concept of unity, “a graded concept for it can be
taken from different angles and standpoints, and it possesses various semantic
layers”.61

Similar to the reactions about globalisation, what emerges from the literature on
fragmentation is the desire, in some way, to piece together often-conflicting parts
of international law and its institutions through a unifying theory. These various
components of the international legal order had to be unified in a manner that
would resemble domestic incarnations of a legal system.

60
61

Ibid at 11.
Ibid at 17.
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The search for what Prost has suggested as unity in international law can be
discovered in attempts to find accountability and or legitimacy through ideas of
constitutionalism or delegation and accountability as principles encapsulated
within administrative law. Yet this search for unity does not take stock of the
challenges of international law. To bring Santos back into the discussion, there is
complete

omission

of

the

second

mode

of

insurgent

cosmopolitanism. 62 Fundamentally, the anxieties about fragmentation have
prompted scholars to search for some means of unifying the various international
legal orders.

2.4 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to position globalisation and fragmentation of
international law as the reason behind the surge in scholarship focused on public
authority, accountability and legitimacy in international law. This search can be
broadly encapsulated under global constitutionalism and global administrative
law. Arguably, the effects of both globalisation and fragmentation have lead
scholars to search for new ways of imaging our international order. In the next
two chapters, I trace how scholars are articulating these measures. I detail how
scholars are theorising global governance through global constitutionalism and
global administrative law.

62

Ibid at 396; Ibid at 263.
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Chapter 3:

False Universalism of Global Constitutionalism and Global

Constitutionalisation?
3.1 Introduction
Globalisation and fragmentation of international law have inspired international
lawyers and international law scholars to theorise global governance through
global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.1 It is not surprising that
international lawyers and international law scholars are using the constitutionalist
lens as a means to understand, mitigate and contend with the fast-paced
evolution of international norms and international institutions. 2 Lawyers and
scholars who adopt this perspective are suggesting it is possible to use
constitutional vernaculars to describe the emergence and operation of
international law and its various institutions.3 International criminal law and its
institutions are an illustrative example in this exercise.4

1

Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, “A Functional Approach to International
Constitutionalization” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds, Ruling the World;
Constitutionalism, international law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009)
at 5-9 [Dunoff & Trachtman, “Functional Approach”].
2
Peters & Armingeon regard it as “constitutionalist spectacles”; Anne Peters & Klaus Armingeon,
“Introduction—Global Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective” (2009) 16:2 Ind J
Global Leg Stud 385 at 385 [Peters & Armingeon, “Introduction”].
3
Ronald St. John Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on
the Legal Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) [Macdonald &
Johnston, World Constitutionalism].
4
Axel Marschik, “Legislative Powers of the Security Council” in Ronald St. John Macdonald & D.
M. Johnston eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal Ordering of the World
Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) 457 at 461-472 [Marschik, “Legislative powers of
SC”].
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Arguably the emergence of various global constitutionalism and global
constitutionalisation perspectives is indicia of the concretisation of international
norms. An example of this concretisation is the development of the prohibition
relating to the commission of genocide. The prohibition of genocide can pierce
the veil of immunity often afforded to incumbent heads of state and their foreign
ministers. As such it prohibits officials from violating internationally accepted
principles. The prohibition of genocide is similar to a constitutional arrangement
within the domestic/national legal frameworks with guaranteed rights, duties and
other such protections against arbitrary use of public power. Another example is
the cosmopolitan project of creating the federal European state.5 A large number
of scholars writing about constitutionalism (and surveyed in this dissertation) are
inspired by the European integration project that started with the nuclear
agreements during the early Post-War period.6 The recent European Union debit
crisis has further spurred on this curiosity and the potential viability of the Union
as a constitutional project.

The purpose of this chapter is to study global constitutionalism and global
constitutionalisation as a unified field of inquiry. The current literature on global

5

Claus Offe, Europe Entrapped (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015); Claus Offe, "Europe
entrapped"(2013-02-06) Eurozine Review < http://www.eurozine.com/pdf/2013-02-06-offeen.pdf>.
6
Christine Schwöbel, “The Appeal of the Project of Global Constitutionalism to Public
International Lawyers” (2012) 13:1 German LJ1 at 5; See below for an in depth discussion of
Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009).
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constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation is tremendous.7 In what follows,
the first section will introduce the various components of global constitutionalism
and global constitutionalisation. Based on this analysis, the second section will
identify

three

specific

camps

within

the

current

literature

on

global

constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation: normative, descriptive and
pluralist. I will provide a detailed description of the arguments in each camp while
paying close attention to the various

scholars that push the normative and

descriptive agendas housed therein. My selection of the different scholars is
based on their contributions to their respective camps. Simultaneously, by using
the case studies detailed in the first chapter, I will challenge key assertions made
by these scholars. In particular, I will delve into the way in which global
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation are being deployed in unison to
further entrench the universalisms embedded in international law chronicled in
the first chapter.

I argue that global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation ignore,
obscure, and efface the underlying context and histories of international law and
its international institutions. Global constitutionalism presents a particular
western understanding of constitutionalism as universally applicable in diverse
contexts and thus, scholars writing in this genre of global governance theory reenact Antony Anghie’s dynamic of difference. By presenting such an image of

7

Christine Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011).

in

International

Legal

Perspective.
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the current world order, these scholars miss an important opportunity to take
stock of on-the-ground realities within contemporary international institutions.

3.2 Global Constitutionalism: Introducing Three Perspectives
The popularity of global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation in
international law coincides with Sujit Choudhry’s reflection that there is a
globalisation

of

modern

constitutionalism.

8

The

rise

in

comparative

constitutionalism is demonstrable through the adjudication process where judges
rely on interpretative techniques from foreign jurisdictions as guidelines for their
own adjudicatory practices. Comparative constitutionalism is often utilised as tool
to examine the proliferation of human rights protection across jurisdictions.
Scholars have coined this as the rights revolution. 9

The rise in comparative constitutionalism can be credited, rightly or wrongly, to a
number of reasons, including the transition to democracy in different countries.10
As countries emerge from Post-War, post-conflict, and post-authoritarian
contexts, they are searching for ways in which to structure their institutions, their
politics and their society. Good governance practices are used by international

8

Sujit Choudhry, “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74:3 Indiana Law Journal 819 at 821.
9
Sujit Choudhry, "Introduction: Integration, Accommodation and the Agenda of Comparative
Constitutional Law" in Sujit Choudhry ed, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration
or Accommodation? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 8.
10
Ibid at 8; Ran Hirschl, Towards Jurisocracy: The Origin and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
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development agencies as part of an arsenal of tools to support these countries.11
Some jurisdictions are attempting to move forward from a debilitating past
marred with mass human rights violations. At times these particular countries
want to confront individuals that may have participated in the commission of
mass atrocities. 12 The use of democratic governance in these countries,
especially after an intense period of authoritarian rule, repression, or conflict, has
been challenged. The challenge is three-fold predicated on who makes decisions
about the choice of procedures in democratic governance, how these decisions
are made, and in whose interests these decisions are made.

The transition from a violent past to a peaceful future has been the central focus
of the dynamic field of transitional justice. The field of transitional justice seeks to
understand how to move forward from times of acute crisis. Moreover,
transitional justice is often a catalyst to transition to democratic rule from postauthoritarian, post-communist, and post-conflict societies. There is an attempt in
this context to transition from moments of acute crisis by moving forward through
the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations as a means to
heal the divisions in the respective communities.13

11

Terence C. Halliday, “Architects of the State: International Financial Institutions and the
Reconstruction of States in East Asia” (2012) 37:2 Law and Soc Inquiry 265 at 272.
12
Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus between
Transitional Justice and Development” (2008) 2 Intl J Transitional Justice25; Vasuki Nesiah, “The
Trials Of History: Losing Justice In The Monstrous And The Banal” in Peer Zumbansen and Ruth
Buchanan, eds, Law in Transition: Development, Rights and Transitional Justice (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2013).
13
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Ruti G. Teitel, “The
Transitional Apology” in Elazar Barkan and Alexander Karn, eds, Taking Wrongs Seriously:
Apologies and Reconciliation (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2006); Paige Arthur, “How
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International prosecutions are part of the legal formalist answer to violence.
There are numerous alternatives to the formalist responses in transitional justice,
ranging from national prosecutions, truth commissions, sanctions, reparations,
amnesties and pardons.14 Earlier debates in international law, vis-à-vis largescale violence, focused on the creation of a right to democracy and the
promotion of democratic values.15 The right to democracy was both celebrated
and criticised. It was celebrated for its embedded values of democracy and the
potential for democracy to allow for participation. It was criticised for its
universalising nature, analogous to claims I set out in the first chapter.16

In

a

similar

vein,

the

rise

of

global

constitutionalism

and

global

constitutionalisation in international law is important. Constitutionalism, as
understood by constitutional scholars, is the theory associated with various
models of constitutions and norms that permeate any constitutional order. It is
the theory of governmental structure, limits of public power17 and procedures

Transitions Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice” (2009) 31
Hum Rts Q 2; Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark & Danielle Granville, Critical Perspectives in Transitional
Justice (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012).
14
Jose E. Alvarez, “Alternatives to International Criminal Justice” in Antonio Cassese, ed, The
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 25
[Alvarez, “Alternatives to ICL”].
15
Thomas Frank, “Emerging Right to Democratic Governance” (1992) AJIL46; James Crawford,
Democracy in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
16
Susan Marks, The Riddle of all Constitutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
17
The term public power is specifically used by those advocating for and against global
constitutionalism; Martin Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” in Petra Dobner and Martin
Loughlin eds, Twilight of Constitutionalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2010) 47 at 63-68
[Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation”]; Neil Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global
Context” in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek, eds, Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union
and Beyond (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2012) 17 [Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism”]. The
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through which public power can be exercised. The key principles of
constitutionalism are independence of the judges, delineation and separation of
the various branches of government, the protection of fundamental rights, and
the role of judges in policing the boundaries of public power.18

If constitutionalism is the political theory of constitutions, constitutionalisation can
be then described as a “process born of a reconfiguration of the political theory
of constitutionalism”. 19 Martin Loughlin argues that constitutionalism is being
repackaged as western liberal-legal constitutionalism and is presented as a freestanding set of norms20 that legitimises our fragmented and globalised social
order at all jurisdictional levels. Loughlin states:
Constitutionalism is no longer treated as some evocative but vague
theory, which expresses a belief in the importance of limited,
accountable government, to be applied flexibly to the peculiar
circumstances of particular regimes. It now is being presented as a
meta theory which establishes the authoritative standards of
legitimacy for the exercise of public power wherever it is located.21
Modern-day global constitutionalism can be traced back to Cicero and the
Roman Republic.22 Some scholars argue that Alfred Verdross and Hans Kelsen

reliance on the term public is the subject of a larger debate in critical legal studies; see for
example, Joseph Singer, “Legal Realism Now” (1988) 76 (2) Cal L Rev 465 at 477 & 534-535.
18
Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” supra note 17 at 55.
20

Ibid at 61-62.
Ibid at 61.
22
D. M. Johnston, “World Constitutionalism in the Theory of International Law” in Ronald St. John
Macdonald & D. M. Johnston, eds, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal
Ordering of the World Community (Leiden: Martinus Nihjoff, 2005) 3 at 16 [Johnston, “World
Constitutionalism in Theory”].
21
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were the first international lawyers to look to constitutionalism. 23 Some credit the
scholarship of Immanuel Kant and other philosophers of the 17th and 18th century
as inspiring the use of constitutionalism in international law.24 The creation and
development of international institutions during the mid-19th century, such as the
Danube Commission to regulate the international waterways, is emblematic of
the ideas expressed in Kant’s Perpetual Peace.25 International institutions were a
potential catalyst for dispute resolution. Arguably, the expansion of the nation
state through colonialism and imperialism facilitated the development of
international institutions. As demonstrated in the first chapter, the expansion of
the nation state, through conquest and colonisation of the new world, solidified
the unequal distribution of wealth and power. Global constitutionalism, as an
international legal discourse, seeks to contend with the modern-day incarnations
of these international institutions that make up the dense web of inchoate
regulatory actors, norms, and processes.26

23

Bardo Fassbender, “The Meaning of International Constitutional Law” in Nicholas Tsagourias,
ed, Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 312 [Fassbender, “The Meaning of International
Constitutional Law”].
24
Martti Koskenniemi, “Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about
International Law and Globalization” (2007) 8 Theor Inq L 9 at 12; Petra Dobner, “More Law,
Less Democracy? Democracy and Transnational Constitutionalism” in Petra Dobner & Martin
Loughlin, eds, The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, 2010) at 141.
25
Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace; A Philosophical Essay (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1903)
[Translated by Mary Campbell].
26
Peer Zumbansen, “Transnational Law, Evolving” in J. M. Smits ed, Elgar Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (Surrey: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2012).
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José Alvarez observed that different disciplines have different methods of
examining the proliferation of international law and its institutions.27 The literature
on global constitutionalism is akin to an interdisciplinary attempt to tackle the
fast-paced growth of international law and its institutions.28 International lawyers,
political scientists and scholars from other disciplines are leading the charge in
encouraging the conceptualisation of the constitutionalisation of international law
because of globalisation and fragmentation.29

Alec Stone Sweet describes global constitutionalisation as thick and thicker to
illustrate the varying perspectives that can be discerned within the current
literature on global constitutionalism. 30 Proponents of the thick version of
constitutionalism have a foundational notion of how “we organi[z]e the state,
constitute our government, provide for representation and participation, protect
minorities, promote equality, and so on”.31 The thicker version depicts a much
more cultural view of constitutionalism that is conceived “as an overarching
ideology of politics, community, citizenship, and the state”.32

27

Jose E. Alvarez, "The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences”, (2003) 38
Texas Intl LJ 405 [Alvarez, “The New Dispute Settlers”].
28
Mattias Kumm, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., James Tully & Antje Wiener, “How large is the world of
global constitutionalism?”, (2014) 3:1 Global Constitutionalism 1 at 1 [Kumm et al, “How large is
the world”]; Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Mattias Kumm, Antje Wiener, James Tully, & Miguel Poiares
Maduro, “Interdisciplinarity: Challenges and opportunities” (2013) 2 (1) Global Constitutionalism 1
[Lang et al, “Interdisciplinarity”]; Antje Wiener, Anthony F. Lang, Jr., James Tully, Miguel Poiares
Maduro & Mattias Kumm, “Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy and the rule of
law” (2012) 1 (2) Global Constitutionalism 1 [Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism”].
29
Alvarez, “The New Dispute Settlers” supra note 27.
30
Alec Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International Regimes” (2009) 16:2
Ind J Global Leg Stud 621 at 627; Sweet uses the language of thick and thin versions of
constitutionalism to identify the possible critique of constitutionalism.
31
Ibid at 627.
32
Ibid at 627.
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As alluded to earlier, irrelevant of whether one is operating at the thick or thicker
register of constitutionalism at the global level, there remains a tendency to
obscure the history of international law and its institutions. Discussions about the
organisation of various international institutions (thick version) or the cultural
views of constitutionalism (thicker version) simply ignore the manner in which
international institutions were forged and have evolved. By disregarding these
foundational aspects of international law and its institutions, scholars working in
global constitutionalism simply forgo any analysis of how western values of
constitutional arrangements, such as separation of powers, have become the
bedrock of their constitutional analysis.

In light of the burgeoning interdisciplinary literature, scholars have more recently
suggested yet another characterisation to understand global constitutionalism. In
a recent editorial in Global Constitutionalism, one of the leading international
interdisciplinary journals, the editors suggest that the current scholarship can be
grouped within the following three registers: normative school; functional school;
and pluralism school.33 Those working under the moniker of the normative school
view global constitutionalism as a “legal or moral conceptual framework that
guides the interpretation, progressive development or political reform of legal and
political practices beyond the state to reflect a commitment to constitutional

33

Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28.
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standards”.34 The functional school focuses on the manner in which international
organisations

are

created

through

different

bargaining

processes

and

negotiations. Their task is to investigate how international institutions function.
The pluralist school houses some of the more contested claims and arguments.
Here the literature is concerned with both describing the current fields of global
governance and creating new global governance regimes found within the
normative and functional schools of global constitutionalism. The literature
“emphasize[s] the importance of distinct, ancient, modern and post-modern eras
of constitutionalism”.35

In addition to José Alvarez’s depiction of the state of affairs based on disciplinary
methods, Stone Sweet’s thick and thicker constitutionalism and the three
different schools’ models described above, there are other taxonomies that
augment the contemporary attempts to understand global constitutionalism.36

These recent shifts in the taxonomies of global constitutionalism are subject to
both admiration and contestation. It is admired because of its uniqueness.
Scholars have been busy building the frameworks necessary to understand the
different claims being articulated in the vast literature of global constitutionalism
that describe constitutional formations in the global context. It is challenging in
34

Ibid at 7.
Ibid at 7-8.
36
These taxonomies of the current literature include for example: Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters &
Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009); Christine Schwöbel, Global Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective.
(Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2011).
35
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that there are multiple ways to organise the literature ranging from the abovediscussed typology of thick and thicker versions to the three different schools.
There are also suggestions that the literature can be organised under the idea of
strands 37 or under the headings of mappers and shapers. 38 Some have
suggested that supranational constitutionalisation can be viewed as trying to
reform the way in which international institutions function. 39 Additionally, the
same scholars argue for a “reconfiguration of the basis of the constitutionalism in
light of late modern conditions”.40

I have elected to pursue global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation
through the prism of three schools or camps outlined by the editors of Global
Constitutionalism. The normative, functional (or what I have reformulated as the
descriptive) and pluralist camps capture the major themes encapsulated within
the current literature on global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.
Moreover, the themes contained in these three camps are an accurate
characterisation of the various strands of literature in global constitutionalism as
opposed to other descriptors.

37

Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) [Klabbers et al, Constitutionalization of IL].
38
Garrett Wallace Brown, “The Constitutionalization Of What?” (2012) 1 Global Constitutionalism
201.
39
Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” supra note 17 at 63; Rob Howse and Kalypso
Nicolaidis "Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?" (2003) 16
Governance 73; Jeffrey Dunoff, “Ehard: The WTO's Constitution and the Discipline of
International Law (2006) 17 (3) Eur J of Intl L 647 [Dunoff, “Constitutional Conceits”].
40
Loughlin, “What is Constitutionalisation” supra note 17 at 64.
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The normative camp seeks to understand the proliferation of international law
and its institutions as part of the process of greater interconnectedness brought
on by globalisation.41 The writers in this camp focus on moulding the foundations
and practices of global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation as a
normative exercise.42 Their project promotes compliance with notions of the rule
of law as it is embodied in international law. More importantly, the scholars
envision global constitutionalism as a response to the acute crises presented by
globalisation and fragmentation, which generates a legitimacy gap in
international law and its institutions. In this regard, the normative camp wants to
transcend the democracy deficit through global constitutionalisation.
The democracy gap stems from both fragmentation of international law and
globalisation of international law in which international institutions are not
accountable to a constituent population. In our modern global order, international
institutions are making decisions without having the consent or validation that
stems from democratic practices found at the local national level.

The writers grouped under the descriptive camp want to understand and identify
the production of international law and its institutions as a form of
constitutionalisation in multiple jurisdictional levels.43 These scholars attempt to

41

Jürgen Habermas, Divided West (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006) [Habermas, Divided West];
David Held, Global Covenant: The Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus
(London: Polity Press, 2004) [Held, Global Covenant].
42
Garrett Wallace Brown, “The Constitutionalisation Of What?” (2012) 1 Global
Constitutionalism 201 at 204.
43
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds, Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, International
Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009)[Dunoff & Trachtman, Ruling
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disentangle the existing structures of international institutions and understand
how multiple actors, norms, and processes operate. It is possible to simply
characterise those writing in this genre as providing a descriptive account.44 By
envisioning the constitutional imperative, scholars in this camp are attempting to
provide a baseline from which the current international order can be vested with
legitimacy.

The pluralist camp has both empirical and normative elements. The empirical
project in this camp is concerned with describing the “competing claims of
ultimate political and legal authority raised in the names of different political
communities”.45 The normative perspective affirms and demands commitments
to political pluralism by thinking about constitutionalism as a doctrine and as a
potential to imagine a new and better world.46

In examining the three camps, I will pursue the scholarship of writers that have
actively engaged in expanding their research on global constitutionalism. I
selected the following scholars for a number of reasons ranging from clarity of
their respective claims, to the importance and significance of their contribution to
the discussions on global constitutionalism. I have included a diverse set of
scholars writing from various perspectives. For example, in the normative camp,
the World]; Macdonald & Johnston, World Constitutionalism supra note 3; Klabbers et al,
Constitutionalization of IL supra note 37.
44
Wiener, “Global Constitutionalism” supra note 28 at 7.
45
Zoran Oklopcic, “Provincializing Constitutional Pluralism” (2014) 5:2 Transnational Leg Theory
200 at 203 [Oklopcic, “Provincializing”].
46
Ibid at 203.
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I have solely focused on the scholarship of David Held and Jürgen Habermas,
two interdisciplinary scholars that have made enormous contributions to our
understanding of global governance, legal norms and world politics. 47 In the
descriptive camp, I have included the three sets of scholars that brought together
experts from various fields to describe and challenge the manner in which global
constitutionalism is conceptualised and described.48 In the pluralist camp, I focus
on the writings of Neil Walker, one of the central figures in the global
constitutionalism literature. All of these scholars come to global constitutionalism
from their respective fields and their scholarship examines specific institutions,
such as the European Union and the World Trade Organisation.

49

Understandably, their perspective on global constitutionalism is greatly
influenced by the dynamics of their respective fields.

In the following section, the writings of these scholars will be presented using the
prism of the three camps. In the remaining parts of this chapter, it will be argued
that global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation do not present a
wholesome understanding of how international law and international institutions
operate. Prompted by globalisation and fragmentation of international law, global
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation are new forms of global

47

David Held, Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010); Jürgen
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (Boston: MIT Press, 1998) [Translated by William Rehg].
48
Macdonald & Johnston, World Constitutionalism supra note 3; Dunoff & Trachtman, Ruling the
World supra note 43; Klabbers et al, Constitutionalization of IL supra note 37.
49
For example, Neil Walker writes about the European Union while Jefferey L. Dunoff’s writes
about the World Trade Organisation; Neil Walker 'Not the European Constitution' (2008) 15:1
Maastricht J European & Comparative L 135; Dunoff, “Constitutional Conceits” supra note 39.
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governance theory that are premised on a narrow and particular reading of
international law and its institutions. Such a critique of global constitutionalism
and global constitutionalisation is part of a recent trend in scholarship that
challenges the existing orthodoxies of international law.50 This trend is part of a
larger critical tradition that challenges law’s formalism.51 Scholars working on
global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation do not acknowledge the
origins of international law and its institutions, the context of its evolution, or its
predilection to present the western particular as universal ideal.

3.3 Normative Global Constitutionalisation and Global Constitutionalism
In what follows, I will examine the discourse that overtly calls for the
development of a normative agenda to shape and mould the existing
international legal order through attempts to secure peace and promote human
rights “as part of the good governance discourse”.52 This particular agenda’s
cosmopolitanism seeks to structure international law and its institutions, broadly,

50

Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of the Legal (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 70; Mario Prost, “Born Again Lawyer” (2006) 7:12 German
LJ 1037 at 1042; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic
Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Antony
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
51
Elizabeth Mensch, “The History of Mainstream Legal Thought” in David Kairys, ed, The Politics
of Law: A Progressive Critique (Pantheon, 1998) at 21; Jack M. Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice
and Legal Theory” (1986) 96 Yale LJ 743 at 746; Roscoe Pound, “A Call For a Realist
Jurisprudence” (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 697; Felix Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach” (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 809.
52
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 24 [Anghie, Imperialism].
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for the betterment of mankind.53 This type of analysis is tied to the progress
narrative presented earlier that position international law as the search for
universal law applicable to all. 54 The idea of progress in international law is
intricately connected to the work of international lawyers to plough their
respective fields of law.55 They do this work as a means to usher in regulatory
frameworks in various areas at the global level.

The implementation of this type of cosmopolitan ideals in the global context is
challenging. There is an absence of an executive or legitimate sovereign. There
is a lack of democratic legitimacy as generally seen in the domestic jurisdictions.
There is no ability to enforce international norms and practices similar to the
intermediary nation state. There is an absence of an executive or even a
legitimate sovereign in the global order. Finally, there is a lack of democratic
legitimacy as generally seen at the local national context. 56 Notwithstanding
these significant hurdles, there are numerous scholars that are pursuing a
normative research agenda under the moniker of global constitutionalism that
seek to reform the existing international institutional structures. Those working
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within this normative research agenda want to mould the existing international
legal order to secure peace, promote economic development, and human rights.

In order to understand the normative camp, I will examine the prolific scholarship
of David Held and Jürgen Habermas. These scholars have captured the
imagination of our contemporary international community through their
respective innovative research and knowledge production.57 More importantly,
these two scholars have significantly influenced the development of an
international legal order through their research by explicitly calling for greater
reforms of the United Nations. It is for this reason that I engage with their
scholarship in this section under the heading of the normative claims of global
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.
3.3.1 David Held and Collective Security
David Held’s scholarship on global constitutionalism has concentrated on the
building and strengthening of existing infrastructures to tackle current global
concerns. In an article titled “Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse Soon or
Reform!” he identifies three sets of global problems with which the international
community must grapple. They are: “concerns with sharing our planet (global
warming, biodiversity and ecosystem losses, water deficits), sustaining our
humanity (poverty, conflict prevention, global infectious diseases) and our
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concern over our rulebook (nuclear proliferation, toxic waste disposal, intellectual
property rights, genetic research rules, trade rules, finance and tax rules)”.58

In order to tackle these issues, Held suggests that we move away from the
Washington Consensus59 based economic policy model to a “wider vision of
institutions and policy approaches”. 60 This approach is premised on social
democracy. Held argues that we should strengthen existing institutions and
foster infrastructure that will deepen our abilities to solve issues of global
concern. In this regard, he argues for future of collective security through
regional and international organisations.

In Global Covenant, Held promotes the project of global social democracy as the
basis for guaranteeing “international law, greater transparency, accountability
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and democracy in global governance […]”.61 Ultimately the long-term goal is to
bring the various players to the table, even though they may have different
interests at stake. In the short-term, Held suggests reforming the existing
international institutions and the creation of specific international nongovernmental organisations. One of Held’s central goals is to ensure that there is
a new convention that reconnects security and human rights elements through
unification of the various spheres of international humanitarian law.

This goal in mind, Held calls for the creation of a new global international
constitutional convention “to explore the rules and mandates of new democratic
global bodies” along with the creation of other mechanism to regulate tax, water
and other relevant global issues.62 Moreover, he suggests that there should be
an expansion of the jurisdictions of the International Court of Justice and the
International Criminal Court, and calls for the creation of yet another human
rights court.63 The position Held advocates for is quite straightforward - greater
development of international law and the creation of additional international
institutions. Doing so, Held argues, will secure world peace and bring about
equitable redistribution of wealth and alleviation of poverty.
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We have already encountered this collective security argument in the context of
international criminal institutions.64 This argument is analogous to earlier claims
in favour of further developing international law, especially as it relates to the use
of the United Nations Security Council’s Chapter VII Charter powers to create the
ICTY and ICTR. At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council
was able to move beyond its limitations created by the power struggle between
the West and the Communist Block. Subsequently, the Security Council was
able to use its Charter power to maintain peace and security. This was a shift
from earlier policies of the Security Council because of the potential threat of the
veto by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its allies on the Council.

The suggestion to create international institutions as part of the normative
agenda of global constitutionalism, simply ignores the history of international law
and its institutions. Within international criminal institutions, we are able to see
the institutionalisation of Anghie’s dynamic of difference as it relates to the rights
of the accused and the role of experts in engendering a pro-conviction bias with
the two ad hoc tribunals. The dynamic of difference captures the means by which
European colonisers sought to dominate the indigenous population though the
sovereignty doctrine during the development of international law in the 16th
century. In particular, the argument is that natural law was extended to the
indigenous inhabitants as a means to apply western conceptions of law during
colonial contact. A universal idea of law was composed and made applicable to
64
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indigenous inhabitants.65 Scholars have traced the evolution of the dynamic of
difference in various fields of international law.66

The ICTY and ICTR are illustrative of this point. In creating the tribunals, the UN
Security Council granted judges the power to amend the rules of evidence and
procedure. These powers, with reference to the ICTY may be seen through a
constitutional lens. The legislative powers of the judges can be conceptualised
as a moment in delegation of Security Council’s law-making capacity. But
simultaneously, power to amend the rules of evidence and procedure has lead to
severe restriction on, and violation of, the rights of the accused.

The ICTY’s mandate is to render justice to the victims and bring the perpetrators
to justice. Its procedures however are problematic; the judges have opted to
make changes that would effectively repeal judicial decisions of the appeals
chamber67, significantly delay the trials68 and admit new evidence on appeal69.

The rights of the accused, even though enshrined in the ICTY Statute, becomes
a mere formality that can be overlooked given the barbarous nature of the acts
that that the accused have allegedly committed. This unhappy result, to use
Justice Pal’s words, takes us back to the way in which international law has
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evolved.70 A particular version of justice is extended as the universal and is
meted out against those that have committed heinous acts of violence. The irony
is that, in doing so, the universal extension is incomplete. Rather, these
perpetrators are prosecuted using western understandings of law (for example
ICTR), but they are not afforded full trial fairness and due process guarantees as
promised by the respective Statute and the International Bill of Rights. This
raises the idea of victor’s justice that has haunted international criminal law from
its inception.71

Ultimately, Held’s calls to strengthen existing institutional frameworks may be
legitimate.

His arguments however ignore the on-the-ground realities of

international institutions and how they function. Held’s position elides the power
dynamics within international institutions, whether it is United Nations Security
Council as discussed earlier vis-à-vis ICTY or the ICC.

Drawing from earlier discussions about the politics of prosecution within the
International Criminal Court, one can see the powerful role of politics in
prosecuting international war criminals. Take for example the emphasis on
prosecuting war criminals from the African continent and the resulting criticism.72
Two Security Council referrals have thus far been made to the ICC. Yet on the
70
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surface, it seems like the Security Council is unwilling, or unable, to act regarding
Palestine or Sri Lanka for political reasons. It is clear that once international
institutions are created, they develop a particular dynamic. We see this unfolding
within the International Criminal Court, particularly as it relates to regulatory
capture of prosecutorial policy by special interests groups.73 These dynamics are
part of the perpetuation of a singular western narrative that is deployed as the
universal, which can be exemplified through the politics decisions of the ICC.
These dynamics then significantly affect the manner in which these institutions
function. Moreover, it affects the ability of these institutions to deliver on their
proposed mandates.74

There are a number of criticisms emerging from the inner workings of the
international criminal justice regime as laid out above and by extension
international institutions broadly. Why then are scholars like Held arguing for
greater reforms to the United Nations and normative global constitutionalism?
3.3.2 Jürgen Habermas and Renewed Cosmopolitanism?
Jürgen Habermas is one the most acclaimed contemporary public intellectuals of
our time. In The Divided West, Habermas examines the relevance of Kantian
cosmopolitanism in our modern world with a singular superpower, the United
73
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States. His argument is premised on the idea that national sovereignty has
eroded in the current era of globalisation.75 The fast-paced creation of norms and
their deployment outside the four corners of the nation state precipitates this
erosion. Habermas accepts the traditional understanding of globalisation
discussed earlier in the second chapter. Such a state of current affairs as
Habermas notes has ushered in “horizontal networks of a global society”. 76
Habermas argues that the cosmopolitan project needs to confront the objections
raised by those who prefer brute power instead of law.

The role of law animates the theatre between these two diverse perspectives:
“whether law remains appropriate medium for realising the declared goals of
achieving peace and international security and promoting democracy and human
rights throughout the world”. 77 This formulation therefore raises the following
question: Can we achieve a solution to the world’s problems through an allpowerful hegemon78 or through legally established procedures of an inclusive,
but often weak and selective world organisation?79

In 2005, two years after the invasion of Iraq, Habermas reflected on our global
order. Citing the failure of the imperial approach, especially the invasion of Iraq,
Habermas rhetorically asked: “… should we not rather hold steadfastly to the
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alternative project of a constitutionalisation of international law […]”?80 In this
process, he acknowledges the successes and pitfalls of the United Nations
system in securing peace, protecting and promoting human rights. In
acknowledging the failures of the UN system, he suggests that globalisation, the
“dissolution of the national constellation and the transition to a post-national
constellation” are not challenges to the Kantian project.81 Rather, these factors
provide a “supportive context for the aspiration of a cosmopolitan condition”.82

Once Habermas has outlined the dangers of an all-powerful hegemon and
depicted the United States as the contemporary example, he wonders: “[d]oes
the inefficiency of the United Nations, its selective perception and temporary
inability to act, provide sufficient reasons to break with the premises of the
Kantian project?”83 In trying to argue for his modest reforms, Habermas contends
that the international community can only overcome the ills of our contemporary
society, such as terrorism, the scourge of war, or military occupation, through
effective coordination of the different available services and procedures.
Additionally, this can be achieved through “the combination of social
modernization with self-critical dialogue between cultures”.84
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Habermas’ contribution to cosmopolitanism and the normative shaping of an
international legal order is the preservation of a multilevel system in which “the
main site of transnational norm generation and application is the continent
regime”.85 Similar to Held, the primary tenet for Habermas’ arguments are that
nation states, given the nature of globalisation and their lack of power, must use
existing institutions such as the ICC to resolve potential conflicts. If this is not
possible, then states must create new mechanisms through the existing
institutional frameworks to resolve these issues, such as the two ad hoc
tribunals. In doing so, Habermas offers an agenda for reform of the United
Nations that is rooted in modern needs that occupy our international concerns.
The overarching theme is that state action must be governed by, and through,
international law. Some scholars have re-characterised this claim as the
“specification of a modest role for global regulation and the emphasis that this
should take place within the universal register of law”.86 In making this claim,
there is recognition of a loose constitutional framework that informs the operation
of law at the global level.

In their inaugural editorial Global Constitutionalism, the editors identify some of
the different camps in global constitutionalism that are interested in shaping how
the global order is constructed by extending the norms and principles of
constitutionalism beyond the nation state’s borders. Similar to the ideas of Held,
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Habermas, and more recently Jean Cohen

87

, the editors of Global

Constitutionalism recognise that some scholars want to expand the alleged
benefits of the domestic constitutional order. These writers do this as a way to
grapple with global concerns such as poverty and human rights violations. There
are numerous examples within the current legal discourse on global
constitutionalism that adopt this normative approach. For certain scholars, a
constitution is a structure-system that is shared by all societies. 88 They argue
that the transfer of the constitutional idea to the international area is
uncontroversial. 89 The constitutional language is often used to describe,
promote, and capture the fundamental changes occurring within international law
that everyone can sense but cannot articulate. The European Union and other
international

institutions

(World

Trade

Organisation

for

example)

have

complicated this process.

Yet there is a long-standing critical tradition operating under Third World
Approaches to International Law that has sought to challenge the universalism of
international law. It is now incontestable that the 17th and 18th century
development of international law is rooted to colonialism and imperialism.90 The
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traditional public international law literature has sought to omit this connection.91
A number of international lawyers and international law scholars have argued
that international law is monolithic in its very nature.92 As demonstrated in the
first chapter, Anghie has historicised the evolution of sovereignty as part of the
colonial encounter. 93 Anghie illustrates that the sovereignty doctrine was
developed as a means to subjugate the savages, the original inhabitants of the
Americas and the new world. This intervention is an important contribution to the
current understanding of international law.94 The effects of colonialism and its
relationship to international law can be deployed directly to challenge the
orthodox understandings of international law to which Habermas is wedded.

Starting the history of international law with the creation of the current
international regime beginning in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia is a
narrative that seeks to universalise the western understanding of international
law. It seeks to morph the particular into the universal. This characterisation of
international law ignores indigenous peoples that lived in the colonised spaces
prior to first contact.95 I raise this critique to illuminate the somewhat simple
assertions that normative global constitutionalism, and Habermas in particular,
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rely upon. While the scholars working in the normative camp are pursuing an
interesting project, the innocent assumptions that they rely upon remain
problematic. In both Held and Habermas’ assertions, the existing international
infrastructure of international institutions can be called on to deal with
international problems. Drawing from the empirical evidence that I presented
earlier, this is a difficult task to complete.

The three case studies of the ICTY, the ICTR and the International Criminal
Court reveal that the dynamic of difference is buried deep within their respective
structures. The dynamic of difference creates a gap between two cultures by
deeming one as uncivilised and barbaric, the other as civilised, and developing
techniques to transcend the difference. With the ICTY and the ICTR, the
amendments by the judges to the rules of evidence procedure caused significant
effects on the rights of the accused. The denial of fair trial rights to the accused
illustrates the manner in which the dynamic of difference operates within the
tribunals. The accused are deemed barbaric and guilty of the alleged crimes,
indicating that they are not worthy of having their guaranteed rights protected.
Moreover, this type of practice is indicative of a pro-conviction bias where the
judges and other officials are convinced that the allegations against the accused
are true. There is therefore no need to have the respective fair trial rights
protected. Even though the international community sought to prosecute the
perpetrators of mass violence in these respective regions, what has transpired,
especially through the actions of those in charge of these institutions is to
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perpetuate a form of victor’s justice that Justice Pal was concerned about within
the Tokyo Tribunal in 1946.

A critical look at the ICC reveals the dynamic of difference as evidence by the
court’s selective prosecution of certain individuals over others as well. The Court
has decided to prosecute Saif al-Arab Gaddafi but it has not decided to
prosecute alleged war criminals from the global North or allies of the West. When
the prosecutorial policy of the ICC is examined, it becomes apparent that politics
determines the selectivity of cases to be placed on the Court’s docket.

In this context, the ideals encapsulated within the worthwhile claims of both Held
and Habermas to reform the international system are illusory because of the
manner in which the dynamic of difference operates. Global governance reforms
simply do not take into account the history of international law. More importantly,
the calls for more law (and institutions) through reform at the international level
simply ignore the legacies of colonialism and imperialism on international law.
The dynamic of difference, as it operates within the international criminal justice
regime and more broadly within the international institutions, is an illustration of
the challenges of normative global constitutionalism. If constitutionalism is to be
a worthwhile project on a global scale, then it must confront the continuing
historical effects of imperialism and colonialism on international law and its
institutions.
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3.4 Context Based Descriptive Global Constitutionalism and Global
Constitutionalisation
In this section, I will canvas the different arguments put forward by scholars
relying on a contextual understanding of international law and its institutions as
an illustration of global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation.96 This
strand of the literature describes itself as the functional camp. The authors
gathered under the umbrella of functional camp study the “processes of
constitutionalisation, which are revealed through bargaining and negotiations in
the environment of international organisations such as the WTO and the EU”.97 I
have reformulated this characterisation as context-based and descriptive global
constitutionalism to include authors writing about global constitutionalism from
diverse institutional perspectives that align with this type of analysis. A contextual
understanding is descriptive of the manner in which international institutions
originated, how they function, and what they accomplish. Scholarship relied upon
in this section is concerned with the descriptive, rather than prescriptive,
accounts of reforming the international system or creating new institutions (as
discussed in the previous section). The descriptive accounts thus seek to identify
existing structures exemplifying global constitutionalism. Scholars writing in this
genre of global constitutionalism do this as a way to demonstrate the existence
of the international order. There is an increase in this particular genre of global
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constitutionalism scholarship. 98 Scholars operating under this framework are
“interested in examining the extent to which law-making authority is granted (or
denied) to a centralized authority as the distinguishing feature of international
constitutionalization”.99

In this section, I will examine three different perspectives through the scholarship
of the following authors in three groups: Ronald St. John Macdonald and
Douglas M. Johnston; Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman; and Jan Klabbers,
Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein. I will first explore their various perspectives and
then I will use the evidence that I have gathered in the first chapter to challenge
these perspectives. The diverse perspectives offered in this camp are
representative of this line of argumentation in global constitutionalism, making
these authors an ideal selection for this dissertation.

3.4.1 Macdonald and Johnston & Towards World Constitutionalism
The first pair of scholars that fit into the descriptive camp is Ronald St. John
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston. While these two scholars were prolific in
their own right, together they pushed for a greater cosmopolitan agenda of
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international law. 100 Macdonald and Johnston identified diverse but often
overlapping models of international law that seek to address plural values in their
collection of essays Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal
Ordering of the World Community.101 Their central aim in this edited volume with
over thirty contributors is to challenge the assertions by American officials that
international law is not binding, especially as it relates to the ICC and
international environmental initiatives.102

What they coin as world constitutionalism emerges out of various western
cultural modes of civic idealisation. 103 For these scholars gathered in this
volume, the rule of law ideology, the concept of the Rechtsstaat, American and
Dutch experiments with federalism and western Bill of Rights traditions, have all
contributed to the imagination of the international order through a constitutional
lens. Constitutionalism therefore is derived from the domestic theories of a nation
state as a means to unscramble the legitimacy problem illustrated in the global
order.
100
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Macdonald and Johnston subsequently argue that constitutionalism has
numerous essential components. To them, these components can be
transplanted to the international sphere to reconcile the lack of legitimacy and
legality in the international space. 104 They identify various examples that
evidence the presence of a constitutional order. These include the United
Nations Charter, the difficulty in amending the United Nations Charter, and the
fundamental human rights guarantees found in the International Bill of Rights.105
Moreover, they cite to clearly visible trends towards the move to constitutionalism
in contemporary international law. They illustrate their point through the following
empirical examples: the codification of international human rights law, the recent
crystallisation of international criminal law and its respective institutions, the
recent trends within the World Trade Organisation, and international trade law.106
In this instance, Macdonald and Johnston are scanning the existing international
institutional infrastructure produced through international law to argue that
constitutionalism is a possibility within the global order. Johnston, in his essay in
the same volume suggests that “such a project, to be useful, must be shared
across all regions, so that allegations of cultural bias in the field of international
104
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law can be confronted. The goals of legal uniformity and universality may have to
be reconciled with the value of cultural diversity”.107

In this descriptive account of global constitutionalism, Macdonald and Johnston
are much more concerned with the ways in which international institutions are
created. Rather than focusing on the internal dynamics of these institutions or
the politics involved in their creation, they focus on the overall presence of these
institutions. These scholars agree with the assertion that the creation of the two
ad hoc tribunals by the United Nations Security Council is a constitutional
moment.108 The manner in which the Security Council deployed its Chapter VII
powers to maintain peace and security is a good example of the United Nations
Charter being deployed for constitutional reasons.

Even the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has waded into this debate. In Tadić, the
Appeals Camber suggests the following:

“It is clearly impossible to classify the organs of the United Nations
into the above-discussed divisions which exist in the national law of
States. Indeed, Appellant has agreed that the constitutional
structure of the United Nations does not follow the division of
powers often found in national constitutions. Consequently the
separation of powers element of the requirement that a tribunal be
"established by law" finds no application in an international law
setting. The aforementioned principle can only impose an obligation
on States concerning the functioning of their own national
systems”.109
107
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The decision of the ICTY Appeals Chamber may give some jurisprudential
weight to the claim that constitutionalisation at the global level need not mimic a
particular domestic model of constitutionalisation. Rather, Tadić, one of the first
decisions of the ICTY supports the idea that there is plurality in how
constitutionalisation may occur.

But based on the empirical evidence that I examined from the ICTY, ICTR and
ICC, this is simply not the case. Empirical scholarship suggests that international
institutions have particular internal dynamics. 110 These dynamics have a
significant effect on the manner in which international criminal institutions
function and whether they are able to deliver upon their promises. 111 The
empirical data from both the ICTY and the ICTR suggests that the changes to
the rules of evidence and procedure have significantly curtailed the rights of the
accused.

Focusing on witness testimony, the ICTR has struggled with cultural competence
within the adjudicatory process. The questions that scholars like Nancy Combs
raise is how to grapple with the local witness that has a different culture than the
experts and officials of the tribunals. 112 The ICTR witnesses rely on cultural
110
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practices to identify events. They recount their narratives of who did what to
whom based on their understandings of the seasons (which helps them identify
the time of the year). Combs’ account thus suggests that the ICTR based its
findings on highly suspect witness testimony. These faulty witness testimonies
however have a direct effect on the rights of the accused, which is protected in
the ICTR Statute.

To make the claim that there is constitutionalisation of international criminal law
by pointing to the manner in which these ad hoc tribunals were created is simply
insufficient. This type of claim only signals to legal texts rather than how these
laws-on-the-books are deployed within international institutions. Surely theorising
global constitutionalism must go beyond just describing the existing legislative
frameworks and must take into account how international institutions function. In
doing so, one has to take stock of the various practices of these institutions to
actually ascertain whether constitutionalisation is possible and is present.

3.4.2 Dunoff

and

Trachtman

&

Ruling

the

World

through

Constitutionalism?
Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman’s Ruling the World; Constitutionalism,
International Law, and Global Governance is a collection of essays that can be
grouped within the descriptive global constitutionalism camp. 113 Dunoff and
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Trachtman portray international law as developing in regional and functional
pockets within a highly “decentralized and non-hierarchical system”.

114

Constitutional coordination therefore is “both necessary and problematic”. 115
They argue that global constitutionalism can harmonise and coordinate the
various components of the international legal system. For Dunoff and Trachtman,
constitutionalised systems authorise the exercise of power. Furthermore, such a
system ensures that the exercise of power does not go institutionally unchecked
and unbalanced.116 Legal orders may “exhibit various constitutional mechanisms
in various degrees”, and constitutionalisation therefore “is a process”.117 From
their

perspective,

global

constitutionalism

is

the

natural

extension

of

constitutional thinking from the domestic to the world order. They are using their
own experience in the field of international trade law to facilitate such a claim.
Their assertion is premised upon ideas, convictions, and commitments, as much
as on politics and legal doctrines.

Dunoff and Trachtman, and some of the contributors to their volume adopt a
functional (or as I suggest context based descriptive) approach to international
constitutionalism. They argue that such an approach sidesteps issues of
definition. The issue of definition is what drives most of the writing on
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international constitutionalism. Their’s is a checklist approach, similar to that of
Macdonald and Johnston, which prevents engagement with the substantive
aspects of contemporary developments in the international sphere, materially
spurred on by the process of globalisation and the specialisation of international
law. Their claim is predicated on the “type” based classification, “rather than a
quantum of rules”.118

The distinguishing feature of global constitutionalism for Dunoff and Trachtman is
“the extent to which law-making authority is granted (or denied) to a centralized
authority”.119 They suggest that constitutionalism has three important functional
roles: enabling the formation of international law; constraining the formation of
international law, and filling in the gaps in domestic law.120 These three functions
are implemented through seven mechanisms that are commonly associated with
constitutionalisation.121 These mechanisms are utilised to enable, constrain, or
supplement constitutionalisation. Simultaneously, Dunoff and Trachtman are
cognisant of multiple institutional structures. They take account of these
institutional structures by being consistent with notions of constitutional pluralism.
I will examine global constitutional pluralism in the following section.122
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By focusing on the law-making power of international institutions, analogous to
Macdonald and Johnston, Dunoff and Trachtman do not take account of the
manner in which these institutions function or the history of international law and
its institutions. The focus on the law-making capacity of an institution does not
increase the legitimacy of the regime; rather this type of focus seeks to impose
constitutionalism through the act of law-making. The law-making capacity of an
institution is representative of a partial story of constitutionalism. To use the
examples from the three case studies presented in the first chapter, the reliance
on the law-making authority of an international criminal institutions (for example
the powers of the judges or the discretionary power of the ICC prosecutor) would
demonstrate the success story of international criminal justice in curbing impunity
as a form of constitutionalism. In adopting such a perspective, global
constitutionalisation would be a possibility because the United Nations Security
Council, prompted by the mass human rights violations, had the power to create
the two ad hoc tribunals or make referrals to the ICC.

But the reality is that these institutions have significant problems in how they
operate. Focusing on the ICTR and its pro-conviction biases substantiates David
Kennedy’s

argument

in

Dunoff

and

Trachtman’s

volume

that

global

constitutionalism, as a theory of global governance is a mystery.123 Even though
the Security Council guaranteed the rights of the accused in the enabling Statute
of the ICTR (and the ICTY), the changes to the rules does not adhere to this
123
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concretisation. Focusing on the witness testimony, the judges, and the ICTR as a
whole have adopted western legal traditions as their modus operandi. Thus, by
using the western adjudicatory form, “international criminal proceedings cloak
themselves in the form’s garb of fact-finding competence, but it is only a cloak,
for many of the key assumptions that underlie the western trial form do not exist
in the international context”.124 Imagining a constitutional order based on formal
structures of international institutions simply ignores the realties on-the-ground.
Moreover this type of scholarship reifies a rudimentary understanding of
international law that perpetuates the dynamic of difference by continuing the
embedded universalism symptomatic in this area of law.

3.4.3 Jan

Klabbers,

Anne

Peters,

and

Geir

Ulfstein:

Eurocentric

Constitutionalism?
The third set of writers, Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, offers
another descriptive account. These scholars are motivated by the European
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence and the possibility of judicially reviewing United
Nations Security Council resolutions. 125 They suggest that the process of
constitutionalisation is a reality and thus provide an account of the “invisible
constitution

of

the

international

community”

by

taking

the

idea

of

“constitutionalism and running with it”.126 More precisely, they unveil how one
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could reasonably think about the various elements of a global constitutional order
and articulate “our constitutional instincts”.127

For Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein, constitutionalism is a “philosophy of striving
towards some form of political legitimacy”.128 This legitimacy is representative of
a constitution. However, they are unclear about what they mean by political
legitimacy.129

Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein are certain that a top-down constitutional process
is not a possibility at the international level. Moreover, existing international
treaties cannot be nominated as constitutional documents.130 Their discussions
have focused on specific regimes, such as the European Union and the resulting
possible constitutionalisation. Unlike the above-mentioned scholars in descriptive
global constitutionalism camp, they argue that these attempts to focus on these
regimes cannot be transferred to the global context.

Klabbers, Peters and Ulfstein point to the existence of “a bric-a-brac of
decisions” taken by actors in a position of authority, responding to the exigencies
of the moment, almost by default.131 This type of decision-making is more likely
to occur at the global level. They contend that, given the unlikely success of all
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other possibilities, global constitutionalism has to make use of other more limited
techniques. These techniques are: subsidiarity, margin of appreciation, and
proportionality.132 These techniques are essential components of the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice jurisprudence. The
European Court of Human Rights monitors the implementation of the European
Convention of Human Rights. It was created through the Council of Europe.
European Court of Justice on the other hand monitors the implementation of the
European Union Treaty.

Ultimately, their suggestion is to rely on the existing European principles and
norms within the current global order as illustrations and mechanisms of global
constitutionalism. Nonetheless, their descriptive account, while the most
compelling of the three groups of writers in this section for its specificity, ignores
the significant history of international law and its institutions. For example, the
three techniques they employ are part of the doctrines developed and employed
by the European Union’s Court of Justice and the European Court of Human
Rights. Even though some of the doctrines have migrated to other juridical
milieus,133 their arguments are Eurocentric. As illustrated in the arguments made
by Macdonald and Johnston and Dunoff and Trachtman examined earlier, there
is a denial of the specificity of these doctrines to Europe. What is even more
troubling is that there is an attempt to transplant the experience from Europe to
132
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the global through these principles. They simply rely on the European regulatory
framework and the ensuing principles as demonstrating the required evidence to
buttress their claims of global constitutionalism. The focus on the European
experience thus reifies a specific understanding of the constitutional order and its
possibilities. These authors do not at all understand the politics of international
institutions and they are seemingly intent on pushing for universalism of
constitutionalism based on western ideals. They could have explored for
example the Inter-American Court for Human Rights and its use of
proportionality. They could have also focused on the emerging body of literature
that hones in constitutionalism’s promises and pitfalls in the global South as
potential lessons about constitutional theory.134

In this section, each of these different descriptive global constitutional
perspectives have sought to similarly describe the contemporary global
governance institutions as mimicking constitutional type behaviour in order to
harness the potential power of constitutionalism. It must be noted that describing
the current international order is, in itself, a normative project. Each of these
scholars, by selecting their respective examples are making choices about what
to include and exclude in their analysis. They are trying to demonstrate how our
current international institutions are functioning, either explicitly or implicitly, by
using the constitutional features. In doing so, they are attempting to embed
notions of legitimacy that are ushered in by constitutional frameworks and the
134
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language of constitutionalism, whether it is through the formalism of a
constitution or checks and balances found in systems with unwritten
constitutions. In doing so, there is “some kind of magic” involved in making
appear what is not really there.135
3.5 Global Constitutional Pluralism
Some of the most contested claims and arguments of global constitutionalism
are housed within the constitutional pluralist camp.136 The literature is concerned
with both descriptive and normative elements found in the above-discussed
camps of global constitutionalism. 137 Its origins can be traced back to the
European context. Some of its proponents use the European Union and the
World Trade Organisation as their unique paradigm. 138

The term constitutional pluralism originates from the writings of Neil MacCormick.
In his reaction to the European Court of Justice’s jurisprudence, MacCormick
suggests that the “most appropriate analysis of the relations of the legal systems
is pluralistic rather than monistic, and interactive rather than hierarchical”. 139
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MacCormick’s analysis is precipitated by the mutual recognition necessitated
between the European Union and its member states. The interaction between
these frontiers is based on an old problem that was presented through legal
pluralism140 and constitutional conflicts.141

Constitutional pluralism is closely connected to legal pluralism, which can be
traced back to the early 19th and 20th century.142 In the late 20th century, legal
anthropologists set out to document how multiple legal spaces co-existed and
how ‘semi-autonomous’ fields of norms (whether formal or informal) influenced
one another other. Sally Falk More traced the manner in which external law and
internal norms structure, and influence group behaviour.

143

The central

contention is that there are multiple norm producers and normative orders that
regulate human conduct in multiple registers. Formal law is thus subject to, and
contingent upon, the informal norms of particular communities. These informal
norms, therefore, have a greater organising effect on the formal structure of law.
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Constitutional pluralism however is distinct from legal pluralism. Constitutional
pluralism explores current normative orders with constitutional characteristics.
Constitutional pluralism “recognises that the European order inaugurated by the
Treaty of Rome has developed beyond the traditional confines of international
law and now makes its own independent constitutional claims, and that these
claims exist alongside the continuing claims of states”. 144 The relationship
between these normative orders is “now horizontal rather than vertical heterarchical rather than hierarchical”. 145 Constitutional pluralism’s focus on
Europe has continued over the recent years.146 The recent Greek debt crisis, and
other global events, will provide an impetus for discussions of constitutional
pluralism as part of global constitutionalism. 147 Other world events will also
continue to foster discussions about the manner in which constitutional pluralism
may be deployed as part of the discussions of global constitutionalism.148 Ruth
Buchanan has suggested that even though constitutionalisation debates about
the WTO may be large, there is a sense of naivety to such claims. 149 In what
144
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follows, I will set out the various claims housed under the banner of constitutional
pluralism. I will focus primarily on the writings of Neil Walker, one of the main
proponents of constitutional pluralism.150

3.5.1 Neil

Walker

and

Constitutionalism

as

Doctrine,

Constitutionalism as Imagination
The central features of constitutional pluralism can be divided into two parts: the
normative and the empirical. The latter is concerned with describing the
“competing claims of ultimate political and legal authority raised in the names of
different political communities”.151 Zoran Oklopcic suggests that these empirical
claims can exist at multiple jurisdictional registers, ranging from marginalised
demands for political authority by particular minority communities in a ‘fragile
state’152 to cooperative constitutional arrangements, such as the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the European Union. 153 From this perspective,
constitutional pluralism is both legal and political. It “exists in different gradients”,
which only in extreme cases conform to everybody’s entrenched juridical
understanding of a constitutional reality.154 On the other hand, the normative
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perspective affirms and demands commitments to political pluralism.

155

Oklopcic’s description harkens back to the earlier definitions of constitutional
pluralism.156

Neil Walker, one of the pioneers of constitutional pluralism writes:

Conceptually, it is argued that in order to capture the full range of
the 'constitutional experience' and imagine the full range of
constitutional possibilities within the new plural order,
constitutionalism and constitutionalisation should be conceived of
not in black-and-white, all-or-nothing terms but as questions of
nuance and gradation. There is no unitary template in terms of
which constitutional status is either achieved or not achieved, but
rather a set of loosely and variously coupled factors which serve
both as criteria in terms of which forms of constitutionalism can be
distinguished and as indices in terms of which modes and degrees
of constitutionalisation can be identified and measured.
In structural terms, it is argued that in order to appreciate the
practical significance of the various constitutional phenomena
identified through the application of these abstract criteria, we must
assess the variable position of the different types of polity or political
process with which these phenomena are linked within the global
configuration of authority, and also examine the relationship
between these polities or political processes. That is to say, as
already intimated, constitutionalism in a plural order is necessarily
conceived of not only as a property of polities and political
processes but as a medium through which they interconnect - as a
structural characteristic of the relationship between certain types of
political authority or claims to authority situated at different sites or
in different processes as well as an internal characteristic of these
authoritative claims.157
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Martin Loughlin is critical of constitutional pluralism. He notes that the
constitutional pluralist faction can be viewed as a sect and their claims can be
summarised in three iterations. 158 First, for the constitutional pluralists, the
foundation of political authority is rooted in a constitution; second within a
supranational space, the political authority is autonomously constituted as
highlighted by Walker’s claims above; and therefore “the issue of ultimate
authority is either left open (radical pluralism) or is re-integrated in a universal
order of constitutional principles (pluralism under international law)”.159

In light of the push back from public lawyers, 160 legal pluralists, 161 and
international lawyers,162 constitutional pluralists have retreated to the confines of
some basic elements in the descriptive and normative camps identified earlier.
Walker proposes to re-imagine constitutional pluralism in light of the heavy
criticisms. He argues that constitutional pluralists are beholden to two central but
different ideas: constitutionalism and pluralism.163

Constitutionalism is premised on the notion that a legal code provides the
necessary legitimation, while pluralism respects political diversity. The
constitutional pluralists account is a reaction to the “post-Westphalian age where
globalising economic, cultural communicative, political and legal influences have
158
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both spread and diluted public power”.164 Constitutional pluralists recognise the
fast-paced expansion in human interactions on a global scale through the
process of globalisation. They take stock of the developments by appreciating
constitutional and political pluralism. This type of argumentation builds on from
James Tully’s important suggestion that constitutionalism must be located in a
historical context. 165 Tully suggests that there are important interconnections
between imperialism, colonialism and constitutionalism. 166 For Tully, modern
constitutionalism is about the strange multiplicity of our postmodern world and
the possibilities of democratising our constitutional imaginations. 167 Moreover,
Tully argues that constitutionalism is deeply imbricated in colonialism and
imperialism. He suggests that modern arrangements of constituent powers and
constitutional forms (constitutional democracies) cannot be understood through
the histories of western states. Rather, modern constitutionalism should be “set
in the broader imperial context of state formation”.168

For constitutional pluralist, and developing Tully’s cortical insights to some
extent, it is impossible to be satisfied with the unitary conception of
164
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constitutionalism. They want to harness the opportunity presented by the postWestphalian moment. Walker suggests: “constitutional pluralist, in short, seeks
to make a virtue out of necessity”.169

The constitutional pluralist claims are not without criticisms, especially with
reference to global order beyond the European context. Walker identifies three
criticisms in his attempt to reimagine constitutional pluralism. The first criticism
has focused on the monist “singularity” that is produced through the language of
constitutions, constitutionalism, and constitutionalisation. The second focuses on
the idea that constitutional pluralism, given its allegiance to various forms of
political authority, is “nothing more than constitutional plurality”. 170 The third
focuses on the fallout from the first two. If we want to avoid the unified
constitutional order, or the fragmented self-contained regimes produced by
globalisation, then we should avoid the language of constitutions and its
anachronistic usage.171

From these critical insights, Walker argues the following: “there remain today
good arguments for pursuing the project of adapting the language and mind-set
of constitutionalism to meet the pluralist imperatives of broader global
conditions”.172 For Walker, if constitutionalism is to offer us anything under the
169
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current conditions of globalisation, then we must adjust our lens and approach
the constitutional predicament through a different perspective.173 The impetus to
adjust our lenses is born out of the experience in unifying Europe through the
European Union.174 Therefore he suggests that we consider constitutionalism as
a doctrine, and constitutionalism as imagination.

Constitutionalism, as doctrine, is conceptualised as a toolbox of mobile
resources. It is a “thin and footloose structure and stylisation of norms used to
qualify and dignify the emergent site of new global regulatory structure of
authority without being constitutive of these sites in the thick manner redolent of
the nation state”.175 Constitutionalism becomes a “matter of detail” forming a
body of principles and norms that can help guide new governance mechanisms.
Principles such as fundamental rights, separation of powers, due process and
natural justice are emblematic of the tools within the constitutional toolbox that
are at the disposal of new governance mechanisms.

Constitutionalism as imagination follows on from constitutionalism as doctrine.
Here it is meant to provide a point of departure. It is about the potential to
imagine a future world based on liberal conceptions of rights, equality and
freedom. Constitutionalism as doctrine attempts to use the existing tools of

173

Ibid.
Neil Walker “Post-Constituent Constitutionalism? The Case of the European Union” in Martin
Loughlin and Neil Walker, ed, The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and
Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 247.
175
Walker, “Constitutionalism and Pluralism” supra note 17 at 32.
174

196

constitutionalism in a post-Westphalian world while constitutionalism as
imagination should serve as a reminder of what “should underscore and inform
our puzzles of governance in state or state-like holistic settings and non-holistic
settings alike”.176 In Walker’s assessment, constitutional pluralism as doctrine
and imagination houses both the normative and the descriptive elements of
global constitutionalism, which then circles back to the scholars that I examined
in the earlier sections.

International criminal institutions serve to illustrate both normative and
descriptive account of constitutionalism. First, international criminal institutions
may demonstrate the existence of a global order that seeks to punish those that
have committed international crimes as defined by the international community.
International criminal law and its respective institutions pierce the veil of impunity
by prosecuting public officials. Simultaneously, the history of international
criminal institutions is such that it demonstrates how arguments to shape the
world order and create a better world have significant purchase. For example,
the International Criminal Court was a dream of international lawyers and
international human rights activists prior to 1989; an era in which the Cold War
between the two superpowers determined when and how international
institutions would function.
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While the attempts to map the existing international structure as moments in
constitutionalism are commendable, grafting international law’s realities onto
ideas of constitutionalism (whether as doctrine or imagination) simply ignore a
central and pressing concern: the internal dynamic of each international
institution and very history of international law. 177 While scholars like Tully
recognise the dangers of relying on western histories of constitutional formation
and state formation, there is no recognition of international law and its
institutions’ role in colonialism and imperialism and its continued effects within
the expositions of constitutional pluralism. What global constitutionalists, in
particular constitutional pluralists, ignore can be characterised as a central
contradiction embedded in domestic liberal constitutions, constitutionalism, and
constitutionalisation. This was the subject of great debate as it relates to liberal
legalism.178

On the one hand, those pointing to constitutional pluralism refer to the manner in
which international criminal institutions serve to prosecute grave injustices and in
the context of genocide, often referred to as the scourge of humanity. The
international community’s decisions to prosecute the commission of evil acts
serve as an illustration of limiting government’s power and protecting the
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fundamental rights of the victims, survivors and the international community. On
the

other

hand,

arguments

for

constitutional

pluralism,

both

normative/imagination and descriptive/doctrine, simply gloss over the biased
selectivity of cases by the ICC for example. Moreover constitutional pluralists
ignore violations of fundamental rights of the accused and the legislative powers
bestowed

upon

international

judges,

reticent

of

the

way

in

which

constitutionalism in its original form in the national experience obscured law’s
role in maintaining societal conflicts.

David Kairys has suggested that a realistic approach to the law (and
constitutionalism) is needed.179 Such an approach is one where the operation of
the law and its “social role must acknowledge the fundamental conflicts in
society; the class, race and sex basis of these conflicts; and the dominance of an
ideology that is not natural, scientifically determined or objective”.180 Returning to
the manner in which international law has evolved and paying close attention to
the dynamic of difference theorised by Anghie and other TWAIL scholars,
constitutional pluralism and constitutional pluralists like Walker simply rely on
constitutional doctrines as a means to see through the cloudy international
space.
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But this international space, as demonstrated in the earlier discussions is
plagued by inequities that have become imbedded in the very structure of
international law and its institutions. My argument is that international law, from
its inception, was created as a means to regulate the encounter between the
Europeans and the local inhabitants of the new colonies. Vitoria’s articulation of
sovereignty is a good illustration of this point. As it has evolved over the years,
international law’s foundational nature has not been severed from its colonial
past. Rather, scholars working under the moniker of TWAIL have chronicled the
continuation of this by-product of colonialism and imperialism. One illustration of
this point can be seen through the manner in which international criminal
institutions function. The selectivity of cases by the ICC or the role of the witness
before the ICTR are good examples in which the colonial past is front and centre.
Turning to the ICC, the overrepresentation of African cases is a significant
problem that threatens the very existence of the international court.181

By choosing to view constitutionalism as a thin structure that is “used to qualify
and dignify the emergent site of new global regulatory structure of authority”,
constitutional pluralists gloss over the underbelly of international institutions as
they deliver on their mandates.182 Whether one takes the ICTR, the ICTY or the
International Criminal Court as examples of new global governance structures,
181
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what is clear is that these entities are deeply political and they continue the
tradition of universalising a particular western narrative. Similar to my criticism of
Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein and their use of principles from European
jurisprudence, constitutional pluralism’s points of departure are susceptible to
similar attacks.

3.6 Conclusion: Mapping a path forward?
I understand global constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation as a
taxonomy of contemporary global governance institutions and a normative
account about global governance. It is a taxonomy since the writers included in
this camp describe the existing world institutions and their respective
infrastructure through the lens of constitutionalism. It is a normative exercise
because it seeks to structure the existing international order using a
cosmopolitan

universalist

vision

of

western

liberal

constitutionalism.

Fundamentally, the rationale for the project of global constitutionalism can be
rooted in the search for, and the need to have, legitimacy and ultimately legality
within the international order as result of fragmentation of international law. It is
also a reaction to our globalised social reality.

The various perspectives presented earlier in this chapter locate formal legal
frameworks, norms and principles that permeate the international legal order to
suggest we have constitutional legal values that inform our global system. These
laws, norms and principles exemplify models through which distribution of power,
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wealth and resources can arguably be mediated and contested. This does not
break from or challenge the idea that international law and its institutions are
closely connected to imperialism and colonialism or international law and its
institutions are currently dominated by western interests, either in the form of
capital or power.183 These accounts of global constitutionalism simply do not take
stock of the realities of how international institutions function within their
respective fields.

By taking the international criminal justice regime as an example, I argued that
the different variants of global constitutionalism are parochial in their analysis.
The parochialism stems from a clear desire to use the western understandings of
constitutionalism as garb to cloak the particular western values as universal.184
Whether it is part of the normative camps’ desire to curb social inequities or
constitutionalism as imagination, there is a tendency to rely on the experience of
the West as the most important signpost. Ultimately, the desire to understand,
inform and make changes to the existing global governance structures however
must take account of the global South. In the following few pages, I will briefly
explore how global constitutionalism can transcend these limitations.
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By shifting reference points from global constitutionalism to comparative
constitutionalism, two particular bodies of interdisciplinary literature offer
significant insights. These insights open up new vistas on how to potentially
transcend the limitations I have identified in this chapter. This is a cursory
account of these fields. It is meant as a signpost to demonstrate that there are
scholars working on constitutionalism from various perspectives that differs from
the accounts presented above. I will take up the theoretical questions about the
turn to the global South in the final chapter.

With reference to the comparative constitutionalism, there are two bodies of
literature that may be useful in transcending the limitations identified above. First
there is a burgeoning body of literature that seeks to examine constitutionalism
of the global South that may open new avenue of analysis. 185 The second,
primarily written by indigenous scholars from North America, has sought to
challenge liberal constitutionalism’s ability to recognise indigeneity and
indigenous claims. In the next few pages, I will explore these two types of
scholarly engagement as a means to signal future directions for global
constitutionalism.
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Under the auspice of constitutionalism of the global South186, some scholars are
interested in challenging the received wisdom of constitutionalism from the global
North. Daniel Bonilla, a Colombian comparative constitutional scholar writes the
following in terms of the received wisdom from the global North:
Only a few institutions - such as the Supreme Court of the United
States, the European Court of Human Rights, and the German
Constitutional Court - are considered paradigmatic operators and
enforcers of modern constitutionalism’s basic rules and principles.
These legal institutions are the ones that determine the
paradigmatic use of modern constitutionalism’s basic norms. They
are the ones responsible for defining and solving key contemporary
political and legal problems by giving specific content to modern
constitutionalism’s rules and principles. The answers that these
institutions give to questions like “What are the limits of judicial
review?” “What is the meaning of the principle of separation of
powers?” […] are considered by most legal communities to
fundamentally enable the connection of modern constitutionalism to
the realities of contemporary polities.187
Writers working on comparative constitutionalism of the global South invert the
order of things.188 They examine the jurisprudence of the highest courts in the
global South, in particular Colombia, India and South Africa. In doing, the authors
gathered under Bonilla’s Constitutionalism of the Global South examine the
jurisprudence of these courts. 189 These scholars have “sought to open the
discussion about the jurisprudence” of three courts on social and economic
rights, cultural diversity and access to justice and “bridge the gap that exists
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between Global South and Global North on constitutional matters”.190The various
analyses encapsulated in Bonilla’s collection expose the manner in which
constitutionalism, once transported to the colonies and the peripheries, can be
deployed in various ways to foster greater benefits for the constituents.191

In tracking the manner in which the various constitutions are being deployed and
understood in these three countries, an important point stands out: when
confronted by questions of systemic change in Colombia, India and South Africa,
the three Courts interpreting the respective constitutions are not arriving at
similar results. There is an internal dialogue taking place within these polities
about the very nature of constitutionalism, which is divergent from the ways in
global constitutionalism has been conceptualised in the global North. This type of
argumentation can be illustrated with the scholarship of Jackie Dugard on the
Constitutional Court of South Africa and Libardo José Ariza on the Constitutional
Court of Colombia.

Even though South Africa’s Constitutional Court may have been vested with the
transformative powers through the post-apartheid constitution, it has been
unable, or unwilling to use these tools to transform the economic, social, and
cultural conditions of the most marginalised South Africans. In the context of
South Africa’s highest court, Dugard asks: “to what extent has the Constitutional
Court, as one of the primary interpreters of the Constitution, fulfilled its
190
191
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constitutional promise?”192 The Court is unable provide the sought after remedy
of the various stakeholders. Dugard offers the following insights:
Thus, despite being racially representative and having expressly
committed itself to overseeing socio-economic justice in the
interests of South Africa’s overwhelmingly poor black majority, the
Constitutional Court has balked at allowing poor people who might
otherwise be denied justice to gain direct access and has failed to
operationalise a meaningful recognition of poverty in its socioeconomic judgments. As a consequence, and in stark contrast to
the popularity of Constitutional Courts in many developing countries
such as Colombia, in South Africa the Constitutional Court is a
remote institution that is increasingly sandwiched between growing
animosity from the polity over its political judgments on the one
hand and, on the other hand, disinterest and distrust by the majority
poor citizenry.193
The South African example demonstrates the difficulty of protecting economic,
social and cultural rights during moments of transitional justice. It demonstrates
the limitations of constitutionalism and constitutionalisation in potentially
changing the lives of the most marginalised.

In the Colombian context, the Constitutional Court has taken a completely
different approach in decisions on prison overcrowding, forced displacement and
social issues of importance to Colombians. The unconstitutional state of affairs
(USoA) doctrine allows the Colombian Constitutional Court to intervene in
instances of massive and systemic violation of rights by government actors.194
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By making this type of a declaration and imposing a remedy, the Court takes on
the role of public policy maker. Ariza writes:
The doctrine of USoA has certainly had a significant impact. On the
one hand, for legal clinics and legal activists in human rights, a
USoA declaration implies that the state acknowledges responsibility
and can be held accountable for its poor performance in enforcing
and guaranteeing rights for a significant population. In this sense,
uttering a USoA declaration means claiming victory in the judicial
field. On the other hand, the doctrine aims to address structural
problems and hardships that swamp efficient institutional
performance, creating institutional and dialogical spaces for policy
decision making that unblocks an obsolete institutional
arrangement”.195
In this instance, the Constitutional Court is rearranging the existing
understandings of the constitutional separation of power doctrine as a means to
protect the fundamental rights of some of the most marginalised. Further
investigation of these similarities and divergence is possible and is part of my
future research agenda to understand global constitutionalism from the
perspective of the global South.

What is important about the South African and Colombian approaches to
economic, social and cultural rights is the availability of diverse global South
perspectives on constitutionalism. In particular, as the sharp edges of
globalisation, neoliberalism and capitalism calibrates the state of affairs in the
global South 196 , the responses of the respective nation states through
constitutionalism either conforms what we already know about legal formalism or
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opens up new opportunities to rethink our attitudes about global constitutionalism
and constitutional ordering. This type of engagement is completely lacking in the
various global constitutionalism camps discussed above.

The second set of scholars that I want to signal to critique constitutional
recognition and constitutionalism in North America. I offer this example as part of
the continuation of the struggle of indigenous people against settler colonial
states. I do not mean to romanticise these interventions or the current lived
realities of the indigenous people, rather I point to this example as part of a
future project to learn from these initiatives of resistance.

The notion of recognition is imbedded in constitutional democracies as a means
to allocate rights to minority communities. Recognition has had a significant
effect on the manner in which indigenous communities, such as those located in
Canada, have sought to regain their sovereignty through the Canadian judiciary
and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.197 In Strange Multiplicity,
James Tully proposes the following insight as means to support the efforts to
reorganise constitutionalism through greater protection of minority rights:
“Perhaps the great constitutional struggles and failures around the
world today are grouping towards a third way of constitutional
change, symbolized in the ability of the members in the canoe [i.e. a
multicultural and diverse societies] to discuss and reform their
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constitutional arrangements in response to the demands of
recognition as they paddle”.198
Tully has subsequently explored how “deeply entrenched roles of constitutional
democracies [can] be de-imperialized?”199 Tully’s analysis forms the backdrop of
much of Walker’s discussions on constitutional pluralism.200 Tully suggests that
there ought be greater participatory democracy by which laws are open to
criticisms, negotiation and modification, akin to writers in constitutional pluralism
(for example constitutionalism as imagination). 201 This suggestion and the
ensuing development chronicled through the Canadian jurisprudence has been
the subject of a deep critique. There are various strands to the critique that
focuses on the emphasis on liberal legalism, 202 notions of sovereignty,203 the
politics of recognition204 and the politics of refusal205.

The politics of recognition can be characterised as a set of “recognition-based
models of legal pluralism” that seek to reconcile the demands for sovereignty by
indigenous groups from settler states like the United States and Canada. 206
These models of recognition tend to be diverse but most often encompass some
form of delegation of land, capital and political power from modern settler nation
198
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states to indigenous communities. Yellowknives Dene First Nation scholar Glen
Coulthard argues that these efforts reproduce colonial and racist state power
over indigenous communities. Coulthard suggests:
[I]nstead of ushering in an era of peaceful coexistence grounded on
the idea of reciprocity or mutual recognition, the politics of
recognition in its contemporary form liberal promises to reproduce
the very configurations of colonialist, racist, patriarchal state power
that indigenous peoples’ demands of recognition have historically
sought to transcend.207
In a similar vein, in investigating the politics of refusal, Mohawk scholar Audra
Simpson writes that there is a political alternative to the idea of recognition
embedded in constitutionalism vis-à-vis minority communities. The alternative is
the politics of refusal. She suggests that:
This alterative is refusal and it is exercised by people within this
book. They deploy it as apolitical and ethical stance that stands in
stark contrast to the desire to have one’s own distinctiveness as a
culture, as a people, recognized. Refusal comes with the
requirement of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged and
upheld, and raises the question of legitimacy for those who are
usually in the position of recognizing: What is their authority to do
so? Where does it come from? Who are they to do so? Those of us
writing about these issues can also refuse; this is a distinct form of
ethnographic refusal […].208

There are number of different ways to transcend the limitations that I outlined in
this chapter on global constitutionalism. The above discussion only highlights two
contemporary bodies of comparative constitutional literature that offer new
insights about constitutionalism and constitutionalisation. These fields must be
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exploited if we are to overcome the context-based problems I detailed in this
chapter. Unfortunately, I cannot engage with this literature in this dissertation.
Rather I point to it to briefly signal its existence. What is important is to note that
global constitutionalism must engage with these scholarly formations if it is to
truly theorise global governance.
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Chapter 4: False Universalism of Global Administrative Law?
4.1 Introduction
The expansion of governance regimes beyond the nation state has prompted
scholars to theorise global governance. 1 By moving beyond the simple
intercourse between sovereign states, this new global order reflects the dense
web of inchoate regulatory actors, norms, and processes.2 The first steps of
mapping, describing, and then theorising various regimes are difficult,
complicated, and often politically contested. As already suggested, there is a
surge in academic writing that conceptualises the global order through the lens
of constitutional law, 3 transnational law, 4 legal pluralism 5 and, more recently,
administrative law. These scholarly interventions seek to legitimise international
law and its institutions in light of the democratic deficit.6 The democratic deficit is
precipitated by the rapid expansion of international law and international
institutions (chronicled in the first chapter).
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Previously I recounted how scholars are turning to a constitutional vernacular in
response to the democratic deficit in global governance. Inspired by domestic
experiences, these scholars attempt to discover constitutionalism in the global
order. Similarly, in this chapter, I will focus on global administrative law as a
means to bridge the accountability gap found within international institutions.

Globalisation continues to have significant effects on how we regulate order at
the global level, spurring on the need for greater regulatory oversight. In fact,
global regulatory regimes govern almost all aspects of our modern existence,
including dentistry, regulation of food, arms control and even prosecution of
international war criminals. The current international institutional landscape
therefore consists of “international, transnational, hybrid, a mixture of public and
private actors, regimes or networks, or even harder to categorise assemblies of
evolving governance structures […]”. 7 These institutions are created through
various international law-making mechanisms that compose our modern
fragmented international legal order. Fragmentation of international law
continues to occur because international law and its various institutions are not
part of a unified legal system akin to those found in national jurisdictions with
specific rules of precedent.
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Most national regulatory institutions have a variety of different branches of
government consisting of elected executive, legislative and judicial chambers.
Based on the accepted legal system in place in these national spaces, the
judiciary can make use of legislative enactments and jurisprudential doctrines in
adjudication. 8 International law scholars have identified close to 2,000 selfcontained regulatory regimes9, each with their own diverse mechanisms for lawmaking and adjudication. As a result of globalisation and fragmentation, there
are instances in which institutional decisions are contradictory. Scholars have
characterised this phenomenon as “regime collision”. 10 The fear of “regime
collision” has justified modern anxieties about our very fragmented global
order.11

In particular, as a result of fragmentation of international law, these multiple and
diverse regimes establish “links with other regimes” resulting in the multiplication
and cross-pollination of global principles and rules.12 The emergence of these
principles and rules is the basis for global administrative law. In what follows, I
will provide a description of the various scholars working within global
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administrative law. In particular, I will present two variations or camps in the
global administrative law literature.

In our complicated global governance milieu, some academics suggest that
international regulatory regimes develop administrative law principles by directly
analogising from domestic administrative law.13 The scholars working within this
first camp argue that there are now clear principles in these regimes that concern
due process, procedural fairness, transparency, duty to give reasons, and other
administrative law doctrines. 14 Drawing inspiration from these principles that
emanate from domestic administrative law, it is argued that the entire “arsenal of
domestic administrative law […] can be found in the global space”.15 I primarily
focus on Benedict Kingsbury and Richard B. Stewart, as these two scholars are
instrumental in the creation of the field of global administrative law. Much more
importantly they both continue to theorise various aspects of global
administrative law.16

Some scholars challenge Kingsbury and Stewart’s assertions. 17 Karl-Heinz
Ladeur in particular asserts that analogising directly from the domestic
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conceptions of administrative law does not yield the expected results. He
suggests that there is a need to reimagine how accountability is generated at the
global level.18 Such an exercise is similar to global constitutionalism’s normative
and pluralist accounts by scholars like Habermas and Walker and their attempts
to portray our constitutional order. In this regard, I will examine the writing of
Ladeur and his accounts of postmodern19 global administrative law. Similar to the
previous chapter, I have characterised these two camps according to my
interpretation of their respective materials.

The first set of scholars of global administrative law provide a detailed
description of how international institutions deploy administrative law in their
everyday interactions. The second, Ladeur, acknowledges the difficulties
encountered by analogising in this manner, and he proposes to read in
accountability in how these institutions function.

This chapter then critiques the turn to administrative law principles deployed in
international law and its institutions as global governance. Fundamentally, I
argue that global administrative law ignores, obscures, and effaces the
underlying context of international law and its institutions. Global administrative
Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff, eds, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law Practice and
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law suggests a particular western understanding of administrative law as
universal and thus, it re-enacts Anghie’s dynamic of difference. In order to
demonstrate this facet of global administrative law, I rely on the international
criminal law case studies canvassed in the first chapter.
4.2 Global Administrative Law: Global Governance as Administration?
As both a student of global administrative law, and as a teacher of national
administrative law, the obvious question in my mind is: What is the significance
of labelling global governance as administration? Moreover, what are the
benefits of identifying the existence or the emergence of administrative law
principles within the global regulatory regimes? Does it benefit anyone?

In our respective domestic experiences, the development of administrative law is
closely tied to the delegation of the state’s power to administrative agencies and
the creation of the welfare state.20 Administrative agencies decide on the various
content of our news, provide services, deliver healthcare, administer schools and
prisons,

and

regulate

our

borders.

21
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administrative law has evolved from the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus that were imposed upon the colonies by their colonial master.22
20
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Administrative law now regulates the conduct of administrative agencies with
delegated executive authority and government agencies that administer special
programs and services. The emerging principles that global administrative law
scholars identify within the international regulatory regimes are an essential
ingredient

in

national

jurisdictions.

These

national

principles

generate

accountability (through the doctrines of reasonableness and correctness for
example) of domestic decision-makers.

Benedict Kingsbury and Richard Stewart are the pioneers of global
administrative law. They have argued that global administrative law contains the
mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understanding that
affect accountability of international regulatory agencies. In particular, they
suggest that international agencies have developed standards such as
transparency, participation, reasoned decision-making, legality and effective
review of the decisions.23 Ultimately, the project of global administrative law,
which started in 2005, has gained traction and continues to grow. An excellent
recent example of its expansion is to regulate governance indicators
operationalised globally international institutions.24 It is now a recognisable field
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of global governance theory. The evidence of this growth can be seen through
the recent publication of a global administrative law casebook.25

One of the central goals of global administrative law is to redeploy global
governance as administration.26 Proponents suggest that this shift allows the
recasting of “many standard concerns about the legitimacy of international
institutions in a more specific and focused way”.27 In the global legal order, and
unlike its domestic counterpart, there is no potential for direct democratic
participation by the various constituents. Much more importantly, there is no
sovereign at the global level and the respective branches of government are
hard to discern.

Like any scholarly field, the current literature of global administrative law includes
both proponents and detractors. Ladeur is a proponent. He demonstrates the
utility of global administrative law while simultaneously providing incisive
adjustments to its central tenets.28 Ladeur argues that administrative law’s (and,
by extension, global administrative law’s) postmodernism necessitates that we
move beyond relying on ideas of delegation, accountability, and legitimacy.
Global administrative law is trying theorise global governance by adapting to,
and experimenting with, the changing nature of postmodern legality. Global
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administrative law is trying to do this while supporting the creation of norms that
will adjust to the complexities of globalisation. The writings of Ladeur represent
the second camp that I will review below.

The detractors have rightly challenged the tentative assessments of global
administrative law. Carol Harlow suggests that it is extremely difficult to identify a
universal set of administrative law principles. For Harlow, administrative law is
“largely a western construct, taking its shape during the late 19th century as an
instrument for the control of public power”. 29 Dominated by a philosophy of
control, “administrative law has played an important part in the struggle for
limited government, its core value being conformity to the rule of law”.30 Susan
Marks’ writings suggest that global administrative law “seems to bring an object
into being, with a solidity and even a monumentality, that risks putting in the
shade disputes over process, agency, and orientation”.31 Global administrative
law’s turn away from democracy is what motivates Marks’ arguments. The use of
delegation, a basic organising principle of global administrative law, therefore
may not be the best way to usher in legitimacy in international law.

There are other areas of scholarship that point to a need for a much more robust
examination of the different understandings of modern administrative law. This

29
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claim focuses on comparative administrative law’s potential to offer diverse set of
insights globally. 32 Global administrative lawyers could explore how different
jurisdictions conceptualise administrative law, as opposed to providing a
definition based on western understandings of administrative law.33 While all of
these areas can be explored further, in this analysis, I focus on universal nature
of global administrative law. This is closely aligned to the criticisms that Carol
Harlow has articulated.

Claims made by global administrative lawyers are far-fetched in that their vision
of global governance ignores the true markings of the international regulatory
regimes, as I have demonstrated in the earlier chapters. Moreover, such claims
to legitimacy, accountability, and other similar principles only obscure the
realities of international institutions, while simultaneously propagating an outlook
premised on particular accounts of domestic conceptions of law, regulation and
governance. In the next section, I will explore two sets of scholarship that are
part of the current literature on global administrative law.

32
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4.2.1 Descriptive Accounts of Global Administrative Law as
Administration: Kingsbury & et al
Global administrative law’s central goal is to position global governance as
administration. This type of positioning allows those working under this
descriptive camp to “recast many standard concerns about the legitimacy of
international institutions in a more specific and focused way”.34 Supporters of
global

administrative

law

argue

that

this

approach

disturbs

orthodox

understandings of the concept of law within global governance.35 For example, in
national jurisdictions, law is created through elected representatives by way of
constitutional arrangements. This is, of course, contested by legal pluralism (and
more recently global legal pluralism). In this regard, legal pluralists posit that the
state does not have a monopoly in norm creation. Rather there are multiple
places in which norm generation occurs.36

Our traditional understanding of legal norm production through the various forms
of government is not possible within the global governance context. The lawmaking capacity of the judges of the two ad hoc tribunals is a good illustration.
Global administrative law allows to us imagine the international regulatory space
as containing the mechanisms, principles, practices and supporting social
34
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understandings that “promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global
administrative bodies”.37 In particular, global administrative law ensures these
international institutions meet adequate standards of transparency, participation,
reasoned decision, legality, and providing effective review of the decisions they
make”.38

For global administrative law scholars like Kingsbury and Stewart, there is an
accountability deficit within international regulatory regimes. Democratic
participation, analogous to that found in the national jurisdictions is not available
in international institutions. International institutions are often created by diverse
sets of actors and they are not accountable to a constituent population (for
example the ICTY and ICTR). The United Nations Security Council created these
two international criminal institutions and granted them specific powers to make
amendments to their respective rules. This rule making power has effectively
given the judges the power to legislate. Judges are solely accountable to the UN
Security Council in making these decisions. As I illustrated earlier, the Security
Council is very keen to deliver justice cheaply and thus instituted the completion
strategy. 39 But these international adjudicatory agencies with these types of
powers generate decisions that affect portions of the population in Rwanda or in
the former Balkans for example. This engenders a democracy deficit.
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Kingsbury and Stewart suggest that the results from such a democracy deficit
have produced two possible responses: extension of domestic administrative law
to intergovernmental regulatory decisions or the development of administrative
law type mechanisms at the global level to address decisions and rules made
within the intergovernmental regimes. Kingsbury and Stewart claim that the
proliferation of international, transnational regulation and administration designed
to address the “globalized interdependence in such fields as security, the
conditions of development […]” underlies the emergence of global administrative
law. 40 “Increasingly, these consequences cannot be addressed effectively by
isolated national regulatory and administrative measures”.41

No particular international regime can takes precedence over another. In fact,
another distinguishing feature of global administrative law is its acknowledgment
of the interaction between the domestic and the international.42 There are other
additional features of global administrative law according to its proponents. To
those gathered in this camp, global administrative law differs from traditional
international law that regulates the intercourse between sovereign equals. It is
sectorial and it relates to the aim of global regulation, which must ultimately
transcend the single nation state. Yet there are no enforcement mechanisms

40
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available to global administrative law because there is no actual constitutional
document per se in the international space.

The following example from the ICTR demonstrates how scholars writing in this
genre of global administrative law can arrive at these respective conclusions. In
July 2001, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Registrar suspended
the employment contract of Thadée Kwitonda, a defence investigator. Kwitonda
was employed as part of Arsène Shalom Ntahobali’s defence team.43 ICTR’s
Office of the Prosecutor investigated Kwitonda as a potential perpetrator of
genocide. The prosecutor’s finding led to Kwitonda’s suspension from his role as
a defence investigator.

In challenging the suspension, Ntahobali argued that his investigator, Kwitonda,
was the only person with knowledge and confidence of the potential witnesses.
Kwitonda was an essential member of the defence team and he was
instrumental in aiding the newly appointed Defence Counsel.44 The prosecutor
argued that the Registrar’s decision was not subject to judicial oversight,

43
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available through legal provisions within the enabling Statute, secondary
legislation such as the rules of evidence and procedure or Tribunal policy.

The Tribunal’s Trial Chamber agreed with the ICTR Prosecutor. The Trial
Chamber relied on the delegated administrative powers and responsibilities of
the registrar in organising and appointing defence investigators as set out in the
Statute. The Chamber found that “the issue of re-instatement of a suspended
[i]nvestigator is an administrative matter resting with the Registry”.45 The Trial
Chamber, using the language of administrative law, showed deference to the
policy decision of the registrar. Those working in the descriptive camp of global
administrative law can use this decision as evidence to support their arguments.

In response to the decision and relying on Tribunal policy directives46, Ntahobali
requested that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s President at the
time, Justice Navi Pillay to review the decision of the registrar and the Trial
Chamber. Justice Pillay dismissed Ntahobali’s motion. She deferred to the
administrative decision of the registrar. In her decision, she stated:

[…] In all systems of administrative law, a threshold condition must
be satisfied before an administrative decision may be impugned by
supervisory review. There are various formulations of this threshold
condition in national jurisdictions, but a common theme is that the
decision sought to be challenged, must involve a substantive right

45
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that should be protected as a matter of human
jurisprudence or public policy.

rights

[…] Bearing in mind also, the limited scope of my judicial review
jurisdiction as opposed to an appeal on merits, I do not find the
exercise of discretion by the Registrar in the present case to be
unreasonable or malafide or based on irrelevant or extraneous
factors. [emphasis added]47
The reference to her capacity to review the administrative decision of the
registrar may allow global administrative law scholars to propose that
international institutions have developed administrative law standards. In this
instance, they would argue that there is the development of a process of
effective review of the decisions that these tribunals make. 48

For global

administrative law scholars, this is a good illustration of global governance as
administration.

49

International

Criminal

In a similar vein, Sabino Cassese et al suggest that
Court’s

role

in

deciding

Palestinian

statehood

demonstrates the Court’s role as a global administrator.50

If global administrative law is to describe law in the international setting, as
Kingsbury and Stewart suggest, then it is a description that “diverges from, and
can be sharply in tension with the classical models of consent-based inter-state
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international law and most models of national law”. 51 In this process, global
administrative law’s law takes on a different character. It is not similar to what
exists in national jurisdictions. Global administrative law is something that is
entirely different from the administrative law found within national jurisdictions.
This is problematic for two reasons.

First, national administrative law is a product of political compromises between
political actors that were directly selected by their constituents, while
international law emanates from a dizzying array of actors and norm producers.
The example from the ICTR demonstrates that the rules of evidence and
procedure used by the judges are not a product of political compromise. Rather,
the Security Council granted the judges the power to draft the rules of evidence
and procedure similar to the Nuremberg Charter so that the Tribunal could
function. It did so for an arsenal of reasons that I discussed in the first chapter.52
As we saw from the empirical evidence that I presented in the first chapter, the
judges and their experts have a pro-conviction bias that surfaces in the manner
in which the rules of evidence and procedure are amended.

Second, this suggestion circles back to the central claim: a dynamic of difference
organises the manner in which international law and international institutions

51
52
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function. 53 To simply assert the existence of administrative law principles found
in the domestic legal order is discernable in international law and its institutions,
as indicia of solving the accountability problems, misses the mark. It does not
take into account the manner in which these tribunals are created, the rationale
and the politics involved in their creation and how they function. 54 Rather,
deploying such arguments obscures and reifies the malignant effects of
international law and its institutions on various parties that are implicated in the
respective decisions. What is crucial to this argument is the effect that these
policies (and changes to the rules of evidence and procedure) have on the
perpetrators and their rights, and more importantly on victims, in whose interests
the international community supposedly created the ICTR.

The aforementioned Kwitonda decision can be used as a potential reference to
judicial review by global administrative lawyers from the descriptive camp. Their
reasoning would be based on how the judges have crafted the respective rules
of evidence and procedure. As demonstrated in the first chapter, the general
manner in which the judges and this particular Tribunal have utilised these rules
has led to a pro-conviction bias that perpetuates western universalism in the
ICTR. The problem started with the manner in which the ICTR was created.
Even though the Rwandan government supported the move to create the tribunal
at the outset, there was a fear that their sovereignty will be eroded and that the
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very structure of the tribunal would generate decisions that would appease the
conscience of the international community rather than people of Rwanda and the
victims of the genocide.55

Ultimately the UN Security Council created the ICTR

to bridge the gap between two cultures, one western and the other, barbaric. It
followed the same process used to create the ICTY and granted the judges the
power to create and amend the rules. The rules were then amended regularly as
a means to comply with the completion strategy and deliver justice quickly at the
expense of the fair trial guaranteed afforded to the accused. Universalism is
embodied through the very dynamics of the tribunal. Only in name are the
accused afforded procedural and due process rights. Constant changes to the
rules have led to problematic witness testimony, trial delay and a myriad of other
related problems, all of which highlight the fact that the rights of the accused are
not seriously applied.56

Even though Justice Pillay was probably right in dismissing the accused’s motion
using the vernacular of administrative law, this does not mean that we can co-opt
this example from a specific international institution as demonstrating the
existence of global administrative law. We must first take a look at the context in
which these institutions operate as well as how they function. The context of
Rwanda is such that almost all of the citizens were affected by the conflict and
the ensuing genocide. Historians such as Mahmood Mamdani have illustrated
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the difficulty in ascribing individual criminal responsibility, either by commission
or omission, because nearly all Hutus in Rwanda were implicated in the
genocide. 57 This revelation leads us to ask why did the registrar allow the
investigator to be employed by the accused in the first place? Do all of the
accused have investigators with similar histories of allegations? If the
investigators were alleged perpetrators, then are they intimidating the witnesses?
These questions force us to contend with the very nature of the Rwandan
Tribunal, its universalist conduct, and its failures in delivering justice. To use the
ICTR and its jurisprudence to as an illustration of administrative law principles in
global governance simply ignores the larger systemic problems endemic in
international law and international institutions.

The presence of these administrative law principles, as illustrated by Justice
Pillay’s limited scope of judicial review jurisdiction, says nothing about broader
accountability or legitimacy of these types of institutions. Simply pointing to the
use of administrative law does not render international institutions more or less
legitimate. Rather, it seeks to mask a larger universalist project embedded in
politics and interests.

Another example is the global administrative law casebook and the Palestinian
bid for statehood. One of the authors included in the casebook suggest that the
Palestinian bid for statehood before the ICC is an indicia of global administrative
57
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law. Such a suggestion is naïve, to say the least.58 It ignores the context of the
Palestinian bid for statehood. Palestinian claims to statehood can be traced back
to the Mandate of the League of Nations, and Arab Israeli conflict starting in
1848.59 The current state of affairs in Palestine and Israel can be traced back to
the peace negotiation between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the
Israeli Government, led by the late Chairman Yasser Arafat and the late Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The peace negotiations resulted in the creation of the
Palestinian Authority. Initially the parties agreed to the Declaration of Principles
in September 1993 60 and subsequently signed the Israeli-Palestinian Interim
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (September 1995). The agreement
delineated the current existing legal governance of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip.61 These two agreements are interim in nature and remain subject to the
final Permanent Status negotiations, which have not yet materialise. These
agreements envisioned a gradual delegation of powers from the Occupying
Forces and the Israeli administration to the Palestinian Authority. The most
substantive agreement, Oslo 2, stipulates the manner of such delegations of
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power and eventual redeployment of Israeli Forces from the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip by Israel (article 10 of the Interim Agreement).62

In the 2006 Palestinian general elections, Hamas took control over the Gaza
Strip and reignited the conflict. With the termination of hostilities in the Gaza Strip
in 2009,63 the Palestinian Authority’s Minister of Justice, Dr. Khashan, lodged a
declaration pursuant to article 12 (3)64 of the International Criminal Court’s Rome
Statute.65 The Palestinian Authority’s Declaration was controversial, particularly
in light of the Goldstone report.66 In April 2012, the International Criminal Court’s
Office of the Prosecutor released a statement suggesting that the determination
of Palestinian statehood rested in the hands of “relevant bodies at the United
Nations or the Assembly of States Parties to make the legal determination
whether Palestine qualifies as a state for the purpose of acceding to the Rome
Statute and thereby enabling the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court under
article 12(1)”.67
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Discussions continue about whether the Palestinian Authority can avail itself of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in light of the recent attacks
on the Gaza Strip in 2014. The ICC prosecutor has agreed to conduct a
preliminary investigation in January 2015. By simply looking at the institutional
framework of the ICC and its capacity to determine statehood ignores the
background of the conflict and the politics.

The history of international law demonstrates that there are disparities between
established, and supposedly neutral, legal concepts and their contemporary
application. As demonstrated in the first chapter, early European attempts to
curtail the raw power of the sovereign by creating new rules in the form of
international law resulted in universal applications of western notions of law on
the

newly

discovered

territories

and

its

inhabitants.

68

Scholars

have

demonstrated that international law, and sovereignty doctrine in particular, was
used largely to regulate encounters between local inhabitants of the new world
and the European colonisers.69 This development of international law in the 17th
and 18th centuries is closely tied to the continuation of colonialism and
imperialism. 70 By the late 19th and 20th centuries, the accelerated drive of
international law had resulted in an abundance of international institutions that
were created to deal with the world’s problems, such as delivering aid to those in
need and dealing with health related issues. This proliferation of international
68
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institutions by the late 20th century created a new international space that
needed to be described and theorised, given the push of globalisation and the
changing nature of the nation state. Global administrative law is one incarnation
of these attempts to describe the existing international landscape inspired by
domestic

understanding

administrative

law

that

of

administration

includes

principles

as
such

potentially
as

embodying

transparency

and

accountability.

The above analysis demonstrates that actual global administrative law cannot be
found. Rather, the context and how the respective tribunal or institution functions
matters because of the very nature of international law. By not engaging in this
manner, global administrative law claims described earlier succumb to a
peripheral

reading

of

international

institutions.

These

characterisations

inadequately reflect the inherent realities of these institutions.

4.2.2 Ladeur and Postmodern Administrative Law
In the previous section, the dominant and descriptive narrative of global
administrative law was presented. In this section, I will focus on the scholarship
of Karl-Heinz Ladeur. Ladeur agrees with other global administrative law
scholars about its utility and he is committed to the idea of global administrative
law generally. He nonetheless challenges certain foundational assertions of
global administrative law. This commitment has precipitated a revision of global
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administrative law’s central tenets and its commitment to domestic administrative
law. This is the reason why I have elected to engage with his scholarship.

Ladeur’s contribution seeks to confront the recent attempts in global governance
to map the existing international legal order based on our understanding of the
nation state. 71 The fragmentation of private and public spheres and the
transformation of the legal system undoubtedly affects our conceptions of
democratic governance. Ladeur suggests that global administrative law may
provide a much more meaningful means to manage and stabilise the
complexities of various international regimes.

Ladeur tests his hypothesis by turning to the “evolution of modern administrative
law” to examine how progress in this field can help us to understand domestic,
transnational, and global law. One of his central contentions is that
administration and subsequently administrators, rather than the legislators and
courts, produces domestic administrative law. With such an understanding of
administrative law, Ladeur suggests that the paradigms of administrative law
have undergone serious changes over the last decade from “the construction
and decision of individual cases to industry related regulation”.72 There is a new
postmodern model of administrative action that is motivated by experimentation
and learning, while reflecting the transformation of culture. The technological
progress has transformed our existing modes of communication. This
71
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transformation in communication, as part of globalisation, has facilitated
specialised epistemic communities and highly sophisticated networks. These
epistemic communities and specialised networks are a ‘society of networks’.73
Ladeur suggests that these developments are generated by globalisation and in
turn have altered the very nature of administration. The creation of networks
must then be encapsulated within what Ladeur suggests as postmodern
administrative law. The role of the state has dramatically changed within this
postmodern reality but it has not lost its relevance. The state does not retreat or
does it vanish. Rather it has assumed the “role of a player with the responsibility
for the rules of the game” to regulate the “polycentric practices of
experimentation in the private realm [that] produce lock-ins as well as perverse
effects”.74

Based on such a societal transformation, Ladeur theorises the possibility of a
new perspective for global administrative law. The network-like structure of
global administrative law is not new, it is a continuation of “fragmentation and, as
a consequence, the increasingly loose coupling of the different layers of the
normative system of postmodernity which can be observed at the domestic
level”.75 Once we understand that the domestic system is not structured by a
unified normative order, it is much easier to imagine its expansion to the
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international space. Ladeur is challenging Kingsbury and Stewart’s assumptions
about the very nature of domestic administrative law. He is challenging their
desire to analogise from a domestic administrative law perspective in search of
accountability and legitimacy.

From this analysis, Ladeur argues that the evolutionary process shapes
domestic notions of law. There are overlapping and interconnected dimensions
in the production of the legal order. Ladeur, unlike other supporters of global
administrative law, asserts that the democratic nature of law should not be
overstated. Law’s accountability to its democratic constituents and its goals in
national jurisdictions must be interrogated. In the domestic context, the question
then is whether the decision-makers are ultimately accountable to the
constituents that selected them as their policy-makers. For example, are policymakers and elected officials actually accountable? Moreover, Ladeur notes that
within the context of domestic administrative governance, accountability cannot
be reduced “to the control of compliance rules”.76

The postmodern nature of society had a fundamental effect on the relationship
between law and its “cognitive infrastructure”, precipitating the evolution of the
legal system with the creation of new accountability regimes called “entangled
hierarchies”. 77 These entangled hierarchies are characterised by erosions in
which rules are designed and applied. Spontaneous accountability generated by
76
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networks emerge in this postmodern space. These regimes are not defined in
advance. They are constituted through a process of network activity. Ladeur’s
entangled hierarchies point to the possibility of generating accountability beyond
our conceptions of legitimacy production. Ultimately, in standard understandings
of global administrative law, there is an overemphasis on democratic
participation in any regime. For Ladeur, the postmodern nature of our world has
transformed these means of participation where accountability can now be
generated through various networks. The control mechanisms conceptualised at
the state level cannot help in this instance.

Postmodern insights on administrative law’s legitimacy seriously challenge the
notion that administrative law must have an element of public law. The
postmodern nature of law, given the rise of the society of organisations and
networks,78 necessitated administrative law to adapt and give way to new explicit
re-formulation and re-modifications of the “whole architecture of the normative
system”.79 This point can be illustrated through the recent shifts in the manner in
which decision-making power is delegated to traditional private institutions. In a
similar vein, questions about the legality of global administrative law must take
stock of the changing nature of national domestic law within the postmodern
moment.
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Global administrative law’s animating concern is the democratic deficit in
international organisations. Ladeur however contends that a focus on the
democratic deficit is overstated. By taking a critical look at the democratic
function of law, Ladeur argues that at times, the role of the state requires
interference with individual rights. Simultaneously, the state is involved in norm
production which “transform[s] the conditions for the use of rights but do[es] not
infringe upon subjective rights in the traditional sense”.80 In this instance, Ladeur
is alluding to the power of the state to transform the conditions of individuals
through agreements between international institutions. These agreements have
a drastic effect on individual rights without actually requiring the state to enact
specific legislation (for example the Treaty of Rome in the European context and
ICC Rome Statute in the international context). Consequently administrative
action is now being directed at complex networks rather than individuals. The
rise of global administrative structures and the fast-emerging norms that regulate
these networks strengthen the autonomy of administrative function. This is in
contrast with Kingsbury and Stewart’s version of global administrative law. Their
version seeks to analogise global administrative law with the domestic
preconceived notions of administrative law.

For Ladeur, global law must be thought of in procedural terms, “as a law which
produces its own preconditions for validity and recognition, beyond the sphere of
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the state”81 that is part of a fragmented context. Such a context is “characterised
by a random coming together of national, conventional international and selforganised global law, on the one hand, and similarly heterogeneous cognitive
rules […]”.82 The discourse of legitimacy in international law over-analogises the
domestic reality.

Ladeur’s contestation may be correct but there is also a danger in assuming the
possibilities of global law in procedural terms with its own preconditions for
validity and recognition. The rules of evidence and procedure of the two ad hoc
tribunals illustrate this point. Even though the statutes of the respective tribunals
have created the preconditions for validity and recognition of the rules, the effect
of the application of these rules on the accused is problematic for various
reasons outlined in the first chapter. Take for instance the example of the judges
of the tribunals repealing judicial decisions using the rules of evidence and
procedure. 83 The judges are using the power granted to them through the
respective statute to legislative and ultimately overrule a judicial decision.

Ladeur’s global administrative law can draw upon “components of both the more
hybrid loosely coupled type of the law of networks, which emerges at the
domestic level, and on components of the new public international law which
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shatters the hitherto established clear separation from the state-based law”.84
Fundamentally, the source of law can no longer be viewed as stemming from
canonical texts. 85 Instead, Ladeur suggests that legal meaning must be
generated from several overlapping texts and practices that encompass an
experimental approach. He uses various examples from investment protection
and environmental governance to suggest that, in these fields, global
administrative law may allow “for the development of rules below the rather rigid
structure of public international law”.86

Ladeur’s account however, does not demonstrate the role of special interests in
the evolutionary process in our society.87 Even though Ladeur notes the dynamic
shifts within the domestic and national accounts of administration, he does not
outline whose interests will be taken into account in this process that describes
the move from cases to regulation. Ladeur’s version of the evolutionary process
within the national fields of law, as a move away from the legislators and the
judges to one that is governed by networks, simply omits to mention the
embedded power structures within and across these networks.88

84

Ladeur, “Emergence of GAL” supra note 17 at 247.
Ibid at 249.
86
Ibid at 263.
87
Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, “In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global
Politics” in Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods, eds, The Politics of Global Regulation (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2009) at 5; David Charney, “Illusions of a Spontaneous Order:
“Norms” in Contractual Relationships” (1996) 144 U Pa L Rev 1841; Patricia J Williams, Alchemy
of Race and Rights: Diary of a Law Professor (Harvard University Press, 1991) at 148.
88
David Charney, “Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships”
(1996) 144 U Pa L Rev 1841.
85

242

A wholesome understanding global governance includes the rise of networks.
This does not necessarily imply that these networks are impregnable to capture
by special interest groups. Regulatory capture denotes the control of the
“regulatory process by those whom it is supposed to regulate”. Regulatory
capture is the process by which a small group, possibly those affected by
regulation, takes control “with the consequence that regulatory outcomes favour
the narrow “few” at the expense of society as a whole.89 The rise of networks
does not take in to account the critical interventions from social scientists about
the very nature of international law and its institutions.

In pushing the boundaries of global administrative law, scholars like Ladeur
identify the global administrative space and its ability to generate self-regulation
as a form of spontaneous accountability. Accountability, however, is tied to
specific biases endemic to interest groups that have captured the spontaneous
legitimacy producing processes within the international institutions. For example,
the United Nations Security Council’s created the two ad hoc international
criminal tribunals to deliver justice and end impunity in the Balkans and Rwanda.
There were a number of political factors that precipitated their decisions. For
example, in creating the ICTY, UNSC was concerned with whether the newly
formed Balkan states would ratify a treaty based international criminal institution.
Similarly, with Rwanda, the Security Council worried about the criticisms about
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the disproportionate attention to European problems. In addition to these political
aspects, the Security Council was preoccupied with a particular set of political
concerns: the desire to end impunity in the aftermath of the Cold War. In this
light, it can be argued that a special interest group has captured the tribunals90
and the interest group is committed to prosecuting those most responsible for the
heinous crimes, even in cases where there is a clear lack of evidentiary basis to
proceed.91 The role of experts outlined earlier is important in fostering this proconviction bias.

The employees of these tribunals are intricately connected to a pro-conviction
bias endemic within their respective international criminal institution. The starting
point of this pro-conviction bias is the manner in which these tribunals were
created. The judges and their supporting staff (for example their Associate Legal
Officers) believe that the accused before the ICTR committed these crimes.
Their belief is predicated on the fact that the Hutu population of Rwanda
committed the genocide and other acts prohibited by international law. This fact
is intrinsically linked to the acceptance of the faulty witness statements.

The arguments in favour of demonstrating a pro-conviction bias are based on
experts that travel from tribunal to tribunal. As noted earlier, there is now a class
of international experts that work on post-conflict justice issues who populate the
90
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tribunals.92 These international criminal law experts maintain an almost nomadic
lifestyle based on their professional affiliation to the respective tribunal. As part of
this lifestyle, they move from one conflict hotspot to another.93 Scholars have
chronicled the manner in which these international experts have gathered their
expertise. Their expertise is based on a “lack of local knowledge of post-conflict
settings, whether that is knowledge of the local legal system, local facts, local
culture or any other relevant information”.94 To illustrate, 2014 ICTR Appeals
Chamber Interns in The Hague may become Associate Legal Officers in Arusha,
Tanzania six months after they have completed their internships. 95 These
experts, once they have completed at least two years at a Tribunal may want to
move to Cambodia or back to The Hague to join another tribunal adjudicating
similar crimes. The content of the law that they work with may be the same but
the nature of the conflict and the associated history of the regions are vastly
different.

The international criminal law experts are not neutral. Their professional careers
are based on the advancement of universalism by ending impunity and
prosecuting the responsible war criminals. David Kennedy’s argument that the
background norms of international institutions are much more relevant than we
92
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had originally thought is important in understanding this process.96 The experts’
politics shape the results of the adjudicatory process. The adjudicatory process
is meant to be objective where the accused is given a fair trial. However, our
international criminal law experts manage background norms, and this
managerial function results in the determination of how the tribunals operate.97
As Kennedy has noted, what really matters at the global institutional level is not
what is in the foreground (the tribunals) or the context (Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia). Rather the experts have “colonized the foreground and the
context”.98

The judges and their expert’s pro-conviction bias is significant to both the
accused and the international community. The pro-conviction bias is rooted
inherently in the way international law is constructed, as part of the dynamic of
difference.99 As noted earlier, notwithstanding the western guilt, the ICTR was
created as a means to bridge the gap between two cultures: the civilised and the
uncivilised. The ICTR was created to bridge the gap between the civilized
international community and the uncivilized Rwandans and to render justice. The
tribunal was modelled on an adjudicatory system where the judges were given
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the power to legislate through the rules of evidence and procedure. Moreover,
and building on the political nature of spontaneous accountability creation,
insights from a historical perspective of international law can be used to illustrate
that international law is not neutral in how it operates, and demonstrate how it is
used to generalise a specific set of western values and traditions.100

The very structure of international law includes embedded politics and a
particular universalistic narrative that is difficult to overcome.101 More importantly,
the origins of international law foster a specific “set of structures that continually
repeat themselves at various stages in the history of the discipline”. 102 This
dynamic of international law therefore encourages regulatory capture by
emphasising specific western set of values and traditions. These values and
traditions are predominantly western, given the role of the experts and where
they come from.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s history with witness testimony
is an illustrative example of western universalism. There is regulatory capture by
special interests that want to facilitate and expedite the prosecutions of alleged
perpetrators of international crimes. This process starts with the experts that
populate these institutions and continues up to the judges and the Security
Council. Such actions may be analogous to the use of international law to further
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colonial expansion as witnessed through the civilising mission discussed earlier.
In this example, the narrative of ending impunity and delivering justice to the
victims of mass human rights violations is used as means to spread western
universalism. This is particularly obvious when the assumed objectivity of
adjudicators, litigators and witnesses are examined. In these instances, there is
an absence of contextual understanding of Rwanda. More importantly there are
difficulties in interpreting the witness testimony that support the decisions
rendered. Arguably, Nancy Combs’ empirical research highlights the explicit
decisions within these tribunals, which then serve to push against and most often
contradict, the claims deployed by global administrative law scholars.

4.3 Conclusion
Globalisation and the fragmentation of international law have led scholars to
theorise global governance in multiple ways. In the previous chapter, I chronicled
the efforts of writers to think about this problem through the lens of global
constitutionalism and global constitutionalisation. In this chapter, I engaged
scholars writing about global governance through the lens of global
administrative law. I reviewed two distinct attempts to understand administration
as global governance. The first was a purely descriptive account of international
institutions and their use of administrative law principles. In this example,
scholars argue that the deployment of administrative principles in international
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institutions can fill the democracy deficit and usher in notions of accountability.103
As I have illustrated, these claims are not possible. As the evidence from the
ICTR reveals, even though it is possible to describe the tribunal’s operation in
terms of administrative law principles, this does not mean that the use of these
principles lead to more accountability. In fact, arguing for the existence of such
principles

obscures

international

law’s

deeply

unbalanced

history

of

universalising a specific set of western norms and how international institutions,
including the ICTR, are imbricated in this history.

The second, as encapsulated within the writings of Karl-Heinz Ladeur, suggests
that

global

administrative

law

must

acknowledge

administrative

law’s

postmodernism. Previously existing articulations of global administrative law
must transcend notions of delegation and accountability as a means to secure
legitimacy within the global space. These concepts, Ladeur notes, are wedded to
out-dated

understandings

of

the

modern

nation

and

ignore

societal

transformations. These transformations, as part of the evolutionary process,
have generated the capacity to produce spontaneous accountability by networks.
Global administrative law’s focus, therefore, should not be on generating control
of compliance rules. Rather for Ladeur, by focusing on entangled hierarchies and
processes of generating spontaneous accountability through the rise of
networks, global administrative law should take on a postmodern understanding
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of administration. Ladeur’s does not take into account the role of special interest
in these networks that he relies.

Ultimately, these characterisations of international institutions and the various
international regulatory bodies are missing the mark by focusing solely on the
general legal frameworks, rather than embracing the internal dynamics
emblematic within these institutions. Depicting a very singular narrative that
focuses on the law on the books, as witnessed by scholars based in Berlin,
Hamburg, London, New York, and Toronto is not useful. Much more importantly,
theorising from this superficial perspective may not help us understand the
different political compromises involved in how international law and its
institutions are created and how they operate. The description of the international
legal order cannot be a single story.

There is a need to move beyond this type of a single, universalising, linear, and
decontextualized narrative. In this vein, the following chapter is my attempt to
think about how we can theorise global governance from the bottom-up,
beginning with the global South.
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Chapter 5:

Theorising from Below? Global South & Third World

Approaches to International Law and Global Governance
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters, I examined two contemporary theoretical frameworks
currently used by international legal scholars to theorise global governance.
These scholars argue that the conditions brought about by globalisation and
fragmentation spur on the need to usher in accountability and legitimacy into
international law and its institutions. These scholars suggest that it is possible to
usher in accountability and legitimacy through global constitutionalism and global
administrative law. In this chapter, I focus on how to transcend the problems that
I identified in the previous discussions about global constitutionalism and global
administrative law.

In my previous analysis, I showed that the first global governance theory uses
both constitutionalism and constitutionalisation to identify existing legitimacyproducing mechanisms in international law and its institutions. Scholars working
in this area suggest that international law and its institutions exhibit
characteristics akin to constitutionalism and constitutionalisation. 1 Under the
banner of global constitutionalism, some scholars argue that international law
should be used to create a better world by imagining a better constitutional
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future. 2 For example, the United Nations Charter is imagined as a world
constitution.3

The second global governance theory focuses on recent attempts to imagine
global governance as administration.4 For those working in global administrative
law, contemporary international institutions are making use of administrative law
principles.

5

Those

analogising

from

Anglo-Saxon

jurisdictions

identify

administrative law norms within international regimes.6 By taking inspiration from
domestic administrative law,7 global administrative lawyers argue that the entire
collection of norms, principles and doctrines that weave together domestic
administrative law can be found globally.8 By demonstrating the presence, or
possibilities, of these norms, they suggest that the current international
regulatory framework explicitly demonstrates or has the potential to produce
accountability. Richard Stewart recently suggests the following: “Despite vast
differences in institutional and political circumstances, experience confirms that
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use of administrative law mechanisms in global administration can help protect
the rights of individuals threatened with sanctions and […] secure greater regard
for the politically weak and vulnerable”.9

In describing the various positions within these theoretical discussions on how to
usher legitimacy and accountability into international law and its institutions, I
identified a number of problems. The central shortcoming of these two accounts
of global governance theory is that they ignore and obscure the true nature of
international law and its institutions. As I have demonstrated in the earlier
chapters, this is part of a larger trend in international law and its where they
deploy the western particular are the universal. This particular facet of
international law can be rooted in its history and the manner in which it was
forged. As illustrated by Antony Anghie, the early beginnings of international law
are imbricated in a universal narrative, starting with the manner in which the
sovereignty doctrine was created.10 This particular aspect of international law
continues to this day, even in the manner in which we theorise international law
and its institutions.11

I have relied on a body of literature that seeks to position the global South in
contradistinction to the global North. By drawing on this body of scholarship, this
9
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chapter explores the various means by which we can overcome the universalism
imbedded in international law and international institutions. In the global
constitutionalism chapter, I identified two potential ways in which we can
transcend the limitations of global constitutionalism. In this chapter, I want to
return to recent scholarly interventions that engage with the lived realities of the
people of the global South. This chapter asks: how can international lawyers and
international law scholars learn from the global South? This question prompts
another related question: should we learn from the global South?12 The second
question will be explored first.

This chapter builds on contemporary literature on the global South so that we
may learn from these diverse perspectives in theorising global governance.
Some scholars, such as Boaventura De Sousa Santos, have expressly called for
such a reorientation:13

The antinomies, difficulties, and hard cases analysed […] demand
that at the beginning of the new millennium we distance ourselves
from Eurocentric critical thinking. To create such a distance is the
precondition for the fulfilment of the most crucial theoretical task of
our time: that the unthinkable be thought, that the unexpected be
assumed as an integral part of the theoretical work. […] I submit
that, in the current context of social political transformation, rather
than vanguard theories we need rearguard theories. I have in mind
theoretical work that follows and shares the practices of the social
12
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movements very closely, raising questions, establishing synchronic
and diachronic comparisons, symbolically enlarging such practices
by means of articulations, translations, and possible alliances with
other movements, providing contexts, clarifying or dismantling
normative injunctions, facilitating interactions with those that walk
more slowly, and bringing complexity when actions seem rushed
and unreflective and simplicity when action seems self-paralyzed by
reflection.14
Others have posited examples from the global South as an interruption to the
Eurocentric focus on constitutional theory.15 The scholars who have expressly
called for this reorientation arrive from various disciplinary destinations, including
law. They challenge the manner in which we imagine the global South. They
argue that the global South is not a carbon copy of the North; rather, it is
particular in its development. This development therefore should be celebrated.
From this vantage point, turning to the global South provides an opportunity to
glean new insights about international law and its institutions.

In what follows, I will set out the basis for this reorientation towards the global
South. Then I will pursue the global South literature in international law, by
focusing on the broad theoretical foundations of the Third World Approaches to
14
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International Law (TWAIL) movement. TWAIL scholarship is a reaction against
the colonial and imperial projects of international law. I set out its main claims
and then examine its proposals. This arrives at an answer to the second
question: should we learn from the global South?

Then, I explore the question of how can we learn from the global South. In
answering this question, I offer two insights. The first is based on the premise of
international law as a field of practice. Often, international lawyers and
international law scholars tend to examine the legal mechanisms and the
ensuing doctrines of international law without reference to geo-political,
economic, social, and cultural contexts. Chapter three on global constitutionalism
conveyed that scholars were preoccupied with mapping the existing international
structures to suggest the existence of a constitutional order. Thinking about
international law as a field of practice can illuminate its unlit corners that are
constituted by diverse set of forces at play in today’s society, rather than solely
focusing on issues of legality. In order to focus on international law as a field of
practice, we must gather more insights about international law and its institutions
through ethnographies. The second insight that I offer attempts to problematise
the ethics of international legal scholarship. In this regard, I focus on the role of
international lawyers and international law scholars and their ethical obligations
in light of the material reality of the global South.
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5.2 Theorising Global Governance from the Global South?
Scholars from numerous disciplines, such as anthropology, cultural studies,
history, political science and others, have examined the relationship of the global
North to the global South. They have sought to critically question the pejorative
and antiquated understandings the West has of the rest of the world.16 These
writers have focused on how the global South is imagined and produced,17 and
the role of national liberation struggles in combating the enduring effects of
colonialism.18 Early anti-colonial and post-colonial literature has also examined
this relationship between the global North and the global South.

With this frame of reference, this chapter examines scholarly interventions that
suggest we should turn to the global South as a site of knowledge production. I
will focus on the writings of two anthropologists and a comparative constitutional
and international lawyer. These scholars argue for a specific reorientation
towards the global South. This will lead into an examination of the reconstructive
elements embedded in TWAIL. Over the past twenty years, TWAIL scholars
have sought to critically evaluate international law and its institutions.
Unfortunately, these interventions have not had a significant influence in
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international legal theory,19 in particular in global administrative law or global
constitutionalism. 20 Accordingly, I use this chapter to examine the diverse
arguments housed under the moniker of TWAIL in order to understand TWAIL’s
reformist agenda and to embed this reformist agenda within conversations on
global governance theories.
5.2.1 Interdisciplinary Reorientation towards the global South
Contemporary scholarship has built upon a tradition of critique by questioning
how the empire speaks to, and can speak about, the metropole. In this vein,
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s 2012 Theory From The South is a text rich
in ideas. They start their contribution by noting:
Western enlightenment thought has, from the first, posited itself as
the wellspring of universal learning, of Science and Philosophy,
upper case; concomitantly, it has regarded the non-West—variously
known as the Ancient World, the Orient, the Primitive World, the
Third World, the Underdeveloped World, the Developing World, and
now the Global South—primarily as a place of parochial wisdom, of
antiquarian traditions, of exotic ways and means. Above all, of
unprocessed data. These other worlds, in short, are treated less as
sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw fact: of the
minutiae from which Euromodernity might fashion its testable
19

Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards A Global History of International Law
in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 2; A recent exception to the rule is Zoran Oklopcic,
“Provincializing Constitutional Pluralism” (2014) 5:2 Transnational Leg Theory 200 at 203. A
similar question was raised by Critical Race Scholars in the United States in the early 1980s; see
for example Richard Delgado, “The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What
Minorities Want?”, (1987) 22 Harv CR-CLL Rev 301; Richard Delgado, “Critical Race Theory: An
Annotated Bibliography”, (1993) 79 Va L Rev 461 at 461.
20
Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 11; But see Peer Zumbansen, “Defining the Space of
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism” (2012) 21:1 Transnat’l L
& Contemporary Probs accessed online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934044; Peer Zumbansen,
Comparative, Global and Transnational Constitutionalism: The Emergence of a Transnational
Legal-Pluralist Order, (2012) 1:1 Global Constitutionalism 16-52; Peer Zumbansen, starting with
his Transnational Legal Pluralism article, has argued that global governance scholarship must
take TWAIL scholarship seriously.

258

theories and transcendent truths. […] But what if, and here is the
idea in interrogative form, we invert that Order of Things? What if
we posit that, in the present moment, it is the so-called ‘Global
South’ that affords privileged insight into the workings of the world at
large? That it is from here that our empirical grasp of its lineaments,
and our theory-work in accounting for them, ought to be coming, at
least in major part?21
Their proposal is based on the realisation that contemporary actors, norms, and
processes are reconfiguring our understandings of the core-and-periphery.
Because of the processes of globalisation, the global South is experiencing
“some of the most innovative and energetic modes of producing value” and this
is the “driving impulse of contemporary capitalism as both a material and cultural
formation”.22 Whether it is to mine mineral resources23 or fabricate clothing, it is
an accepted fact that most materials are now produced cheaply and quickly in
the global South. Moreover, various modes of governance techniques are being
deployed in the global South. In order to grasp the history of the present, both
empirically and theoretically, they suggest that we must study the global South.24

Comaroff and Comaroff’s argument that the global South can open new vistas
into the way in which our world works is built on two interrelated arguments.
First, based on insights developed over the last 100 years, they argue that
21

Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 1.
Ibid at 22.
23
Charis Kamphuis "Foreign Investment and the Privatization of Coercion: A Case Study of the
Forza Security Company in Peru" (2011-2012) 37 Brook J Intl L 529; Edward Bearnot,
“Bangladesh: A Labor Paradox’, The World Policy Institute”, online: (May 2013) “Join the
Conversation”, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Bangladesh - Labor - Paradox>.
24
Jean Comaroff & John L. Comaroff, “Theory from the South: Or, how Euro-America is Evolving
Toward Africa” (2012) 22:2 Anthropological Forum: J Social Anthropology & Comparative
Sociology 113 at 117 [Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South”]; Comaroff & Comaroff,
Theory supra note 13 at 7.
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modernity, 25 particularly in the African continent (and the global South by
extension), cannot be understood as a carbon copy, derivative, a Doppelgänger
or a counterfeit of the Western (American and European) original.26

The term “modernity” has captured the imagination of various scholars. It
describes the processes of globalisation beginning in the 15th and 16th centuries
and this process continues today. It is a treacherous, and often contested,
concept. 27 It is about the shift from traditional modes of governance and
production to the contemporary modes of regulation with which we are now
familiar. Modernity is concerned with the transition from the traditional to the
new, as understood through teleological notions of progress.28

Dipesh Chakrabarty offers a concrete articulation of political modernity:

[…] The phenomenon of “political modernity” — namely, the rule by
modern institutions of the state, bureaucracy, and capitalist
25

For a cursory discussion of the term in the context of international law, see John D. Haskell,
“The Traditions of Modernity within International Law and Governance: Christianity, Liberalism
and Marxism” Howard University School of Law, Human Rights & Globalization L Rev (Fall 2014,
Forthcoming); Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 118-119 .
26
Ibid at 117; Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 7.
27
Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (Pala
Alto: Stanford University Press, 1991); Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press) at 10; Latour addresses the question of what does it mean to be
modern with the following: “Modernity comes in as many versions as there are thinkers or
journalists, yet all its definitions point, in one way or another, to the passage of time. The
adjective 'modem' designates a new regime, an acceleration, a rupture, a revolution in time.
When the word 'modern', 'modernization', or 'modernity' appears, we are defining, by contrast, an
archaic and stable past. Furthermore, the word is always being thrown into the middle of a fight,
in a quarrel where there are winners and losers, Ancients and Moderns. 'Modern' is thus doubly
asymmetrical: it designates a break in the regular passage of time, and it designates a combat in
which there are victors and vanquished”.
28
Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Is the Post- in Postmodernism the Post- in Postcolonial?” (1991)
17:2 Critical Inquiry 336 at 341-342.
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enterprise—is impossible to think of anywhere in the world without
invoking certain categories and concepts, the genealogies of which
go deep into the intellectual and even theological traditions of
Europe. Concepts such as citizenship, the state, civil society, public
sphere, human rights, equality before the law, the individual,
distinctions between public and private, the idea of the subject,
democracy, popular sovereignty, social justice, scientific rationality,
and so on all bear the burden of European thought and history. One
simply cannot think of political modernity without these and other
related concepts that found a climactic form in the course of the
European Enlightenment and the nineteenth century.29
Similarly, Comaroff and Comaroff suggest that modernity is an orientation about
how to be in the world. It encapsulates ideas of identity, consciousness, and
progress, which in itself is closely tied to the idea of modernisation.30

Modernity, in the continent of Africa specifically, and in the global South
generally, has its own diverse and multipronged path. Such a trajectory has
shaped the “moral and material” everyday life of the global South. 31 They have
produced different means through which to make sense of the surrounding lived
reality of every person. Comaroff and Comaroff characterise this activity as
fashioning “social relations, commodities, and forms of value appropriate to

29

Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 4.
30
“Modernity refers to an orientation to being-in-the-world, to a variably construed and variably
inhabited Weltanschauung, to a concept of the person as self-conscious subject, to an ideal of
humanity as species being, to a vision of history as a progressive, man-made construction, to an
ideology of improvement through the accumulation of knowledge and technological skill, to the
pursuit of justice by means of rational governance; to a relentless impulse toward innovation
whose very iconoclasm breeds a hunger for things eternal (cf. Harvey 1989, 10). Modernization,
by contrast, posits a strong, normative teleology, a unilinear trajectory toward a particular vision
of the future—capitalist, socialist, fascist, whatever—to which all humanity should aspire, to
which all history ought to lead and all peoples should evolve, if at different rates”; Comaroff &
Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 118-119.
31
Comaroff & Comaroff, Theory supra note 13 at 8.
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contemporary circumstances”. 32 Much more importantly, this lived reality is
calibrated by the impact of capitalism, colonial contact, and more recently by
internationalism and globalism. Africa’s own modernity has given rise to “iconic
cultural forms, like popular Christianity, or mass-mediated musical modes, or
cinematic genres”.33 African modernity is a “discursive construct and an empirical
fact” that relates to the traumatic history that was made, and that is continuing to
be made.34 Yet the global South is posited as the younger backwards child of the
North that is often trying desperately to catch up.

The second argument relates to the manner in which the global South is
constructed in our collective imagination. This argument is simple: the processes
of capitalism and globalisation,35 as we understand them today, were forged and
deployed first in the global South. In their own articulation, Comaroff and
Comaroff suggest that the “regions in the South tend first to feel the concrete
effects of world-historical processes as they play themselves out, thus to
prefigure the future of the former metropole”.36 As the acceleration of the various
modes of production by different actors, processes, and norm generators
expand, it is the global South that is experiencing these repercussions first. This
insight is invaluable for the current purpose of how we theorise global

32

Ibid at 8.
Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 118.
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Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Globalizations" (2006) 23 Theory Culture Society 393;
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governance. As international lawyers like David Kennedy have suggested, the
global South is where the global governance rubber hits the road.37

In the context of law, Daniel Bonilla’s arguments are analogous to the above
claims. In his collection of essays in Constitutionalism of the South, he examines
how the Colombian Constitutional Court, the Constitutional Court of South Africa,
and the Indian Supreme Court can contribute to modern understandings of
constitutionalism.38 His point of departure is to recognise the Eurocentricism in
constitutional theory. Constitutionalism is usually reliant upon Western legal
thinkers, which results in the exclusion of knowledge production from the global
South. Bonilla characterises this as the relegation of legal thinkers from the
global South to “particularly low level” priority and importance.39

In asserting this characterisation, Bonilla makes five arguments. First, he argues
that legal systems in the global South reproduce the legal systems of the global
North. Second, Western contributions to legal theory and the adoption of the
Western legal systems by countries in the global South have reified the claim
37

David Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance” in Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds,
Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge
University Press, 2009) at 41 [Kennedy, “Mystery of Global Governance”].
38
Bonilla thus states: “The book aims to open the discussion about the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court of Colombia, the Indian Supreme Court, and the South African Constitutional
Court. The articles gathered in this book explore the jurisprudence of these courts on three
matters: social and economic rights, cultural diversity, and access to justice. These three topics
are directly related to poverty and inequality, political violence, cultural minorities and the
consolidation of the rule of law – issues that are fundamental in these three countries. The book
also aims to bridge the gap that exists between the Global South and Global North on
constitutional matters. Finally, it aims to make explicit the need to widen the number of
authoritative interpreters of modern constitutionalism”; Bonilla, “Introduction” supra note 15 at 29.
39
Ibid at 4.
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that the legal systems of the global South are similar to the legal systems of the
global North. This reification has led to the notion that there is little value in
understanding the global South as a site of unique legal knowledge or rich legal
traditions.40 Third, the indifference demonstrated by scholars of the global North
is based on an alleged formalism of the laws in the global South, which
ostensibly

demonstrates

the

global

South’s

backwardness

and

underdevelopment. However there is merit in global North scholars studying the
issues of social justice in the global South as a way to ameliorate the conditions
of those living there. Ultimately, if one were to pursue this argument, its results
would be that the global South can be enlightened through the scholarship from
the global North by showing the underdeveloped how to use law for their
betterment. The fourth argument is that the academic knowledge production of
the global North is deemed to be much more robust than the academic
knowledge production of the global South. Finally, Bonilla stipulates that the
“closed and parochial character of U.S. legal academy, along with the selective
openness of most of Western Europe’s legal academy, discourages any dialogue
with the legal institutions of the [g]lobal South”.41

Bonilla’s arguments generate three rules that “govern the production, circulation,
and use of legal knowledge”: 42 the well of production rule 43 ; the protected
designation of origin rule44; and the effective operator rule.45

40

Ibid at 6.
Ibid at 6.
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The according to the first rule, the global North is the only place able to produce
legal knowledge. This signifies that the global South is incapable of producing
original knowledge and that it simply replicates knowledge from other sources.
Bonilla is accurate in his description of this normative tendency, which is evident
in how we theorise global governance today. When discussing the descriptive
accounts of global constitutionalism, there is a propensity to rely on European
models, European authors and the European experience. For example, in the
discussions about the descriptive accounts of global constitutionalism, Klabbers,
Peters, and Ulfstein rely on principles from the European Union and its
adjudicatory frameworks as illustrative of global constitutionalism. 46

The second rule suggests that all knowledge produced in the North should be
respected and recognised. This particular insight is extremely valuable to this
discussion. Even though scholars from the Third World (and their allies) have
been active in international law and its institutions, their critical insights have not
been adopted into the literature of global administrative law 47 and global
43

“This states that the only context for the production of knowledge is the legal academia in the
North”; Ibid at 9.
44
“This indicates that all knowledge produced in the North is worthy of respect and recognition
per se, given the context from which it emerges”; Ibid at 10.
45
“This rule indicates that academics and legal institutions from the North are much better trained
to make effective and legitimate use of legal knowledge than academics and legal institutions
from the South”; Ibid at 11.
46
Jan Klabbers, “Setting the Scene” in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & Geir Ulfstein eds, The
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
47
In the context of global administrative law, the main interlocutors often cite to Bhupinder
Chinmni’s work on global administrative law. This reference simply acknowledges that there are
scholars like Chimni that challenge the central assertions of global administrative law from the
perspective of the Third World. For a recent example, see Richard B. Stewart, The normative
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constitutionalism. This critique is similar to the reflections of Richard Delgado in
1992 about civil rights scholarship. Delgado noted that an: “inner circle of twentysix scholars, all male and white, occupied the central arenas of civil rights
scholarship to the exclusion of contributions of minority scholars. When a
member of this inner circle wrote about civil rights issues he cited almost
exclusively to other members of the circle for support”. 48 Similarly in our
discussions about global administrative law and global constitutionalism, there is
a reluctance to even acknowledge the presence of Third World-based
scholarship.49
The final rule - effective operator - indicates that, when compared to their global
South counterparts, the institutions and the academic community of the global
North are much better equipped and trained to make use of legal knowledge.
The analysis provided in the first chapter on the history of international law and
its institutions is relevant in this instance. Experts in the international criminal law
context move quickly from one tribunal to another, taking with them their
particular sense of expertise.50 Their expertise and the institutions are evidence
of the Bonilla’s effective operator rule.

dimensions and performance of global administrative law" (2015) 13 (2) Intl J Constitutional L
499 at footnote 2.
48
Richard Delgado, “The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How To Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten
Years Later” (1992) 140 U Pa L Rev at 1352.
49
For a recent example, see Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters, Introduction: Towards A Global
History of International Law in Bardo Fassbender et al, eds, The Oxford Handbook of the History
of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 2.
50
See Chapter, section 1.4.1.2.
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In short, Bonilla’s work illustrates the current reality in legal theories about global
constitutionalism and global administrative law. This is specifically true in terms
of the argument that many fields of the global South academy tend to repurpose
original thinking from the global North.

Bonilla’s assertions are grounded in Comaroff and Comaroff’s claim that to
understand the history of the present vis-à-vis theories about constitutionalism
for example, both empirically and theoretically, we must study these phenomena
in the global South.51 This is predicated on two interrelated arguments. The first
is that the modernities of the global South are unique and must be understood on
their own terms. Second, the daily modalities of capitalism and globalisation are
experienced first in the global South. Thus, in order to understand the dynamics
of global governance we must turn to the global South as the harbinger of the
future.52 Bonilla’s arguments thus demonstrate the urgency in this endeavour by
illustrating the lack of self-awareness in literature from the global North about the
global South.

The merits of Bonilla’s claims can be examined through the different types of
legal norms, and the doctrines used to interpret these norms. Bonilla suggests
that these arguments and rules tend to obscure reality by hiding the diversity of

51

Comaroff & Comaroff, “Theory from the South” supra note 24 at 117; Comaroff & Comaroff,
Theory supra note 13 at 7.
52
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tendency to romantaise the experience of the global South.
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the global South’s legal communities, both in terms of knowledge that is
produced and the strength of the different academic communities located
therein. Fundamentally, the various arguments and their resulting rules
categorically ignore the rich and valuable theories and doctrines that are being
produced by the global South. Bonilla’s collection of essays ultimately seeks to
initiate a conversation about what we can learn from the global South. 53 I
highlighted some of the arguments from South Africa and Colombia in the global
constitutionalism chapter.

Bonilla’s contributions signify a number of important observations about global
administrative law and global constitutionalism, which I briefly raised earlier. The
first rule about the well of production is visible in the discussions on legitimacy of
international law and its institutions. Even though there are significant overtures
to include scholars from the global South (especially in terms of their physical
presence in edited collections, journal articles, and conferences54), the current
field of global governance theory vis-à-vis international law and its institutions
can be characterised as devoid of contextual analysis from the perspective of the
global South. 55 For example, there is an assumption that Northern scholars’
cursory top-down view of how international institutions operate may capture the
essence of how these international institutions actually function in their
53
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respective contexts, such as the ICTR’s operations in Arusha, Tanzania. This
analysis reinforces Bonilla’s positing that the “only context for the production of
knowledge is the legal academia in the North”. 56 By ignoring the relevant
discussions about the global South, including the critical insights of the subaltern
studies movement 57 and its progenies, 58 there is a reliance on the well of
production rule in global governance theories.59

The second and third rules - “protected designation of origin"60 and “effective
operator”61 - are very much present in our conversations about international law
and its institutions. We can broadly discern that there is a general emphasis that
Northern legal knowledge production is worthy of respect and recognition “per
se, given the context from which it emerges”.62 This can be illustrated by the
56
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Ranjit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, Delhi, 1983 & New edition: Durham: Duke University Press, 1999); Dipesh
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failures of global administrative lawyers and global constitutionalism scholars to
incorporate critical insights from and about the global South, as well as the
results of liberal legalism on the lived realities of the people of the global South.63

International criminal law scholarship provides further evidence of this omission.
With the advent of the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as the creation of different
international criminal institutions, English language international criminal law
literature has generally focussed on the dynamics of the field. In particular, this
literature has focussed on the dispensation of the anti-impunity agenda as
constructed in the West and popularised by international non-governmental
organisations. Scholars such as Anthony Anghie, Kamari Clarke, and Bhupinder
Chimni have sought to question the liberal legalism of international criminal
law.64

Clarke has recently argued that there is an overemphasis on the prosecution of
alleged war criminals.65 By reviewing the prosecution of Charles Taylor, the
former Liberian leader by Special Court of Sierra Leone, Clarke suggests that the
63

For a similar claim in the American domestic context, see Richard Delgado, "The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature" (1984) 132 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 561 at footnote 2.
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) [Clarke, Fictions of Justice]; Tim Kelsall, Culture
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focus on perpetrator responsibility elides and obfuscates the role of political
economy in how the Sierra Leonean conflict started. She is acutely aware of the
role of colonialism and the resource extraction industries in fuelling the conflict.
Similarly, Anghie and Chimni, as early as 2003, were critical of international
criminal justice. They argued that the shift to individual criminal responsibility and
the move away from national prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against
humanity would not be productive.66 But the anti-impunity agenda, as reflected
through the International Criminal Court’s prosecution policy, continues, ignorant
to these critical reflections.67

The above analysis suggests that there is a strong emphasis for a reorientation
towards the global South as a site of knowledge. In the next section, I focus on
TWAIL’s attempt to reorient its own field of inquiry.

5.2.2 Third World Approaches to International Law
TWAIL’s origins can be attributed to an emergence of both reactive and
proactive scholarships against the various colonial and imperial projects of
international law. The first ever TWAIL conference was organised at Harvard
Law School in 1997.68 The movement has grown since then, and now includes
scholars from diverse disciplines and locations. Accordingly, there have been a
66
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number of conferences, with the most recent taking place in 2015 in Cairo,
Egypt.

Given the origins of its first conference, TWAIL’s foundations are rooted in critical
scholarship, especially US legal realism, critical legal studies, feminism and
critical race theory. 69 TWAIL’s origins can also be located in postcolonial
theory.70 I note the controversy in tracing TWAIL’s origins to US-based legal
theory, but TWAIL scholars have alluded to this connection themselves. For
example, James Gathii, one of the graduate students who organised the first
conference, states:

In the spring of 1996, a group of Harvard Law School graduate
students initiated a series of meetings to figure out whether it was
feasible to have a third world approach to international law and what
the main concerns of such an approach might be. On Friday, April
26th, 1997 background papers were presented to the group by
Bhupinder Chimni who was a Visiting Fellow at the Graduate
Program at Harvard Law School in the 1995-1996 academic year
and myself.71
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5.2.2.1

Contemporary TWAIL

TWAIL can be characterised as an anti-hierarchical counter-hegemonic
coalitionary movement that is deeply suspicious of universal creeds and truths.72
It is anti-hierarchical because it challenges the Eurocentricity of the history of
international law and continued propagation of particular monolithic universal
values therein. These include, as demonstrated by this analysis in the previous
chapters, specific claims to global administrative law and global constitutionalism
as universal creeds. In a subversive turn, TWAIL scholars suggest a dialogic
maneuverer across cultures. TWAIL calls for the recognition of existing inequities
within the structures of international law. It also calls for the recognition of the
subaltern voices and demands that all voices be represented.73

Various scholarly views can be grouped under the TWAIL movement. The
movement’s unifying raison d’etre is to:

challenge the hegemony of the dominant narratives of international
law, in large part by teasing out encounters of difference along
many axes- race, class, gender, sex, ethnicity, economics, trade
etc. – and in inter-disciplinary ways – social, theoretical,
epistemological, ontological and so on.74
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By challenging these dominant narratives, TWAIL seeks to “reduce the distance
of the world of international law from the lives of ordinary peoples”.75

TWAIL scholars have identified two generational moments in the development of
TWAIL scholarship. 76 The first moment can be classified as the work of
international lawyers from the 1960s to 1980s. This is generally known as TWAIL
I scholarship. Even though these lawyers did not classify their scholarship as
such, and this type of classification is subject to some contestation, 77 early
TWAIL-minded scholars, such as Ram Prakash Anand, argued that international
law legitimised the subjugation of the Third World. Moreover it was argued that
the pre-colonial southern societies had a vernacular of international law prior to
the colonial encounter. 78 These scholars also recognised the impossibility of
rejecting international law by the newly independent states. More importantly this
group of scholars argued that the grammar of international law could be
transformed to accommodate the demands of the global South. They argued that
international law had the potential to be emancipatory and should be used as a
way to de-colonise the global South.79
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TWAIL II scholars, on the other hand, were much more theoretically attuned to
politics, economics, international relations, and other interdisciplinary insights.
They focussed on the relationship between law, markets, and society as a way to
track the influence of colonialism and imperialism. They articulated the following
powerful claim: “colonialism is central to the formation of international law”.80 This
observation focused their attention on the role of the civilising mission in recent
governance projects, such as the modern nation-state81.

TWAIL II is deeply critical of the contributions of their predecessors as evidenced
by the structuring of their arguments in direct opposition to TWAIL I. These
scholars are critical of the post-colonial state: “TWAIL II scholars have developed
powerful critiques of the Third World nation-state, of the processes of its
formation and its resort to violence and authoritarianism”.82 TWAIL scholars are
therefore interested in the lived realities of the people of the global South, and
not simply the formal equality ushered in by decolonisation. By honing in on lived
realities, these scholars continue to systematically decentre the grand narratives
that are embedded within multiple doctrines of international law and its more
recent progenies such as international rule of law, law and development, and
human rights.
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Makau W. Mutua formulated TWAIL II’s three central tenets in 2000.83 The first is
to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law as a
medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialised hierarchy of
international norms and institutions that sub-ordinate non-Europeans and
Europeans alike.84 The recent scholarship under the auspice of TWAIL II can be
grouped under these tenets. The previous chapters in this dissertation were
conceptualised and written in this tradition. The second component of TWAIL is
much more prescriptive in that it seeks to create alternative normative legal
edifices for international governance. This is what I hope to achieve in this
chapter. Third, through policy scholarship, TWAIL scholars aim to eradicate the
conditions of underdevelopment in the global South (through praxis for
example).85 This reformist agenda presents a natural opportunity for building
bridges between conceptions of global governance and critical insights about the
global South.

There are a number of scholars using the proscriptive elements of TWAIL. The
fundamental task of these scholars is to articulate the emancipatory ideals
housed in international law. These overtures are analogous to the arguments
deployed by TWAIL I scholars, who called for the emancipation of the former
colonies using international law.
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Nevertheless, these critical claims from these international law scholars have not
garnered much influence on substantive reforms or in theoretical debates. For
example, in the fields of international criminal law and transitional justice, TWAIL
scholars are quite active in describing the problematic nature of prosecutions of
international criminal institutions,86 polemics of transitional justice,87 or sole focus
of prosecution by the International Criminal Court in Africa.88 Such projects, while
worthwhile, reinforce the claim made in 1983 by the first Tanzanian President
Julius Nyerere that “[i]n international rule making, we [the Third World] are
recipients not participants”.89 Given the inequities perpetuated by the on-going
proselytisation of universal values, there is a need to interrupt this narrative and
reimagine a better future. This is a future that includes the various places and
peoples of the global South as both recipients and active participants in
international law and its theories.

Critics of TWAIL allude to its potential for nihilism.90 The charge of nihilism is
predicated on TWAIL scholars’ critical position towards international law. These
claims of nihilism ignore TWAIL’s reformist aims. It is precisely these neglected
reformist aims that I seek to position in conversations on theorising global
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governance. In this regard, analogous to the other disciplines and other fields of
law that I discussed earlier in this section, TWAIL too does call for a reorientation
towards the global South. The proscriptive elements housed within TWAIL are
part of this reorientation.

There is another line of criticism that has centred on the Marxist tradition. Robert
Knox, who works within the frame of TWAIL, argues that TWAIL scholarship is
wedded to liberal legalism.91 Using the idea of principled opportunism,92 Knox
suggests that TWAIL, and critical scholarship in general, must now rethink its
efforts to achieve systemic change. His fear is that by focusing on immediate
concerns, critical scholars lose track of the larger strategy. Scholars committed
to a better world end up confusing the current tactic for immediate gains with the
overall strategy of broader systemic change.93 Knox is absolutely correct in his
observation. This particular chapter is written in this tradition of trying to move
beyond the immediate tactics that Knox is critical of to one where we can
theorise global governance from the vantage point of the global South.

Having identified a various perspectives that argue in favour of a reorientation
towards the global South and setting out TWAIL’s foundational pillars, I will now
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elaborate on TWAIL’s prescriptive components as it relates to the question: how
can we learn from the global South in theorising global governance?

5.3 Resistance and Renewal: How to Learn from the Global South?
While current TWAIL literature can be broadly categorized as a form of
resistance, it is also important to note the calls for reform.94 As suggested earlier,
the first tenet of TWAIL is to deconstruct and unpack the existing hierarchies
within international law and its institutions. The current TWAIL II literature seeks
to challenge western universalism in particular. In the first chapter, I sought to
challenge the ideals encapsulated within international law and its institutions, in
particular international criminal justice by pointing to the manner in which
particular values are made to seem universal and how this affects the rights of
the accused.

A small number of contemporary academics are working on reformative projects
in TWAIL II. These projects seek to redeem international law’s promise. TWAIL’s
prescriptive elements are more prevalent in the writings of TWAIL I scholars
though. These writers sought to harness the emancipatory power and promise of
international law. Not entirely dissimilar to their predecessors, academics
working under the more contemporary umbrella of TWAIL II are not keen on
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eliminating international law either.95 Rather, these TWAIL II scholars argue for a
reconstruction of international law in a manner that reflects the concerns of the
global South.96

One such example is the scholarship of Balakrishan Rajagopal. Even though he
recognizes that such attempts may render minimal results,97 he suggests that it
is “legitimate to use international law as an explicit counter-hegemonic tool of
resistance”.98 The current TWAIL II scholarship is hopeful that international law
can realise its emancipatory potential. An illustration of this hopefulness is
apparent in Anghie’s writing:

I continue to hope, together with the many scholars who are working
to reconstruct international law precisely because of their
awareness of the many ways in which it has operated to exclude
and subordinate people on account of their gender, race and
poverty, that international law can be transformed into a means by
which the marginalized may be empowered. In short, that law can
play its ideal role in limiting and resisting power. At the very least, I
believe that the Third World cannot abandon international law
because law now plays such a vital role in the public realm in the
interpretation of virtually all international events.99
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Even though the hopefulness expressed by Anghie and other TWAIL scholars
has been the subject of a recent debate,100 it is certain that there are at least two
prospective prescriptive claims that we can discern in answering the question of
how can we learn from the global South in theorising global governance.

The first claim, forged as a response to TWAIL’s flirtations with monism, is to
take stock of international law as a field of practice and to expand ethnographic
research that is committed to a TWAIL-based ideology. Here the argument
centres on the potential use of ethnography as a means to study the field of
international law from the perspective of the global South and to provide insights
into how global governance mechanisms affect the daily lived realities of the
people of the global South.101

The second centres on the duty of international lawyers and international law
scholars to contend with the material reality of the global South. In this section I
argue that as intellectuals, they have an ethical responsibility to articulate
100
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accurate portrayals of global governance initiatives and its effects on the lives of
the people of the global South.
5..3.1 International Law as Field of Practice
Some writers believe that while TWAIL scholars engage in thoughtful political
arguments that lead them to the edge of the abyss, they are nonetheless unable
to go beyond the precipice because they are wedded to monist understandings
of law.102 Monism is the belief that international law, made through international
relations, must be brought home through sovereign enactment by way of
domestic governments. Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja make the following
argument:
TWAIL scholarship gestures toward the idea that what gives
international law its emancipatory appeal is its promise of
universality as such. Such a promise of universalism is quite
different from international law’s usually formal claims to
universality, which are in themselves, as TWAIL scholars have
argued, the carriers of specific particularities. Because of this
recognition or in some cases, intuition, most TWAIL scholars
eschew attempts to re-establish a putatively genuine universality.
Such an attempt would be to engage in a neo-Kantian enterprise of
finding a new, genuinely universal ground for law. TWAIL’s concern
for history has shown us repeatedly that these ostensibly genuine
universals invariably end up elevating a particular meaning to the
universal, thus enacting a familiar mode of power”.103
Eslava and Pahuja’s intervention signals a warning to TWAIL’s reformist agenda.
What we can gather from their analysis is rather prescriptive. They hint that
TWAIL’s political project calls for the recognition of a universality. To them, it is a
normative conception of international law’s promise of universalism and they see
102
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it as being “quasi-transcendent”.104 There is no material reality at the moment in
which to achieve emancipation as a result of TWAIL’s criticisms. Such
recognition gives way to the potential of plurality. In effect, they posit a moving
away from monist conceptions of international law to one that envisions
international law as domain of practice.105

In this imagining, we are able to rely on international law’s specific procedures,
“artefacts and forms of being that operate at the mundane and quotidian level
and that tie together a vast raft of heterogeneous phenomena in a specific kind
of way”.106 TWAIL’s body of scholarship has already identified political, cultural
and economic biases buried deep within the structure of international law. Eslava
and Pahuja’s approach would shine a light on how these embedded vernaculars
affect day-to-day lives of those that must confront the effects of international
law.107

Taking our cue from Obiora Okafor’s position that TWAIL is a theory and
method, this proposal seriously pushes for a methodological shift, analogous to a
104
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call to arms. 108 This call demands TWAIL “build explicitly on the legalethnographic method currently being applied explicitly in international sites and
artefacts such as international criminal courtrooms or international NGOs”.109
Eslava and Pahuja call for an ethos of ethnography as TWAIL’s new unexplored
frontier in which scholarship seeks to identify embedded biases in multiple
registers.

Ethnography as a field of study is intricately connected to social sciences like
anthropology and sociology. It is a method of study deployed by social scientists,
including legal scholars. It is generally understood as the study of people in
“naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by methods of data collection which
capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher
participating directly in the setting”. 110 The purpose is to collect data in a
systematic fashion without externally imposing meaning.111

Ethnography has evolved over the years. At its inception, it was the handmaiden
of colonialism and imperialism.112 It was used as a means to track and study the
indigenous populations of the newly discovered world by the various colonisers.
This field of study has evolved, integrating insights from various disciplines and
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theoretical positions, including postmodernism and postcolonialism.

113

In

particular, there is a burgeoning sub-field of critical ethnography that focuses on
power relations and effective systemic changes “toward greater freedom and
equity”.114

Most recently, Mohawk scholar Audra Simpson has added another layer to the
discussions about ethnography that is premised on the politics of refusal. This is
important in thinking about ethnography as potential tool in learning how to
theorise global governance from the perspective of the global South. Simpson
coins her intervention the “cartography of refusal,” which requires an
acknowledgment of the role of ethnography in constructing and defining
indigenous groups and their politics.115 In describing this refusal, Simpson notes:
These conditions have led to this book as an ethnography that
pivots upon refusal(s). I am interested in the larger picture, the
discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously
historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in
which Kahnawa'kehró:non had refused the authority of the state at
almost every turn and in doing so instantiated a different political
authority. […]
There is no place in the existing literature for these articulations; nor
is there now a neat placement for them within postcolonial studies
or analysis. Kahnawa'kehró:non were not free from occupation,
which naturalized as immigration, as multiculturalism, and was and
is a legalized, settler occupation of the territory that they claim. Thus
there was no doubleness to their political consciousness, a still113
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colonial but striving-to-be “postcolonial consciousness,” that denied
the modern self, which Frantz Fanon, Homi Bhabha, and Anthony
Giddens speak of and from […]. Here I want to push “turning away”
into the ambit of refusal - of simply refusing the gaze of
disengagement - and to the possibilities that this structures: subject
formation, but also politics and resurgent histories. In my
ethnographic work I was deeply mindful of the range of possibilities
available for political life, for identification and identity within and
against recognition, all instantiated in refusals. There seemed,
rather, to be a trippleness, a quadrupleness to consciousness and
an endless play, and it something like this: I am me, I am what you
think I am, I am who this person to the right of me thinks I am, and
you are all full of shit, and them maybe I will tell you to your face
and let me tell you who you are”.116
This new layer adds further nuance to the study of ethnography. This layer holds
a significant amount of potential for future TWAIL-based ethnographies about the
material reality of the people of the global South. Simpson thus posits the idea of
using ethnography as both a form of resistance and as a tool of emancipation.

The turn to empiricism in law can be traced back to the early 1900s,117 and in
particular to two legal theories: legal pluralism and American legal realism. This
empirical turn greatly influenced scholarship of the legal pluralist in the 1960s.
Social scientists, especially anthropologists, sociologists and others, have
additionally contributed to our understanding of law from varying disciplines
utilising different methods. Legal pluralism can be traced back to the early 19th
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and 20th century. 118 In the late 20th century, legal anthropologists set out to
document how multiple legal spaces co-existed and how ‘semi-autonomous’
fields of norms (whether formal or informal) influenced each other. In
documenting various legal spaces, scholars had to deploy various social science
tools, in particular ethnography.

In her now classic text, based on fieldwork in Africa and informal discussion with
workers in the garment industry in New York, Sally Falk More examined how
external law and internal norms regulate group behaviour amongst the Chagga
and New York City garment workers.119 The formal legal structures coexist along
with the internal norms. Furthermore, the internal norms of each community are
self-regulating and formal laws are invoked when individuals within the social
field decide to gain access to the law such as reporting bribes. This perspective
can be seen as a novel approach to formal and informal law in society. Formal
law is subject to, and contingent upon, the informal norms of the particular
community. These informal norms, therefore, have a greater organizing effect
than the formal structure of law. Thus, by studying the way in which groups
navigate the terrain of law and non-law, we are able to understand how
communities interact with state power.
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This turn to empiricism is also part of the American legal realist critique. It was
inspired by Oliver Wendell Holmes’ canonical Path of Law, which sought to
question established and traditional understandings of law. 120 Legal realist
scholars, such as Holmes and Wesley Hohfeld, were struck by the formal
structures of law and they sought to question its very foundation. 121 More
contemporary versions of the realist critique have emerged, the latest incarnation
being new legal realism; its aim is to provide a counter narrative to law and
economics and new formalism.

New legal realists, similar to the legal realist of the 1900s, have attempted to
provide an account of decision-making, conceptions of the state, and individuals,
and to a large extent legal scholarship.122 New legal realists are concerned with
inequality at the broader level, and thus they seek to expose power and
distributive conflicts in law through empiricism or as some have characterised as
the continual reminder of the need to include the bottom.123

We must return to Eslava and Pahuja’s suggestion for further empirical and
ethnographic scholarship with an understanding that this field of study is
multifaceted with its own boundaries. More importantly, the call for ethnographic
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research and empirical studies is not new as I have detailed above. Rather it is
part of a rich history in interrogations imbedded in critical approaches to law.
Earlier chapters in my analysis relied on anthropological, ethnographic and
empirical research from the international criminal institutions to provide the
narratives of resistance.124 The move towards ethnographies from the global
South as a means to theorise global governance continues quite simply to be
within the confines of the first central tenets of TWAIL. Yet it does offer us the
potential to map out the existing material reality relying on data collected based
on observations. These observations can capture the social meanings of
everyday occurrences in international law and its institutions. There are a handful
of examples of scholars who have provided such analysis.125 Luis Eslava has
undertaken an ethnographic analysis of international development policies in
changing the internal dynamics of Bogota, Columbia.126 But we need more such
scholarship, especially as it relates to lived realities of the people of the global
South and how global governance mechanisms affect their daily lives.

Conducting ethnographic work is complicated. In theorising global governance
from the perspective of the global South, we must contend with the complications
124
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that arise out of ethnographic research. We are well served to take account of
Audra Simpson’s warnings. Taking stock of the work of critical ethnographers
and the interventions by Simpson, there is a need to engage in this type of
scholarship with a commitment to the politics of the global South. Much more
importantly, in undertaking this type of work, scholars must engage with the
politics of recognition and the politics of refusal.127 The politics of recognition
centre on the possibility of engaging the contemporary legal orders as a means
to make material changes outside the confines of liberalism.128 The politics of
refusal is centred on the material reality that current legal structures will not yield
any such possibilities. Emancipation is not possible through international law.
What is important about this type of scholarship is that it demonstrates it is
possible to live and resist in this world without engaging. In this instance, there
are various possibilities of that are part and parcel of this research agenda. For
example, does the Palestinian Boycott Divestment and Sanctions Movement
represent as an aspect of the politics of refusal? Or are there other alternatives
that are predicated on much more closer reading of Simpson’s politics of refusal
in the international law context?

What we can learn from Eslava and Pahuja’s articulation of international law as
practice is the need to examine the broader context in which international law
and international institutions function. Analogous to the discussion about the bias
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of judges in the ICTR in the previous chapters, it is necessary to be attuned to
the socio-political, cultural and economic factors that surround the examples that
are used to denote the legitimacy of international law and its institutions. The
exercise of thinking about international law and its institutions as a field of
practice shifts our perspective away from one centred on legal mechanisms. By
repositioning our attention to the realm of practice, we are able to take note of
divergent factors that shape the operationalisation of international norms on the
ground, or where the rubber of global governance hits the road.129

5.3.2 International Lawyers, International Law Scholars and Ethics
What Lassa Oppenheim suggested in 1908 – that international lawyers should
plough their fields – is still very relevant today.130 When writing about global
constitutionalism, global administrative law, public international law, and global
governance, international lawyers and international law scholars often craft the
territorial boundaries of their respective subfields. For example, scholars such as
Cherif Bassiouni and others have helped define the field of international criminal
law. These practical implications about the very nature of international legal
practice are analogous to, and bound up in, concerns that domestic legal
professional regulatory bodies and domestic practitioners often grapple with.131
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These implications centre on such questions as: what is the role of the
international lawyer and international law scholars in contemporary society?
What are the professional responsibilities and obligations of international lawyers
to their clients, and much more importantly, who exactly is their client? What is
the significance of the international lawyer or international law scholar’s
understanding of context in delivering opinion (for example do they have
competent understanding of Rwandan history or Yugoslavian politics)? I argue
that it is important for international lawyers and international law scholars to take
stock of the material and lived realities of the global South. It is their duty as
intellectuals to portray events in a broader context, depicting and talking about
various portions of people that may be differently affected by the manner in
which international law and its institutions function.

In national jurisdictions, various legal professions regulate the provision of legal
services. In the global South, legal transplants have ushered in professional
bodies that are similar to their former colonial masters.132 As seen in Sri Lanka,
the legal profession is regulated by a law society that functions akin to those
found in the United Kingdom, Canada and the rest of the commonwealth.
Domestic practitioners must adopt a specific attitude in how they behave with
their clients.133 Domestic lawyers, depending on their respective jurisdictions, are
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heavily regulated through the respective rules of conduct by their professional
bar. A lawyer’s professional license is contingent upon ethical behaviour towards
the client, the court, the legal community, and the general public.

In the international context, there is no such governing regulatory framework.
James Crawford thus suggests the following: “There is clearly no international
law bar comparable to domestic bars – there are no qualifications which
someone must attain before appearing before international courts and tribunals,
no international code of ethics with which they must comply, and no international
association to sanction them for misconduct”.134 There is only a fragmented set
of rules that apply to advocates and counsels before the International Criminal
Court, the ad hoc tribunals and other such organisations.135 Without reinforcing
the liberal legalism imbedded within these professional regulatory regimes136, the
questions that fuel this discussion are, to what extent should international
lawyers take note of the global South and its material reality, and do they even
have an obligation to do so? Questions such as these underscore the
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responsibility of the international lawyers and international scholars in a
regulatory space devoid of formal regulation.137

Before delving into a potential answer, it is important to note the overlap between
international lawyers and international law scholars. Throughout this analysis, I
have referred to a number of academics who are both international lawyers and
international law scholars. James Crawford is a good example. He is an
established academic with a long history of teaching in Australia, the United
Kingdom, and other countries. Crawford is also an established international
lawyer. He was counsel in a number of leading international law cases before the
International Court of Justice. 138 Crawford was recently appointed to the
International Court of Justice. In a similar vein, a number of scholars have
demonstrated the connections between the role of specific international lawyers
and the development of international law (M. Cherif Bassiouni is a good
example). 139 Thus, given the fragmented nature of the various standards of
conduct and the various roles performed by international lawyers and
international law scholars, it may be more useful to think of these individuals,
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given their overlapping functions, as intellectuals engaged in praxis of
international law.

Various writers have theorised the role of intellectuals in our modern society.140
Edward Said’s contributions are especially significant. Said states: “the principal
intellectual duty is the search for relative independence from such [societal]
pressures. Hence my characterizations of the intellectual as exile and marginal,
as amateur, and as the author of a language that tries to speak the truth to
power”.141

The latter point is of particular importance in answering the question: to what
extent should international lawyers and international law scholars take note of
the global South and its material reality? It is important because international
lawyers and international law scholars, as intellectuals, are constantly imbricated
in the milieus of power and authority that shape the lived realities of the people of
the global south. Said suggests that intellectuals should move away from specific
specialisation (or as he coins it professionalisation) to the much more accessible
attitude of an amateur:

I have already suggested that as a way of maintaining relative
intellectual independence, having the attitude of an amateur instead
140
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of a professional is a better course. But let me be practical and
personal for a moment. In the first place amateurism means
choosing the risks and uncertain results of the public sphere - a
lecture or a book or an article in wide and unrestricted circulationover the insider space controlled by experts and professionals.
Several times over the past two years I have been asked by the
media to be a paid consultant. This I have refused to do, simply
because it meant being confined to one television station or journal,
and confined also to the going political language and conceptual
framework of that outlet. Similarly I have never had any interest in
paid consultancies to or for the government, where you would have
no idea of what use your ideas might later be put to. Secondly,
delivering knowledge directly for a fee is very different if, on the one
hand, a university asks you to give a public lecture or if, on the
other, you are asked to speak only to a small and closed circle of
officials. That seems very obvious to me, so I have always
welcomed university lectures and always turned down the others.
And, thirdly, to get more political, whenever I have been asked for
help by a Palestinian group, or by a South African university to visit
and to speak against apartheid and for academic freedom, I have
routinely accepted.
[…]
But what are these amateur forays into the public sphere really
about? Is the intellectual galvanized into intellectual action by
primordial, local, instinctive loyalties one's race, or people, or
religion -or is there some more universal and rational set of
principles that can and perhaps do govern how one speaks and
writes? In effect I am asking the basic question for the intellectual:
how does one speak the truth? What truth? For whom and where?
Unfortunately we must begin to respond by saying that there is no
system or method that is broad and certain enough to provide the
intellectual with direct answers to these questions.142
In asking these questions, Said helps us move away from understanding
international lawyers and international law scholars as specialised professionals
embarking on their duties by ploughing their respective fields. Rather, Said
forces us to ponder on the material reality of the work that international lawyers
142
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and international law scholars undertake in shaping and writing their fields. Thus
in effect, this forces us to come face to face with those that are directly affected
by the laws and polices that is shaped and created by intellectuals working with
international law.

Recently, Chimni captured one of the central concerns of TWAIL as part of its
reformist agenda: “Is human emancipation and environmental protection possible
by altering the material structures or does it require an “evolved ethical and
spiritual self”?143 He thus enquires about the role of international lawyers (and
international law scholars) in thinking and bringing about equitable relations
between and amongst nations states and those that live in these constructed
boundaries. The rationale for his newfound search for answers is rooted in the
following:

The absence of a self that is rooted in duties to strive for selfknowledge and promote the global common good is based on an
excessive faith in the idea of restructuring international laws and
institutions for creating a humane world. However, by facilitating
accelerated capitalist globalization these laws and institutions
continue to marginalize subaltern classes and nations and entrench
in multifarious ways a singular conception of good life that is
inhospitable to the idea of an ethical and spiritual self. In other
words, the present day accent on reconfiguring international law
and institutions has not produced an adequate focus either on deep
structures of global capitalism or on the ethical and spiritual self,
embedded in the notion of duty to humanity […].144
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In trying to respond to these important questions, Chimni acknowledges that the
Marxist tradition, which he has relied on to deliver his TWAIL-based arguments
against international law, is not useful in providing adequate insights for reform.
This is especially the case because of the “uneasy experience of actually
existing socialism” that we experienced over the years that is rooted in
“philosophy of militant materialism as a basis for building a world that expands
the realm of human freedom”.145

Chimni subsequently turns to Gandhi’s 1904 Hind Swaraj to find inspiration for
some of the central organising problématiques embedded in TWAIL. The
rationale for this choice is based on the relationship that Gandhi constructs
between the self and social transformation as a critique of modern civilisation.
Building on Hind Swaraj, Chimni seeks to address Marxism’s failings by clarifying
the need to be simultaneously “attentive to material structures and to work on the
self”.146 He proposes a number of critical observations that attempt to fill these
gaps. By drawing directly from Gandhi, Chimni maps out a number of significant
proposals about the state, the grounds for obedience to laws, the understanding
of the legal profession and passive resistance. 147 By reflecting on these
important factors, Chimni reveals glimpses into alternative global futures, the

145

Ibid at 1160.
Ibid at 1163
147
Ibid at 1167.
146

298

means by which we can create a better world, and locate the role of international
law and international lawyers in that process.148

In this regard, I want to hone in on one of the central themes that Chimni
identifies in creating a better world - the function and role of international lawyers
and by extension international law scholars. Focusing on this proposal about
international lawyers and international law scholars opens up new vistas in
imaging various futures from the perspectives of the global South.

Gandhi’s criticisms about the legal profession were based on the role of the
courts and lawyers in maintaining and sustaining the colonial rule and the
oppression of the people of the global South. Gandhi’s cynicism about the legal
profession was precipitated by the disparity between the colonised and
colonisers, and the resulting unequal treatment between the European right
bearers and Non-Europeans without rights. His cynical views extended further to
the belief that the legal profession teaches immorality because lawyers benefit
from conflicts that they seek to mediate. Chimni explicates some of these
implications for international lawyers and international law scholars with the
following:

In my view Gandhi’s critique of the legal profession raises crucial
issues with respect to the responsibility of international lawyers. I
will flag some of them. The first matter relates to the role of the legal
adviser to governments. In giving advice should legal advisers
148
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privilege truth, read as the global common good and our common
humanity, over perceived national interests? Should a legal adviser
do a Gandhi to his client if truth were not spoken with regard to the
material facts in issue? Secondly, should international lawyers
charge exorbitant fees even when that prevents poor individuals
and nations from seeking justice? Thirdly, are international lawyers
willing to assume personal responsibility for particular
interpretations of international law with troubling outcomes for
subaltern groups and peoples in the world? Can the ethical self use
the legal form as a shield to deflect criticisms? Finally, does a
shadow fall between the ideals that often inform the writings of
international lawyers and their practices in their professional lives?
An example of the latter is the jostling for power and positions in
universities and professional bodies. The shadow between
aspiration and practice is not unique to any profession or vocation.
In many ways it represents mundane reality. The point is that
modern professions are subject to an inner dynamic that occludes
reaction on the ethical self. What we can learn from Gandhi is that
in a very profound sense (to invert Ludwig Wittgenstein) deeds are
words.149
It is imperative that those making legal decisions about the very nature of
particular regimes become aware of the lived reality of the global South and the
dynamics that spur on international law and its institutions. The UN SecretaryGeneral’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (March 2011)
recommendation for the establishment of an “independent international
mechanism” is illustrative.150 Were the drafters of this recommendation151 aware
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of the serious problems with the role of the judiciary in amending the rules or
serious concerns over witnesses and the rights of the accused within the current
international ad hoc tribunals? Did they pay close attention to the manner in
which witness testimony is elicited before the international criminal tribunals? Put
differently, why did the UN Panel of Experts recommend the creation of an
international mechanism when they should have known about the problems
international criminal institutions are facing? Unpacking the rationale for these
questions is another project.152

International lawyers and scholars have an ethical obligation to relay their claims
to actual evidence from the ground (based on ethnographic research), rather
than relying on antiquated notions about the very nature of law and our society.
Such a reflection takes us back full circle to Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff’s
Theory from The South and their central intervention. Their thesis is that
contemporary actors, norms and processes are reconfiguring our understandings
of the core-and-periphery. 153 Thus to grasp the history of the present, both
empirically and theoretically, we must study the global South.154
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5.4

Conclusion

In preceding chapters, I took two ad hoc international criminal institutions and the
International Criminal Court as case studies to demonstrate the deeply
ahistorical and contradictory nature of global constitutionalism and global
administrative

law.

Broad

and

general

claims

to

administration

or

constitutionalism as forms of global governance are problematic, because of the
inherent structural bias built into the international system and the indeterminacy
of liberal legalism. In this chapter, I relied on interdisciplinary insights and TWAIL
to address current gaps in international law, its institutions, and global
governance theories. This chapter was organised around two specific questions:
should we learn from the global South in theorising global governance; and how
can we learn from the global South in theorising global governance.

In answering the first question, I relied on interdisciplinary scholarship and
scholars working under the moniker of TWAIL to suggest that this question has
already been answered.

In answering the question how can we learn from the global South, I advanced
two arguments. First, I argued that international law and its institutions are
mediated, moulded, and mitigated by multiple political and material forces.
Theories of global governance thus should take these factors into account by
thinking about international law and its institutions as a field of practice. Doing so
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invites a realisation that there is a need for further investigation of on-the-ground
realities and effects of global governance. This, in turn means that we need
much more robust ethnographic research, which can better chronicle the effects
of global governance on the people of the global South.

Similarly, my second argument sought to locate the role of the international law
scholar and international lawyer in this exercise of contending with the lived
realities of the global South. I argued that international lawyers and international
law scholars as intellectuals have a duty to transform and improve the material
reality of the people of the global South.
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Conclusion: Theorising from Below
International law and international institutions are intimately involved in the lives
of the people of the global South. Yet theories of global governance, global
constitutionalism, and global administrative law in particular, ignore the
significant importance of the global South in our global order. In the forgoing
analysis,

two

central

arguments

were

pursued:

First,

both

global

constitutionalism and global administrative law, as theories of global governance,
ignore colonial history of international law and the on-going significance of this
lineage. Second, as a means to transcend these limitations of global
governance, I articulated a modest proposal of engagement to link global
governance with the global South and its respective literature.

The first four chapters in this analysis focused on the first question and identified
the problems with global constitutionalism and global administrative law. The
final chapter sought to address ways by which we can build bridges between the
existing literature on the global South and global governance. Fundamentally, I
have argued that the manner in which we theorise global governance is wrong
as it ignores the colonial past of international law and the ensuing repercussions
are side-lined. This occurs because of our inability to contend with the lived
realities of the global South and the proselytisation of western normativity.
Second, and as a result of this omission, international lawyers and international
law scholars must engage with the global South by asking how can we learn
from this material space.
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Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic state: “legal storytelling movement urges
black and brown writers to recount their experiences with racism and the legal
system and to apply their own unique perspectives to assess law’s master
narratives”.1 Scholars use critical race theory’s method of personal stories and
narratives to describe, understand, and theorise their subject position vis-à-vis its
field of study.2 They use this method as a means to transgress law’s formalism
and capture their own particular voice as form of resistance. Situated scholarship
is an offshoot of storytelling employed by critical race scholars.

In developing their method of analysis, critical race scholars have posited that to
analyse and challenge power-laden beliefs, it is possible, if not necessary to
“employ counter stories, parables, chronicles, and anecdotes aimed at revealing
their contingency, cruelty, and self-serving nature”.3 This type of analysis is novel
for international lawyers and international law scholars. In particular, there is a
controversy in international legal thinking about objectivity, neutrality and subject
position.4

In this vein, my arrival to this project has been shaped by my own personal
experience with international law and international criminal law. My interest in
1
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international law and international criminal in particular stem from my own
personal history and my situatedness in the geo-politics of the global South.
Undoubtedly, my experiences as a refugee fleeing war affected Sri Lanka in the
1980s is one of the motivators for my keen interest in, and continued faith in,
international law. This experience has incubated a firm belief in the potential to
secure some form of accountability for the countless victims. I am related to,
friends with, or had the honour of working alongside some of these victims.

In this vein, I draw inspiration from my experience of working with nongovernmental organisations in Sri Lanka and Palestine, and the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. By working in institutions located in
areas of acute conflict and with an international appeals court tasked with
adjudicating human suffering have undoubtedly shaped my understanding, faith
and subsequent disenchantment with international law and its institutions.

In early 1999, I was part of a Sri Lankan led initiative to document war crimes
and crimes against humanity in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the
country. As part of Australian Government funded project, we embarked on
tracking and monitoring human rights violations perpetrated by both parties to
the conflict. The fundamental purpose of the project was to determine who did
what to whom as a means to ensure some form of accountability was possible
for the victims. The evidence collected over a span of 10 years remains unused,
stored away in boxes in Colombo Sri Lanka, waiting to tell the stories of the
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victims. Some of these materials did eventually make their way to the UN
Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka, but that report too is
collecting virtual dust in the annals of the internet.

Similarly, while working in Palestine for a Palestinian non-governmental
organisation, I helped author affidavits from victims in the West Bank that were
submitted to the international inquiry lead by Richard Goldstone in Gaza (20082009). It was by working in these spaces that I noticed an undeniable belief in
international law and its institutions’ potential to change the material reality of the
people of the global South. The superhuman amounts of energy and time spent
in engaging with international agencies as a strategy to end impunity cannot be
measured. All of this to say that there was, and continues to be, a sense of
hopefulness in pushing for the recognition of the rights of victims. There is a
fundamental belief in the potential of law, especially international law. Patricia
Williams has characterised this belief (vis-a-vis rights) as: “Rights” [international
law, international criminal law etc] feels new in the mouths of black people. It is
still deliciously empowering to say. It is the magic wand of visibility and
invisibility, of inclusion and exclusion, of power and no power”.5

While in graduate school at York University, I spent six months working for Judge
Agius of the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chamber. Even though I cannot disclose
the intricate details of what I saw and touched, I can speak to a sense of loss
5
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307

that I felt as I left the institution after six months. Elena Baylis and Janet Halley
have theorised elements of this encounter.6 There is a sharp distinction between
my experiences of working in these two specific places - Sri Lanka and Palestine
- in the global South and my experience of working as professional within the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR. The latter experience is one of
disappointment, not of hope. The drastic regulatory capture by a universalistic
ethos of ending impunity without much attention to the procedures and practices
of the tribunals is unfortunate. This is a missed opportunity.

These

experiences

have

fundamentally

shaped

my

understanding

of

international law and its institutions. My legal experience working for Judge Agius
in the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda7, my practical legal
experience working with non-governmental organisations and clients in the
global South (Sri Lanka and Palestine) and my subject position (as a queer Tamil
refugee) have shaped the conceptualisation of this research project. Ultimately I
have attempted to weave in my personal encounter with harnessing the potential
power of international law while working in the global South with the
disappointment of perpetuating universalism through international criminal
institutions through the questions I have answered in this project. In particular, by
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focusing on the theories of global governance, I identified some of the inherent
problems with the manner in which our international criminal organisations were
formulated. Moreover, I was hopeful that by centring my critique of the theories
of global governance, we might be able to learn from the global South in the
future as we continue to regulate internationally.

In this context, this analysis has sought to achieve two objectives. First, it sought
to challenge the false universalisms in global governance theories. My analysis
in the first chapter identified a specific trend in international law and its
institutions theorised by Antony Anghie as the dynamic of difference. This
dynamic characterises how the western particular has become universalised
through international law and its institutions. Moreover, this trend continues
unabated. More specifically, the demarcation of one culture as barbaric and
another as civilised fosters international law’s authority to regulate various
diverse forms of relationships. By framing one culture (the different people of the
global South) as inferior and the western as superior creates the mechanism by
which we can transcend this difference and apply universal western conceptions
of law. I chronicled this feature of international law and international institutions
and focused on the newly minted international criminal institutions ushered in to
end impunity in the Cold War’s wake.

By providing the empirical evidence from these institutions, this analysis
challenged current theories of constitutionalism, constitutionalisation and
administration in global governance. These pages presented the argument that
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these theories mischaracterise how international institutions function because
they ignore international law’s colonial past and this past’s enduring legacy of
exclusion as witnessed in how these institutions function today. Then I turned to
my second question that focused on transcending the limitations of global
governance theories. In this respect, I asked how can we learn from the global
South?

In coming to these conclusions there are two themes that are poignant.
International law’s past has a way of catching up to its present and its future. I
have chronicled this via the international criminal justice regimes. Second,
international law is a construct and a tool, the experts and professionals driving
this process of instrumentalisation matter. With the reference to the first theme,
as we have seen from the manner in which these international institutions
operate and how they are unable to grapple with distinct local witnesses. Their
modus operandi is premised on western values and culture, which are
subsequently unable to understand the local witnesses. Second, the people
populating these institutions also matter. International criminal institutions are
operationalised by a specific class of experts that seem to ignore the real
problems of translation, rights of the accused and other similar issues.
Connectedly, the same experts then theorise global governance using models
inspired by domestic law that are unable to grapple with the difficulties endemic
in international law.
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There is much work to be done. Much more robust ethnographies focusing on
the various global governance institutions and their relationship to the global
South are urgently needed. For example, within the field of international criminal
law, there is a need to trace how local officials in countries like Sri Lanka handle
transitional justice questions. How judges and advocates before the local courts
conceptualise and reason transitional justice in both public and private law
matters. By thinking about the local responses to transitional justice, a much
more robust international understanding can be developed.

What would global governance from the global South entail? What does
constitutionalism of the South look like? What are its possible features? Why is
this a viable project? Should scholars and practitioners engage in this type of
theorising?

These questions highlight the need for a theoretical foundation and an
increasingly nuanced understanding of how international law and its institutions
are functioning. By building bridges between theory and practice, between the
global South and global governance, we ensure that international law,
international institutions and global governance can generate some form of
emancipation

for

the

people

of

the

global

South.
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